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ART. I.—MALACHI.

SECTION III, CHAP. ii, 17—iii, 6.

The coming of Christ and the Forerunner.

- ii, 17. "Ye weary Jehovah with your words. And ye say, 'Wherein do we weary him?' In your saying, 'Every one who does evil is good in the eyes of Jehovah, and in them he delights;' or, 'Where is the God of judgment?'"
- iii, 1. "Behold, I send my messenger, and he shall prepare a way before me, and suddenly there shall come to his temple the Lord, whom ye are seeking, and the messenger of the covenant for whom ye are longing.
2. Behold he shall come, saith Jehovah of hosts. And who shall endure the day of his coming? And who shall stand in his appearing? For he
3. shall be as a refiner's fire, and as a fuller's soap. And he shall sit, refining and purifying the silver, and shall purify the sons of Levi, and refine them, as gold and as silver, and they shall be Jehovah's, offering sacrifice
4. in righteousness. And grateful to Jehovah shall be the sacrificial offering of Judah and Jerusalem, as in the days of old, and as in the years of the
5. past. And I draw near to you for judgment, and I will be a swift witness against the sorcerers, and the adulterers, and those who swear to a falsehood, and those who defraud the hireling of his wages, and the widow, and the orphan, and those who oppress the stranger, and who fear not
6. me, saith Jehovah of hosts. For I am Jehovah, I change not, and you (*therefore*) sons of Jacob are not consumed."

Chap. ii, 17. Here opens another count in this solemn indictment, the charge of an Epicurean scepticism, or a denial of the providence of God in human affairs, so far, at least, as their own condition was concerned.

There is no attribute of God more wonderful than his long-suffering. It has borne with a sinful world for six thousand years, with unwearied patience, and is even now waiting to be gracious. Hence when we read, as we do in this verse, that this attribute is exhausted, we infer that the wickedness which possessed such power as this, must have been very flagrant. What then is this enormity? Not

murder, or lust, or any of the most atrocious crimes of the human standard of guilt, but the abuse of the long-suffering itself as an indication that God was indifferent to sin. To pervert this very kindness into a pretext for so blasphemous a thought exhausted the kindness itself, and extorted from the prophet the indignant accusation, "Ye weary Jehovah with your words." The extent of their depravity is evinced by the mode in which this charge was met. It was not met with penitent regret, or even silence, but with the insolent challenge, "Wherein do we weary him?" What have we done so much worse than others that God charges us with wearying him? The prophet replies, that it was in saying that either God loved evil-doers, or there was no directing hand of a righteous God in the affairs of men.

The cause of this ungodly challenging of Divine Providence lay in the existing circumstances of the Jews. After they returned from the captivity, they continued, in spite of the efforts of Haggai and Zechariah, to neglect the more important duties of religion, while they discharged other lesser ones with superstitious punctiliousness. Because of the discharge of these minor duties, they conceived God as laid under obligation to prosper them. But because of the neglect of the higher duties God did not prosper them, even as much as surrounding heathen nations were prospered. Instead, however, of inferring that their peculiar privileges above the heathen brought after them peculiar guilt in the neglect of these privileges, and demanded peculiar punishment, they looked only at the few points of their obedience, and inferred that they were unjustly dealt with in not being rewarded for them. They therefore came to the monstrous conclusion, that either God loved and rewarded the evil-doer, like the surrounding heathen; or if not, "Where is the God of judgment?" Where is the proof that there is any directing hand of God in human affairs? Either there is no providence, or it favours the wicked. Hence they longed for the coming of that Messiah whom the prophets had promised, and whose coming was to bless the chosen people; supposing that when he came all these apparent anomalies would be rectified, and prosperity return to Israel. These delusions are corrected in the remainder of the section, when it is shown that this Messiah shall come; but his coming, so far from bestowing reward upon them in their sins, would only hasten their punishment, and bring about that final rejection which should scatter them like autumn leaves, all over the earth. The state of mind, therefore, which the prophet addresses, is not that of scepticism as to the ultimate coming of Messiah, as interpreters generally assume; but false views as to the

purpose and result of that coming. This is proved by chap. iii, 1, where they are said to be "seeking" him, and "longing" for his advent, not doubting it. It was not doubt about his coming, but delusion that he would correct. "He shall come as you expect, but not with the results that you expect." Such is so clearly the drift of the passage, that it is surprising that the other view should have obtained such universal prevalence.

Chap. iii, 1. In regard to this important verse several questions arise. Who is the messenger sent to prepare the way? Who is the Lord? Who is the messenger of the covenant? And what is the connexion of this passage with previous prophecies in the Old Testament, and the references to it in the New? An answer to the last question will aid us greatly in reaching an answer to the others, and therefore we address ourselves first to its consideration.

This passage is evidently founded on Isaiah xl, 3-5: "The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord," &c. This was probably a favourite passage with the Jewish people at this time, from which they drew their hopes of a Messiah, who should rectify all their anomalies and grant them a signal prosperity. Hence they looked anxiously for the promised forerunner who would herald his coming. Malachi assures them that this prophecy would be fulfilled—the forerunner and the Lord would both surely come as they were predicted. The voice was to cry from a wilderness, not in a literal sense so much as a figurative. The condition of the chosen people would be that of a wilderness—one of desolation and ruin. Now when that desolation was darkest and wildest the voice of summons should be heard calling upon them to prepare for the coming of the Lord. This voice is applied expressly to John the Baptist in Matthew iii, 3; Mark i, 3; Luke i, 76; iii, 4; and John i, 23. But the question arises, Is John alone referred to by this voice? Hengstenberg, Olshausen, and other expositors of note, say that he is not the only one referred to, but only the last one of a series. This is inferred from the use of the plural "our God," and from the fact that this preparation was really the work of all the prophets who prophesied until John, and not of John alone. The cry was the same, but it was taken from lip to lip along the whole line of prophets, until the last and greatest of them could say, "Behold the Lamb of God!"

In the citation of this prophecy in Mark i, 3, it is preceded by that of Malachi iii, 1, and there is a difficulty in the quotation that does not meet the eye of the English reader. The received text reads "as it is written in the prophets," which, as the quotations are from

both Malachi and Isaiah, presents no difficulty. But the true reading is admitted to be "as it is written in Isaiah the prophet," and hence the question arises, How can the passage from Malachi be referred to Isaiah? Hengstenberg explains it by the fact that the passage in Malachi rested on that in Isaiah, and hence the original was quoted, as it was the greater, as well as the older prophecy, to indicate this connexion. This is very ingenious, though Olshausen (on Matt. iii, 3) remarks, that it seems forced. The fact is, that as the minor prophets were regarded as but one book, they were rarely quoted by name, and where they were cited with one of the major prophets, the name of the latter was naturally given, especially as in this case, when the other evangelists had cited the major prophet by name. The omission, therefore, of the name of Malachi, is unimportant.

It is then plain from this brief reference to the relations of this text to Isaiah and the Gospels, that "the messenger" here predicted was John the Baptist. Mark quotes it with several verbal alterations to adapt it to his purpose in the use he makes of it. Christ expressly refers it to John the Baptist in Matthew xi, 10, and Luke vii, 27. Hence there can be no doubt in the mind of any believer in the claims of Christ, as to the proper reference of this text to John the Baptist. The only question is, whether it refers to him exclusively. Hengstenberg and others say here also, that it does not. Their reasons are, (1) the connexion with Isaiah xl, 3, where not an individual but a series is meant; (2) the word "behold," intimating a nearer connexion with the time of the prophet than the age of John; (3) the connexion of this passage with chap. iv, 5, that predicts the coming of Elijah, which, as we shall see, is the strongest reason of the three. By this interpretation the word "messenger" is applied to that long series that ended in John, to all of whom this preparatory work was assigned. The prophecy was really fulfilled in John, though not exhausted by him, but possessing a continuous fulfilment all along the history of the past. The work of John was too narrow to meet the sweep of the predictions of this prophecy. Hence, when he appeared in the wilderness, fasting, and clothed in the wild garb of the old prophets, he appeared rather as a symbol to gather in his own case all the scattered delineations of prophecy, and explain their meaning and application, than as himself the end and object of these prophecies. His appearance was not so much a mere fulfilment of prophecy, as a reëxistence of all its awful and glorious voices, couched under obvious symbols. The Jewish people were in a state of desolation, all the bloom of their civil and spiritual life withered, and their hearts as hard as the

parched wilderness. Hence, when John took up his abode in the wilderness, he presented to the people a vast and silent symbol of their condition. He came, clothed in a garb of penitence, like the older prophets, and eating a diet of penitence, to present a symbol of the great duty of the people, *repentance*. He then proclaimed the near approach of the Messiah, thus gathering up the three great topics of prophecy, sin, repentance, and salvation, and presenting them for the last time before the coming of the expected One. His ministry was therefore a symbolical epitome of all that had gone before, in the prophetic teachings of God to the Church; and hence he was, as the last representative of this long line of ambassadors from God, preëminently the messenger.

Who then is meant by "the Lord" *ה'הוה*? We reply, God; because *הוה* with the article always has this meaning. See Exod. xxiii, 17; xxxiv, 23; Isa. i, 24; iii, 1; x, 16, 33, &c. In Dan. ix, 17, it seems to mean the Son, where the prophet prays to God to grant his request, for the Lord's sake. The fact that God is the speaker proves the same thing; for after declaring the way shall be prepared "before *me*," he adds that the Lord should come, thus identifying the Lord with himself.

There is now but little difficulty in determining who is meant by the "messenger of the covenant." The authority of the New Testament settles it to be the Messiah, Jesus Christ. The "covenant" here does not mean any specific outward transaction between God and the Jews, but that deeper inward relation which he has to the whole Church, involving, as it does, the great purpose and plan of redemption, of which Christ was the executive agent. In distinction from this national covenant, Christ is called "the Mediator of the new covenant," Heb. xii, 24; in allusion to such passages as this one, Jer. xxxi, 31, &c. He is called the "messenger" or "angel" of the covenant, in allusion to Exod. xxiii, 20, where the Jehovah Angel is promised as the guide of the people. This angel is thus identified with the Shekinah, that went before the tribes, dwelt in the tabernacle, and afterward in the temple, through which all the manifestations in the Old Testament were made. This text, compared with Mark i, 2, identifies this angel with Christ, proving thus, that all the theophanies of the Old Testament were through the Son, who became flesh, and dwelt among us. Those who wish to pursue this interesting theme more fully, will find it very ably discussed in the Lectures on Divinity, by Principal Hill, of St. Andrews. (Book iii, chap. v, sec. 1-3.) The bearing of this point on the Socinian controversy is obviously very important, for if this is established, it follows irresistibly that Christ is God.

The words "for whom ye are longing," show clearly that the state of mind existing then was delusion and not doubt, as is commonly stated. They longed for Messiah to bring those temporal blessings which Jehovah had not bestowed on them yet, and the prophet corrects their error as to the purpose of his coming. To assume, as the expositors do, that only the pious portion of the people thus longed for him, is perfectly unauthorized and arbitrary, for the very persons longing thus, are those reprov'd for sin, and threatened with his coming. The temple here is not necessarily to be limited to the literal temple, any more than the wilderness in which the other messenger was to appear. The theocratic people, the Church, is sometimes called the temple of the Lord. (See Jer. vii, 4; and especially Zech. vi, 12, 13, 15, which is exactly parallel to this passage.) The Church is frequently so called in the New Testament. (See 2 Cor. vi, 16; 2 Thess. ii, 4; Rev. iii, 12, &c.) The literal temple was only a symbol of this spiritual temple, built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, with Jesus Christ as the chief corner-stone.

Ver. 2. "The day of his coming," and his "appearing," are not to be limited to the first advent of Messiah, but to his entire work, including the whole dispensation that shall end with the judgment. The "day of his coming" is parallel to "the day of the Lord" mentioned so frequently in the prophets, (see Amos v, 18; Joel ii, 11, &c.) and afterward called "the great and dreadful day of the Lord" in chap. iv, 5, where it is obviously identical with the day spoken of here. This is further proved by the allusions to this text in the New Testament, *e. g.*, Luke xxi, 34, 36; Eph. vi, 13; and Rev. vi, 16, 17, where this "standing" at his appearing is referred to a period yet future. The mission of Christ is regarded as a whole, from the manger of Bethlehem to the throne of judgment, and declared to be for the fall as well as for the rising of many in Israel, a work that should separate the pure from the impure, just as the refiner's fire and the fuller's washing lye, or potash. This process began during the life of our Lord on earth; it has been going on ever since; and will continue until the final separation, of which we have so solemn a description from the lips of Christ himself in Matt. xxv, 31-46.

Ver. 3 takes up the metaphor of verse 2, and, slightly altering it, gives it more distinctness, and presents us with an image of exquisite beauty. When the ore is cast into the glowing crucible, it seems as if it were to be destroyed, and could it reason, it would, like Christians when put into the furnace of affliction, infer that the result and design must be destruction. But when the process is ended, that which went in cold, sordid, and impure, comes forth

bright, glowing, and unalloyed. And the refiner is beautifully represented as coming and sitting down beside the crucible, that the fire may not be too hot, or the process left incomplete. He bends in patient love over the furnace, until, (in the rule given to the Manchester ladies, who sought an illustration of this text in a refiner's shop,) when he looks down on the liquid metal, he can see his own image perfectly reflected there; then the process is completed, and the fire removed. The Old Testament images of "sons of Levi," "sacrifice," &c., are here used to express New Testament facts with obvious propriety. *לֵיהוָה* means belonging to the Lord, including their own joyful acknowledgment of this fact.

Ver. 4 declares the result of this process, that the offerings of the people shall be grateful to God. These sacrifices are of course eucharistic and not expiatory, such as are mentioned in Rom. xii, 1; 1 Peter ii, 5, &c.

Ver. 5 refers to the godless cavil of chap. ii, 17, "Where is the God of judgment?" as if he was totally removed from all notice of human affairs. God says that he is near to them for judgment, and a swift witness against their crimes, committed against their helpless wives and dependents. He may seem not to notice sin, and to delay its punishment, but all the time his sleepless eye is noting the sinner, and his thunder but grows hotter the longer it sleeps. While these impious cavillers were inferring that God did not hate sin, because he did not punish others, they would suddenly receive a proof of his justice in his punishing themselves. The first three crimes were against their wives; sorcery was connected with the idolatrous worship to which their heathen wives allured them, and was a common practice among the later Jews, as appears from Acts viii, 9; xiii, 6; and also from Josephus, (Arch. xx, 6; B. Jud. ii, 12, 23,) quoted by Hengstenberg. The other crimes were against the unprotected, of whom God touchingly represents himself as the protector and avenger; oppression of the helpless is defiance of God. The root of their crimes is traced in the fact that they do not fear God—a crime whose folly seems even greater, if possible, than its wickedness.

Ver. 6. The exact force of *וְ* in this verse is somewhat obscure. It must be taken as a causal particle, introducing a reason for, or an inference from what precedes. The connection is probably as follows:—In view of this prevalent wickedness, there were two conclusions that might be drawn. First, that of the sceptic—that God had ceased to punish sin, since the sinning people still continued to exist; and secondly, that of the timid believer—that with so much sin, Israel must be destroyed. God replies that neither of these conclu-

sions is correct. "They are spared and not consumed, because I am Jehovah, the covenant God of their fathers, and they, sons of Jacob, to whom I am bound by covenant; and while I spare them, I will also punish them, and while I punish them, I will also preserve them from total extinction!" The stress of the verse, then, is found in the meaning of *ברית*, which was the covenant name of God to the Jews, as is clearly proved by the remarkable—and on any other hypothesis inexplicable—passage, *Exod. vi, 3*; and is here used in antithesis with Jacob, the covenanting head of the visible theocracy. So when the Church grows cold, and there shall be no faith on the earth, the hope of the Christian must be founded, not on the visible tokens of either impunity or gathering doom, but on the unchanging love of God, who will not allow the gates of hell to prevail against her. The immutability of God, then, is at once the guarantee that his people shall be cast into the furnace, and also that they shall not be consumed.

Some of the solemn lessons of this section are, that one of the greatest sins we can commit, is to infer that the inequality of human condition is a proof that God is indifferent to human conduct. The inference is unfair on a sufficiently extensive induction of facts, if we know nothing of God, but most atrociously wicked, even if more plausible, in view of what we actually know of him as a righteous ruler. *Chap. ii, 17.*

The remedial dispensation of God's mercy in Christ has two aspects—one of wrath, the other of love. The Angel of the Covenant is the same that led the people out from Egypt; and like that cloud-girt presence of Jehovah, it has an aspect of terror to the foes of God, while it has an aspect of love to his friends. The gradual dispensation of the gospel is separating the gold of the earth from its dross, in the mass of men, and doing the same refining work in every Christian heart. When the separating process is complete in the one case, the world will end; when in the other, the fire will be put out in the furnace of affliction, and the purified spirit brought out of the crucible. *Chap. iii, 1-3.*

It is not enough to desire the coming of Christ. Many desire it, to whom it will be a dreadful apocalypse of wrath. *Chap. ii, 17.*

The helpless, who have no human protector, have a mightier and surer one in God. He may allow them to be oppressed for a time, but in the end will visit swift and terrible judgment on their oppressors. *Chap. iii, 5.*

Let not the Christian heart grow timid in a time of prevalent wickedness and unbelief, in the fear that the ark of God may perish. The sons of Jacob shall not be consumed—the seed of Christ shall

not perish. The unchangeableness of God is the sheet-anchor of the Church. He will be faithful to his Son, and to his word, however disheartening external circumstances may appear to our wavering faith. Chap. iii, 6.

SECTION IV, CHAP. iii, 7-12.

Neglect of Tithes and Offerings.

- iii, 7. "From the days of your fathers ye have departed from my statutes, and have not kept them. Return unto me, and I will return unto you, saith
 8. Jehovah of hosts. And ye say, 'Wherein shall we return?' Will a man defraud God? Because ye have defrauded me. And ye say, 'Wherein
 9. have we defrauded thee?' In tithes and offerings. Ye are cursed with
 10. a curse; for ye have defrauded, the whole nation (*of you*). Bring all the tithes into the house of the treasury, and let there be food in my house, and prove me, I pray you, in this, saith Jehovah of hosts, if I will not open to you the flood-gates of heaven, and pour down upon you a blessing perpetually. And I will rebuke for you the devourer, and it shall not destroy for you the fruits of the ground, and it shall not blight for you the
 11. vine in the field, saith Jehovah of hosts. And all nations shall pronounce you blessed, for ye shall be a land of delight, saith Jehovah of hosts."

Ver. 7. It is a principle in God's government, that the sins of the fathers should be visited upon the children, in order that parental affection may be an additional restraint against sin. Now the Jews having begun their wanderings after returning from captivity, at the point where their fathers had left off, instead of repenting of and forsaking their sins, this law of hereditary guilt was allowed to take its course. God, however, assures them that if they return to him in penitence, he will return to them in prosperity. They then, with the same stolid impenitence that they have all along shown, ask wherein they were to return—as if the accusation of departure was a calumny.

Ver. 8 answers this insolent question with a burst of indignant invective. What, when the cry of your injured wives, the ruins of the holy city, and the neglected altars of the temple, are all telling of your having withheld from God his dues, do you ask wherein you must return? Will a man defraud God, and yet think that he has nothing to repent of? The word *נִפְסָה* having the radical sense of covering or hiding, is properly to *defraud*, rather than to *rob*. The force of *נָּ* seems to be as follows: "Can you think that sacrilege is not a crime to be repented of? Yet you have committed that crime, because ye have defrauded me." Again the hardened insolence of the people rears its brow, and demands wherein this fraud had been committed? And God answers, "In tithes and offerings." The tithes required by the Mosaic law were, first, a tenth of all that remained after the first fruits, (which belonged to God and must be

given to him,) which tenth was God's, as the original proprietor of the soil, and was to be paid to the Levites for their maintenance. Lev. xxvii, 30-32. Secondly, from this tenth the Levites paid a tenth to the priests. Num. xviii, 26-28. Thirdly, a second tenth was paid by the people for the entertainment of the Levites and their own families at the tabernacle. Deut. xii, 18. Fourthly, another tithe was paid every third year for the poor, widows, orphans, &c. Deut. xiv, 28, 29. The first three classes of tithes are specially referred to here, as appears from the context, though the fourth was also withheld as we would infer from chap. iii, 5. "The offerings" are referred to in chap. i, 7-14.

Ver. 9 states that, because of this defrauding of God, the people were cursed, as already stated in chap. ii, 2. The position of "me" we regard as emphatic, designed to intimate the enormity of the attempt to defraud God. For the syntax of ך, which is here taken causally, see Nordheimer, § 1093, 6, *e. a.*

Ver. 10 contains God's challenge: Be faithful to God, and see whether he will not be faithful to his promises. "All the tithes:" (see under ver. 8 what these were.) The phrase ך-לל-ך has been variously rendered; literally it means, "until a failure of sufficiency," and the interpretation depends on the exact reference of sufficiency. Our version understands sufficiency of room to receive the blessing; but it seems most natural to refer it to the source of this sufficiency, viz., God. This makes it precisely analogous to the corresponding passage where this idiom occurs, (Psa. lxxii, 5.) "Until a failure of the moon," *i. e.*, as long as the moon endures, which was equivalent to saying perpetually: so here it would be equivalent to, "as long as the sufficiency of God endures;" and as this sufficiency is infinite, it means perpetually. We have preferred to translate the idiom into its proper equivalent in our language. The reasoning is, that constant obedience will produce a constant shower of blessing; the exact meaning of the phrase being *perpetuity* of blessing, rather than *abundance* of blessing, as it is commonly rendered, a thought which was sufficiently expressed by the words "pour down" and "flood-gates of heaven."

Ver. 11. "The devourer" is not any specific kind of destroyer, but any and every one, rational or irrational. The allusion is to the threat of chap. ii, 3, which is here specifically revoked, on condition of repentance and obedience.

Ver. 12 promises a blessing in the same form in which it is promised in Deut. xxxiii, 29; Zech. viii, 13.

The doctrine of this section is, that the man who defrauds God defrauds himself—the Christian who keeps back the time, the toil,

and the treasure that God claims of him, will be in the end the greatest loser. We fear that there are many tithes yet withheld from the treasury of the Lord, and that this is one great cause of the barrenness and deadness of the Church. The flood-gates of spiritual influence are closed, and the heavens are to us as brass, because we have defrauded the Lord's pensioners and the Lord's house. Let Christians only take God at his word, and prove him in this matter—be whole-hearted and whole-handed Christians—and see if the cloud will not rise over Carmel, and the heavens grow black with rain.

SECTION V, CHAP. iii, 13—END.

Reproofs and Warnings.

13. "Your words have been violent against me," saith Jehovah. And ye
14. say, 'What do we say against thee?' Ye say, 'It is vain to serve God, and what profit (is it,) that we have kept his observances, and that we have
15. walked mournfully before Jehovah of hosts? And now we pronounce the proud happy; they are built up, the workers of iniquity: also, they tempt God, and escape.'
16. Then they who feared Jehovah, spake, every man to his neighbour; and Jehovah attended and heard: and there was written a book of remembrance before him, for those who feared Jehovah, and for those who thought
17. upon his name. And they shall be mine, saith Jehovah of hosts, in the day in which I shall make up my possession, and I will spare them, as a
18. man spares his son that serves him. And ye shall return and discern (*the difference*) between the righteous and the wicked, and between him
- iv, 1. who serves Jehovah, and him who serves him not. For behold! the day comes! burning like a furnace! and all the proud, and all the doers of evil are chaff! and the day that comes, burns them, saith Jehovah of
2. hosts, who will not leave to them root nor branch. And then shall rise on you who fear my name the Sun of righteousness, and healing in his
3. wings, and ye shall go forth and leap as calves of the stall. And ye shall trample down the ungodly; for they shall be ashes under the soles of your
4. feet in the day which I make, saith Jehovah of hosts. Remember the law of Moses, my servant, which I commanded him in Horeb, for all Israel, statutes and judgments.
5. Behold! I send to you Elijah the prophet, before the day of Jehovah
6. comes, the great and the terrible! And he shall return the heart of the fathers to the sons, and the heart of the sons to the fathers, lest I come and smite the land with a curse.'

The passage (ver. 13–15) repeats in a more aggravated form, the sin of the ungodly Jews, reprov'd in the previous portion of the prophecy. That sin was—charging God with partiality and injustice, because he did not reward them for their mercenary and imperfect obedience, while the heathen seemed to be so much more prosperous. There is a sort of climax in the utterance of their feelings. At first, their murmurings were such as to cause God to say that he had no pleasure in them. Chap. i, 10. Then their unreasonable

pertinacity was such that their words wearied him. Chap. ii, 17. But now their insolence arises so high as to amount to audacious violence. Chap. iii, 13. The error, lying at the root of all this, was a mistake in regard to the nature of God's service, and converting it into a mere mercenary kind of worldliness, supposing that, if it did not reward, in the good things of this life, all those who performed its outward observances, whatever was the motive of these performances, it was a failure. They mistook, at once, the spiritual motives and feelings required, and the eternal rewards promised to those who served God. This selfish estimate of religion, and disposition to test it by the worldly prosperity it confers, is one of the tendencies of the human heart that did not cease with the calculating religionists of the times of Malachi.

Ver. 13. *נָקַם* with *עַל* is literally to be *strong upon* any one, *i. e.*, to be violent. It represents the aggravated insult contained in the words of the Jews, as if they really forced God to punish them. *נִקְמָתוֹ*, being the Niphal form of the verb, has the reciprocal sense of this conjugation, (see Nordheimer, vol. i, p. 94, § 141, 3.) and implies that these things were said—not directly to God—but of God, to one another. For this meaning of the word, see Ezek. xxxiii, 30, where it is fully explained in the context.

Ver. 14 expresses the corrupt feelings, the utterance of which had so insulted God. They had engaged in the discharge of duty, not from any love to God, but from a hope of being well paid for it; and when they found that God did not pay them as they expected, they murmured, and charged him with being unjust. Their error, however, was not in thinking that God would reward those who faithfully served him, but in thinking that such beggarly services as theirs, arising from such ignoble motives, had any claim on God's favour. "To walk mournfully" was to assume the garb of penitence, which was the garb used by mourners. They had even submitted to fasting and humiliation, and yet had not been paid for it, forgetting the teaching of Isaiah lviii, in regard to the fast which God had chosen.

Ver. 15 is a continuation of the conversation of the people with one another. "And now" expresses the inference they stated to each other, as to be drawn from their adversity as compared with the prosperity of the heathen. "Since we are not rewarded, who serve Jehovah, and the proud heathen flourish in prosperity, we must now pronounce them the favourites of God, and say that he builds up the workers of iniquity, and allows them, who dare him to punish them, by breaking his laws, to escape." This atrocious insinuation, that God favoured evil-doers, was the highest insult they could have

uttered, and was that which, as it were, drove God to inflict his judgments upon them.

Ver. 16. It is a cheering thought that no defection from the truth has ever been so wide spread, as not to leave a remnant who never bowed the knee to Baal. Such was the fact here. Amid the astounding wickedness of the people, there were still those who were faithful to God. Their *character* is described as those "who feared Jehovah." This fear is not the fear of terror or guilt, but the fear of a love that is always tremblingly alive to the possible alienation of its object. Their *conduct* is also described: "They spake one to another." While the wicked spake to one another words of daring scepticism, they who feared the Lord were speaking to each other words of encouragement and faith. Maurer and Hitzig endeavour to show that the persons referred to in this verse are the same with those spoken of in verses 13-15. But the promises in verses 16, 17 are plainly inconsistent with the heavy condemnation implied in verse 13. The reward of this fidelity is then stated. The kings of Persia were accustomed to enter in a book the names of those who had rendered any special service to the king in order that they might be duly rewarded. See Esther vi, 1. This, or the books in Daniel vii, 10, may be referred to here, to express the fact that their fidelity would not be overlooked. The faintest whisper which they utter in the ears of each other will be heard and recorded in heaven.

Ver. 17. The word כֶּסֶף in the English version is rendered "jewels;" but it strictly means "a possession," implying some special value, though without limiting it to the precise kind of valuables indicated by the word jewels. It will admit of two constructions. The first is that preferred by Maurer and the older interpreters, which connects it with יָרֵךְ, and gives the sense, "They shall be my possession in the day that I shall make." This construction is at variance with the accents, and does not give that fulness of significance to the promise that seems to be demanded by its terms. Hence the other construction is preferable, which declares that in that great day of final adjustment, when God shall make up his own peculiar people from the assembled millions of the earth, then these humble and fearing followers of Jehovah, in the midst of abounding wickedness, shall be his; and when the threatened wrath begins to consume the enemies of God, he will spare them with all a father's yearning fondness for a docile and loving child. Thus the prophet carries the mind forward to the mighty adjustments of the future, in which all the seeming anomalies of the present shall be fully explained and wholly removed forever.

Ver. 18 expresses this fact: "Now you murmur at the ways of

God as unjust in seemingly confounding the righteous and wicked, thus refusing to him the justice you concede to a man, not to condemn an unfinished plan, because it seems to you to be objectionable. It is in part to test your disposition to trust God in spite of all appearances that perplex, and to make your service of him less mercenary and selfish, that this blended state of facts is allowed. But when the experiment has been fully made, and it is thus seen who will be faithful in the face of perplexity, and who will be otherwise, then shall you see clearly that there is a difference between the righteous and the wicked as broad as the abyss between heaven and hell."

Chap. iv, 1. In this verse we have a prophecy that requires the application of what we may call the principle of successive fulfilment. This is one of great importance in interpreting the Bible, if we would avoid confusion. There are a number of statements by the sacred writers that are designed to apply to distinct facts, successively occurring in history. If the words are limited to any one of these facts, they will seem exaggerated, for no one fact can exhaust their significance. They must be spread over all the facts before their plenary meaning is reached. There is nothing in this principle that is at variance with the ordinary laws of language. The same general use of phrases occurs repeatedly. Thus, Berkeley's celebrated line, "Westward the star of empire takes its way," is fulfilled with every new advance of occidental greatness, and includes the smallest as well as the greatest facts of this nature. The expression, "The schoolmaster is abroad," has its fulfilment in every successive teacher of youth who goes forth to his work. Every language contains these formulas, which refer not to any one event, but a series of events, all embodying the same principle, or resulting from the same cause. Hence, there is nothing in this principle at variance with the laws of language.

We find repeated instances of this species of prediction in the Scriptures. The promise in regard to the "Seed of the woman," (Gen. iii, 15,) refers to no one event, but runs along the whole stream of history, and includes every successive conquest of the religion of Christ. The same thing is true of the promise, that men shall beat their swords into ploughshares; and kindred predictions of the peace that shall ensue in Messianic times. They refer to every advance that is made in the peaceful tendencies of the religion of the Bible, and await their fullest fulfilment in the future.

There is a class of predictions in interpreting which this principle is eminently important. It is that which refers to what the old theologians called the *novissima*, to which this verse belongs. When

Christ speaks of these last things, he does it in terms that obviously refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, and yet as obviously transcend that event. This has led to the Universalist dogma, that there is no day of judgment, except in that indefinite sense in which every judicial visitation of God is a day of judgment, just as every gracious visitation of God is a day of grace. Relying on the indefinite use of the word day in Scripture, they seek to eviscerate these predictions of a future day of judgment of all the tremendous significance that they have commonly possessed. They refer to the fact that Peter applied Joel's prediction of the day of the Lord to the events of Pentecost, in Acts ii, 16; and from thence infer that the formula "day of the Lord" cannot be applied to a future judgment, as it is commonly held. The difficulty which they press, however, can be wholly removed by adopting this principle of successive fulfilment. It is true that the deluge, the destruction of Sodom, Babylon, and Jerusalem, and all subsequent visitations of God's wrath, were days of the Lord, and in each one of them the proud and evil-doers were as chaff. But as each one did not exhaust these ominous predictions, so all together have not yet met the full reach of the terrors, which will only be done in that future day in which the Lord shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel and the trump of God, and the drama of earth shall be ended. All previous judgments were but reddenings of the dawn, that betokened the coming, but did not unfold the terrible brightness of that awful day. As the prophet in this verse gazes upon its distant rising, he exclaims, as if in breathless emotion, It comes! burning like a furnace! the wicked proud are chaff! the day burns them! There is something very forcible in these abrupt exclamations, as if the prophet was elevated on some mount of vision, and actually beheld this terrible pomp come rolling up the distant skies, with its reddening pathway of fire and blood. The finality of this day is distinctly declared in the utter ruin that it is predicted to bring.

Ver. 2 presents the situation of the righteous in this future day of terror, as contrasted with that of the wicked. To the wicked, the day should come fierce and consuming as a furnace; to the righteous, it should dawn in peace, and the sun that should illumine it would be, not one of condemnation, but of "righteousness,"—not one of destruction, but of "healing." Wings are attributed to the sun, poetically, in allusion to his apparent motion, just as we read of "the wings of the morning," in *Psa. cxxxix, 9*. The image of the sun seems to have been suggested by the expression "day," used in the preceding verse, in order to make the contrast more striking between the day of terror to the wicked, and of gladness to the right-

eous. The phrase "Sun of righteousness" is generally applied to Christ in popular language, and if the ultimate ground of this future gladness and righteousness is brought in view, the phrase is undoubtedly applicable to him. But we cannot think that the prophet here meant to predict Christ personally by this phrase, or indeed to look at the ground of this righteousness at all. His object was to show the contrast that this future day would present to the righteous, from the aspect it would present to the wicked; and while it is true that the foundation of this contrast rests on Christ, yet it is the contrast itself, in its bright and joyous character, rather than the foundation that is here contemplated by the prophet. To leap as a young animal, which after confinement exults in the joyousness of freedom, is a striking image of the joy that the righteous shall feel after being kept so long waiting for deliverance.

Ver. 3 is designed to meet the perplexity of the righteous, in view of the prosperity of the wicked. That prosperity would be brief, and soon reversed. The image of ashes refers us back to that of fire in ver. 1, which was to consume the ungodly.

Ver. 4 expresses the condition on which this future blessing would be bestowed, namely, obedience. Obey the law already given, and at the proper time it shall be found, that in the end it shall be well with the righteous, for the reward of his hands shall be given him.

Ver. 5. The main difficulty in this verse, is, to answer the question, Who, or what is Elijah? Is he the Tishbite, who is personally to reappear on earth? So the Jews, and even some of the early Christian fathers, thought. But the reference by Christ himself of this passage to John, proves that this could not be its meaning. Indeed, the fact that he is called "the prophet," and not "the Tishbite," implies that it is his official, and not his personal relations, that are here contemplated. If, then, it is not Elijah personally, is it John personally that is here predicted under the name Elijah? This view of the case is contradicted by the express assertion of John. When, in evident allusion to this passage, he was asked, (John i, 21,) "Art thou Elias?" he replied, "I am not;" and then, as if to meet the supposition, that he might thus only mean to deny that he was Elijah reappearing on the earth, when he was asked further, "Art thou that prophet?" (the article here must be taken as emphatic,) he replies, "No," thus asserting that none of these prophecies found an exhaustive fulfilment in him individually. The Jews supposed that this prophecy would be fulfilled finally in a single individual, and that when this individual would come, the time of Israel's glory was near at hand. It was this false view of the passage that John denied, and not any reference of it to him. He must have

known, from the communication of the angel to his father, (Luke i, 16, 17,) that this prophecy had a reference to him, and his adoption of the costume of Elijah proved the same thing; hence it could only have been the exclusive application of the text to him that he meant to deny.

In what sense then is Elijah predicted? The fact that John, to whom the passage is applied by Christ, calls himself "the voice crying in the wilderness," which we have seen (Mal. iii, 1) to be identical with "the messenger" then predicted, proves that Elijah is here to be understood in the same sense with "the messenger." We are here therefore presented with another case of successive fulfilment, such as we found in ver. 1. Indeed, this is expressly intimated when we are told that John was to come in "the spirit and power of Elijah." Luke i, 16, 17. As Moses in the preceding verse was taken as the representative of the law, the preceptive revealings of God, so Elijah is taken as the representative of the prophets, or the prophetic revealings of God. This was done again in the transfiguration, where these men appear in their representative and not in their personal character. This use of Elijah is not unknown to the Old Testament; in 2 Chron. xxi, 12, it is said that "a writing from Elijah the prophet" came to King Jehoram, when Elijah had been for many years in heaven. This can only mean a prophecy, in the spirit of Elijah. So in 1 Kings xix, 15, 16, it is predicted that Elijah shall do acts that in fact were done by Elisha (2 Kings viii, 13) and one of the young prophets. 2 Kings ix, 13. This also implies that Elijah was taken as a representative of the prophetic order, or more strictly, of the spirit of prophecy. This prophetic mission was to reprove, to instruct, to warn, and to predict. The general fact, then, that is predicted, is, that before God comes in his terrible mission of judgment, he will send agencies to revive and reform his people, so that they may escape from the wrath to come. Were it announced to us that before God would cut off an apostate Church, he would send a Luther, we should instantly comprehend the meaning of the prediction, and see no confusion of language, but rather a greater clearness in this use of a typical or representative man. Thus, then, it is predicted, that before God sends wrath, he will send messengers to summon to repentance. This was done before the downfall of the Jewish people. John, as the first of these sent messengers, had especial prominence, but he was not the last; others followed with the same message, "Repent, for the day is coming!" And in every subsequent revival of religion in the Church it has been so. In the reformation of the sixteenth century, Elijah came in the burning words of Luther, Calvin, and Knox; in the eighteenth, in the fervid spirits of

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the Wesleys, Whitefield, and Edwards; and now that we are verging upon yet more fearful unfoldings of the wrathful visitations of God on the earth, we look for Elijah to come forth again in some new and mighty awakening of men to repentance. Indeed, to every regenerated soul there is essentially this coming of Elijah, this summons, "Repent, for the day is coming!" And as the faithful minister of Christ goes forth, it must ever be in this same spirit, calling on men to repent, and pointing to the lurid flashings of that *dies iræ*, which, when once perceived by the startled eye of the soul, will lead it to flee to the only refuge from this wrath to come. We thus see, that instead of a narrow prediction that is exhausted by its application to a single man, and that confuses us by this restriction, we have a magnificent formula of the spiritual world, that stretches like a law over all its phases, and gives unity to them all, from the most mighty to the most minute.

Ver. 6 describes the work of the preacher of repentance. The expression, "return the heart of the fathers to the sons, and the heart of the sons to the fathers," has usually been explained to mean the restoration of domestic harmony among the people. But this is a very meagre sense of words that close up the utterances of God to his people for twelve generations. Want of domestic concord was not one of the sins charged upon the people, and its removal would hardly be the great work assigned to the Elijah messenger. The meaning is suggested in the words of the angel to Zacharias, in Luke i, 16, 17; where, instead of the clause, "the heart of the sons to the fathers," is put, "the disobedient to the wisdom of the just." This paraphrase indicates that the hearts of the devoted ancestors were to live again in the obedience of their repentant posterity, and that the backslidden sons were to be restored to the piety of their fathers. The piety of the fathers had been referred to repeatedly before, (see i, 2; ii, 5, 6; iii, 4,) and the promise is, that this piety should live again in the children, under the Elijah call to repentance; and it is threatened, that if this is not the result, the land shall be laid under the terrible *harem*. This was a devotion to destruction, such as was done to the Canaanites by the judicial act of God. As these guilty nations were cut off because of their sins, so should the people who had taken their place on the soil of the land of promise, or those who in turn would take their place on the covenants of promise, if they imitated their sinful example. This was fulfilled five hundred years afterward, when the chosen people were finally rejected, and the awful blood was upon them and their children, according to their own imprecation. And to this hour, the soil that was wet with that blood lies under the terrible *harem*, and will so continue, until that Elijah

call that shall bring back the heart of David, of Isaiah, and of Nathanael to their exiled posterity, enabling them to see him whom they have pierced, and to cry, "My Lord and my God." And by the same principle of interpretation that we have applied to the previous verse, do we extend this warning to every age of the Church, and find in it the germ of the solemn admonition of Paul in discussing the same subject, (Rom. xi, 20, 21,) "Be not high-minded, but fear; for if God spared not the natural branches, take heed, lest he also spare not thee."

The reproofs and warnings of this section are eminently applicable to our Epicurean age. There is the same tendency to challenge the dealings of God now that there was then, and there is the same need to point men forward to the mighty adjustments of the future, in which all these apparent anomalies will be rectified, and to urge them to listen to the heavenly voice that calls them to repent, believe, and obey, assuring them that if any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, he is *Anathema, Maran-atha!* And it is suggestive of much solemn thought, that the last utterance of God to the Church and to the world, before the coming of the Messiah, the word that was to sound through four hundred years of history, was that awful word "*curse!*"

ART. II.—CURTIS'S HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION.

History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United States, with Notices of its Principal Framers. By GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. In two vols. Vol. I. New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1854. 8vo., pp. 488.

THE English Constitution is the aggregate of all the fundamental laws, usages, and institutions under which the people of England live. The Constitution of the United States is something very different. It is not the aggregate of *all* our laws and institutions, nor even of the larger portion of them. The law with which we most frequently come in contact, which governs most of our ordinary transactions, and to which we oftenest have occasion to appeal, emanates from the particular state in which we reside, and is not at all affected by the circumstance that we are also subject to another jurisdiction, and to a second fundamental law, which regulates the remainder of our ordinary concerns. There is a division of *the matter* of sovereignty, not of the sovereignty itself, between two distinct powers, which touch us, so to speak, on opposite sides. The one is not superior, and

the other inferior; each, within its own domain, is absolute sovereign. The state, for instance, cannot interfere with a law of Congress regulating commerce; Congress, on the other hand, cannot interfere with a state law regulating the descent of property. The state cannot coin money; the United States cannot train the militia, nor appoint its officers. Even the matter of the punishment of crimes is divided between the two authorities; sometimes a man is hanged by the United States marshal and his deputies, sometimes by the county sheriff, who is a state officer.

Such a double-headed government is an anomaly among nations. Nothing like it exists anywhere else upon earth, and nothing like it is recorded in history. It is not a mere confederation of otherwise independent states, such as existed under the Amphictyonic Council, the Achaian League, the empire of Germany, or such as now exists among the several cantons of Switzerland. The essence of such a league is, that the states themselves—the several political communities in their corporate capacities—are the only parties to it; the regulation of the league affecting these states alone, and never touching the individuals who make up any one of those states. A confederacy, or league, is an association of states; a government implies an association of individuals. Now the United States in their collective capacity form one government, just as the authorities of Massachusetts constitute another; yet they are not, properly speaking, two governments, but one government, as they work together, each supplying the deficiencies of the other, and both affecting the same individuals. Yet each part is fully organized, having its distinct departments, its separate executive, judicial and legislative bodies, and all the machinery of government complete.

Such a political system is not only anomalous; it is complex and intricate. At the first view, it seems open to grave objections; it is operose and artificial, lacking unity, and liable to be thrown into confusion by the clashing of the two parts of which it is composed. It is even difficult to be understood; English politicians, historians, and speculatists having but a very imperfect notion of it to this day. They seldom speak or write about it without falling into gross blunders, such as holding the national government responsible for the action of individual states, or one state for the action of another state. No political speculatist, no constitution-monger would have devised such a system, and recommended its adoption. Even the Abbé Sieyès, who had a new constitution for France in every pigeon-hole in his desk, and who succeeded in causing half a dozen of them to be put to the test of experiment—a test which was very quickly fatal to them—never imagined what he would have called

so fantastic a contrivance as the Constitution of the United States. Yet this complex and anomalous system works well. It has stood trial for two-thirds of a century, during which time the political storms, which have shattered most of the constitutions of Europe, have passed over it unharmed. Under its protection and guidance, the people have made greater progress in population and opulence than any other nation on earth. And if a check should ever be put to this extraordinary prosperity—if the Union, for instance, should fall asunder—the check must arise, so far as we can now see, from causes extrinsic to the Constitution, and not from any defects in the instrument itself, or from any dissatisfaction with it considered as a scheme of government. In other words, the practice of the government, not the theory of it, is the great evil we have to apprehend.

How came such an anomalous yet prosperous political system into being? This is the question which Mr. Curtis proposes to answer in the work now under review. To adopt his own language in the preface, he proposes to show "how the Constitution of the United States came to be formed; from what circumstances it arose; what its relations were to institutions previously existing in the country; what necessities it satisfied; and what was its adaptation to the situation of these states." Only half of the work is as yet published; but it affords ample evidence of the careful research, the rigid impartiality, and the sound scholarship with which the author is prosecuting his labours. He writes neither as a rhetorician nor a partisan; there are no unreasonable flights of eloquence, and no attempts to smuggle the political controversies of the nineteenth century into a grave history of what belongs only to the eighteenth. In conceiving the plan of his work, and devoting himself to its execution, Mr. Curtis had the countenance and encouragement of the great senator from Massachusetts, whose recent loss the whole country still deplores. To write a "History of the Constitution" was one of the favourite day-dreams of Mr. Webster's mind,—a dream which he abandoned only when the shadows of the dark valley had begun to thicken around him; and then, kindly, but solemnly, he made over the task to one of his young associates and disciples. The mention of these facts suggests rather a damaging comparison for Mr. Curtis; for one who opens his volume almost involuntarily asks himself: "How would Mr. Webster have written such a work?" But as this thought subsides in the interest of perusal, the reader will learn to do justice to the care, discretion, and ability, the soundness of opinion and uniform good taste with which the present undertaking has been executed.

Going back to the question first propounded—How came our

intricate and anomalous Constitution into being?—the answer readily suggests itself to every attentive student of the history of our revolutionary times. This answer is, that the Constitution naturally and necessarily grew out of the circumstances of the period in which it had its birth; it was moulded in all its important features by the grave exigencies of the case. The leading provisions of it could not have been different from what they are, without the whole project perishing in its inception; as either the people would have rejected it, or the great evils and perils which then weighed upon the nation with a paralyzing force, finding no check or remedy in an imperfect instrument and half-way measures, would have reduced the nation to disunion and anarchy. We do not mean, of course, that there was no merit on the part of those who fashioned the instrument, and secured its adoption. Hamilton, Madison, Jay, Morris, Pinckney, and King, were the ablest statesmen who have ever had the guidance of our ship of state, and a lasting debt of gratitude is due to their memory for the sagacity with which they discerned the exigencies of the times, and the wisdom with which they shaped their measures to meet those exigencies. Still the credit due to them rests not upon the ingenuity with which they devised such constitutional provisions as seemed to them best in the abstract, but upon the manliness and practical wisdom which they manifested in giving up their individual opinions and preferences, and submitting to be guided by circumstances. They adjusted the details only; causes were at work which shaped the main features of the instrument in spite of them. Strictly speaking, when the Constitution was completed, in its first draft, it fully satisfied nobody, either in the convention or out of it. "No man's ideas," said Hamilton, "were more remote from the plan than my own." At the close of the convention, Dr. Franklin said: "I consent to this Constitution because I expect no better, and because I am not satisfied that it is not the best. The opinions I have had of its errors I sacrifice to the public good." Six delegates refused to affix their signatures to the instrument. The convention itself, in its circular letter recommending the Constitution for adoption by the several states, spoke with singular diffidence and modesty of the result of its labours. "The Constitution which we now present," it remarked, "is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable. That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every state is not perhaps to be expected;" but "that it is liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected we hope and believe."

Thus, though the Constitution of the United States is what has been reproachfully termed "a paper constitution,"—though it was devised and reduced to writing, as a whole, in one deliberative assembly convened for the purpose,—it still offers no exception to the general remark, that "constitutions are not *made*, but *grow* by an inherent law of progress and adaptation to changing circumstances." This is only another form of saying, that constitution-making, if successful, is not man's wisdom, but God's wisdom. When we say that the leading features of all successful and lasting systems of government are moulded by circumstances, and not by man's device, we mean that they are but a part of the grand scheme for the moral government of the world by its Creator. What is irresistibly controlled by events, is his ordinance, who ordereth all events for good. Any other view than this is paganism. It is in this sense that we interpret the noted remark of St. Paul, which has been so wofully perverted by the advocates of passive obedience: "For there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God."

According to this view, when we compare the different portions of the Constitution with each other, we may expect to find that those which have worked best, which have been most regular and beneficial in their operation, are precisely those which were forced upon the framers of the instrument by circumstances, and which they accepted, not of their own free will, but as necessary concessions and compromises; while those parts which have worked ill, or have become obsolete, were the choice inventions, the darling projects of those who had spent most time and thought upon the system. Take, as an instance of the former class, the equal representation of all the states in the Senate,—an arrangement which gives as much weight in legislation, in making treaties, and in appointing the subordinate officers of government, to Delaware, with less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, as to New-York, with more than three millions. Apparently, nothing could be more anomalous, unequal, or unjust; and nothing but the stern necessity of reconciling the conflicting claims of the larger and the smaller states could have induced the convention to propose such an article, or the people of the several states to accept it. The arrangement was literally forced upon us by circumstances; yet experience has proved it to be one of the most useful and beneficent features of the whole scheme. It has created no discontent; it has soothed state pride, and harmonized the mutual relations of the different members of the Union; it has supplied the necessary check upon sudden and

injurious fluctuations of popular opinion as manifested in the lower house; it has given stability and dignity to the legislative and administrative action of the government. If the Constitution were to be made over again, this feature in it would probably be reenacted by unanimous consent.

As an example of the latter class, take the mode of choosing the president—not directly, by popular vote, but through the medium of an electoral college—with the several contrivances to secure the purity and freedom of action of the electors. Theoretically considered, this is one of the wisest provisions in the Constitution. All abstract considerations are in favour of it; and it was adopted by the convention and the several states on its own merits, no pressing exigency of the time forcing such an arrangement upon the country against its own will. The strong arguments in its favour were thus ably set forth by Judge Story, in his excellent *Commentaries on the Constitution*:—

“A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass for this special object, [of choosing the president,] would be most likely to possess the information, and discernment, and independence essential for the proper discharge of the duty. It is also highly important to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. These evils are not unlikely to occur in the election of a chief magistrate directly by the people, considering the strong excitements and interests which such an occasion may be naturally presumed to produce. The choice of a number of persons to form an intermediate body of electors would be far less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of one who was himself the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors chosen in each state are to assemble and vote in the state in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation would expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all convened at one time in one place. The same circumstances would naturally lessen the dangers of cabal, intrigue, and corruption; especially if Congress should, as they undoubtedly would, prescribe the same day for the choice of the electors, and for giving their votes, throughout the United States. The scheme, indeed, presents every reasonable guard against these fatal errors to republican governments.”

But what is the lesson of experience respecting this provision, so unexceptionable in theory and so strongly commended by argument? Practically, this notable contrivance has been a dead letter ever since the formation of our government. It has produced no effects at all, for the very good reason that it has been practically nullified and blotted out of the Constitution. Every one knows that the form of voting for electors, instead of voting directly for a president, is a mere farce. The electors being irredeemably pledged beforehand to vote for a particular candidate, and this fact being universally known, every voter practically casts his ballot directly

for the man of his own choice to be chief magistrate. The electors do not pretend to deliberate or to choose; they are tied hand and foot by their previous engagements, and have no office to perform which might not be as well discharged by wooden automata as by human beings. The presence of the electors' names on the ticket which the voter casts into the ballot-box, is only an indirect mode of spelling the name of Clay or Polk, Taylor or Cass, Pierce or Scott. The electors are mythical personages to the voters, just as John Doe and Richard Roe are to the lawyers. The president is chosen directly by the people in spite of the Constitution; and not one of the predicted evils and abuses of this direct vote has actually happened.

According to the view now presented, the Constitution of the United States in all its important characteristics had its origin, not in human wisdom, but in the force of circumstances and the providence of God. This fact lends peculiar interest and value to the history of the circumstances which preceded and attended the formation and adoption of the instrument. Such a history offers the only materials for interpreting and judging the Constitution. The meaning of each article is best perceived in the exigency which led to it, and in the purpose which it was designed to accomplish. The general character of the whole instrument is best seen in the history of the circumstances which called it into being, and fashioned its leading provisions. The heresy of nullification, for instance, is not more fully confuted by the plain language of the Constitution, than by an exposition of the weakness, and the failure of the confederation, and the consequent determination of the statesmen of that epoch to substitute a government for a compact, and to consolidate the Union, instead of altering the terms of a league. Mr. Curtis's work is almost as much a commentary upon the Constitution as a history of it; or, rather, it is a commentary because it is a history.

We do not attempt to analyze the book, because no abstract of its contents could do justice to its merits. It is written in a grave and impartial tone, suited to the dignity of the theme, and it bears the marks of deliberate consideration and careful research throughout. Beginning with the outbreak of the Revolution, we have a plain and succinct account of the nature of the revolutionary government, which was at once established by universal consent, of the various attempts that were made to strengthen the central power, of the obstacles which impeded these efforts, and of the final establishment of the confederation. Here is a lucid explanation of the position of the colonies with respect to each other, when they first assumed an attitude of resistance to the authority of England.

"The statements which have now been made are sufficient to remind the reader of the important fact, that, at the commencement of the Revolution, there existed, and had long existed, in all the colonies, local legislatures, one branch of which was composed of representatives chosen directly by the people, accustomed to the transaction of public business, and being, in fact, the real organs of the popular will. These bodies, by virtue of their relation to the people, were, in many instances, the bodies which took the initiatory steps for the organization of the first national or continental congress, when it became necessary for the colonies to unite in the common purpose of resistance to the mother country. But it should be again stated, before we attend to the steps thus taken, that the colonies had no direct political connexion with each other before the Revolution commenced, but that each was a distinct community, with its own separate political organization, and without any power of legislation for any but its own inhabitants: that, as political communities, and upon the principles of their organizations, they possessed no power of forming any union among themselves, for any purpose whatever, without the sanction of the crown or parliament of England. But the free and independent power of forming a union among themselves, for objects and purposes common to them all, which was denied to their colonial condition by the principles of the English constitution, was one of the chief powers asserted and developed by the Revolution; and they were enabled to effect this union, as a revolutionary right and measure, by the fortunate circumstance of their origin, which made the people of the different colonies, in several important senses, one people. They were, in the first place, chiefly the descendants of Englishmen, governed by the laws, inheriting the blood, and speaking the language of the people of England. As British subjects, they had enjoyed the right of dwelling in any of the colonies, without restraint, and of carrying on trade from one colony to another, under the regulation of the general laws of the empire, without restriction by colonial legislation. They had, moreover, common grievances to be redressed, and a common independence to establish, if redress could not be obtained: for although the precise grounds of dispute with the crown or the parliament of England had not always been the same in all the colonies, yet when the Revolution actually broke out, they all stood in the same attitude of resistance to the same oppressor, making common cause with each other, and resting upon certain great principles of liberty, which had been violated with regard to many of them, and with the further violation of which all were threatened."

The revolutionary union had its origin in the pressing necessities of the contest. Only in united means and united effort, in unity of command and a vigorous central power, was there any hope of resisting the arms of England. While the excitement of the original quarrel was fresh, and the patriotism of the people was high, before the states were exhausted by their efforts, or the alliance with France had given hope of external aid, a spontaneous and undefined union, and an extemporized central government, were enough. The revolutionary congress was an anomalous body, exercising anomalous functions. It had no constitution, no grant or limitation of its powers, beyond what it established for itself, and what it supposed the people and the states would tolerate. It had no authority but what it assumed. Urgent as the necessity was, for united and harmonious action, there is evidence enough, that the several states or groups of states, even at this epoch, were jealous of each other; and that

congress was obliged to temporize, and to humour the popular feeling which it could not control. In the notes to Mr. Curtis's volume are presented some curious passages from the secret history of those times, especially in relation to the appointment of a commander-in-chief, and the arrangement of measures leading to the Declaration of Independence. A great deal of the real work seems to have been done out of doors, in private consultation and agreement; the formal votes, in full session, sanctioned what had previously been arranged. In fact, as the congress had no power, and no occasion to enact laws, its functions were executive rather than legislative. It was not so much a deliberative assembly, as an executive council. It appointed general officers and ambassadors; it conducted diplomatic correspondence; it *recommended* certain measures to the states. Its sessions were secret, and there was little or no occasion for debate. Most of the work was done in committees, or through the agency of the president or the secretary of congress. We doubt if any measures excited much formal discussion, except the memorable one of declaring independence, and the perplexing task of arranging the articles of confederation. And the debate on either of these difficult and important themes could not have occupied more than a day or two. Private consultation among the members took the place of open discussion. We hardly need say, that a body could not have been more unfortunately constituted for executive purposes than this congress. Unity, energy, secrecy, and dispatch, are the most important qualities of a national administration; the revolutionary congress did not possess one of them, though it made an awkward attempt at secrecy, by holding its sessions in private. Fortunately, the members had sense enough to follow implicitly, as a general rule, the advice of the illustrious leader of their armies. They lent the weight of their authority to the recommendations of Washington; and, at the darkest period of the strife, as if from a sense of their own incompetency, they wisely gave him full dictatorial power.

For a while, however, as we have intimated, this anomalous and extemporized scheme of government worked tolerably well. The spirit of the people, the pressing exigencies of the hour, the wisdom of the commander-in-chief, supplied all defects. But when exhaustion, weariness, and gloom succeeded the first burst of enthusiasm and patriotism, the intrinsic evils of the system became manifest, and a change became inevitable. It was a dark hour to arrange the terms of a league, and to substitute an administration of legitimate authority, with well-defined powers and a regular organization, for the improvised executive council which had hitherto nominally held the reins of affairs. Unluckily, too, when the hour came to devise a

scheme of confederation, congress was no longer what it had been, at the opening of the contest, in respect to the zeal, ability, and influence of its members. The men were changed; as the authority and influence of the body had declined, the most eminent patriots had sought and found another sphere of action, in which they could be more serviceable to their country. Adams and Franklin had gone to Europe on public missions; Jefferson, Hancock, Rush, Hopkinson, Rutledge, and many others, had gone home to direct or inspect their respective state governments. Second rate men were delegated to fill their places; and even these felt so little interest in the exercise of their narrow and ill-defined powers, that with difficulty could a sufficient number of them be kept together for the transaction of business. All were not even honest; or, at any rate, they lacked wisdom to show their honesty. Cabal and intrigue began to appear among them, and to the pressure of public difficulties were added all the evils of personal jealousy and ambition. The machinations of Gates and Conway found more countenance and support in congress than in the army.

The articles of confederation, framed by such men and under such circumstances, were as wise and good as could reasonably have been anticipated. To some extent, they substituted system for disorder, a legitimate for an assumed authority, and strictly limited powers for vague experiments and feeble recommendations. The great mistake in framing them, appears to have arisen from the belief that it was enough to give form, precision, and legitimacy to powers already exercised by assumption, without materially enlarging the basis of the government, or adding to its means and authority; congress under the confederation could legally do about as much as congress had already done by general consent. The confederation was a formal league for general defence and protection; such a league had virtually existed by common assent, ever since the beginning of the contest. Under the new system, congress could determine how many men and how much money each state *ought* to raise; and under the old system, or want of system, it had done precisely the same thing. In neither case, had it any power to enforce its recommendations. In some respects, congress, under the confederation, was even weaker than its predecessor. The mode of voting was the same, each state having one vote. But in the revolutionary congress, any question that could be decided at all, could be decided by a bare majority of the states; while under the confederation, treaties or alliances could not be formed, money could not be borrowed or appropriated, bills of credit could not be emitted, the quotas of the several states could not be ascertained, and many other important

functions could not be exercised, except by the assent of nine states out of thirteen; frequently, two or more states being for the time not represented at all, the assent of nine out of ten or eleven was necessary. In fact, little could be done except by virtual unanimity; congress had no power of taxation, no control over commerce, no means of enforcing any of its measures upon a recusant state.

For a masterly account of the manner in which the defects of the confederation were developed by experience, and of the evils and exigencies which demonstrated the necessity of a more perfect union and a more efficient government, we refer our readers to Mr. Curtis's volume. For our own part, what seems most to need explanation in the history of those eventful times, is the strange reluctance of the states and the people to acknowledge the difficulties of their situation, and to accept the obvious remedy for them by creating a vigorous national government. Now that we have been living under the federal constitution for two-thirds of a century, and have experienced from it nothing but good, the country having been prosperous beyond all expectation, and our attachment to the memory of those who framed the instrument having risen to absolute veneration, it is difficult to go back to the period of its formation, to enter into the feelings and opinions of the men of those times, and to understand why they regarded with so much jealousy and dread the proposal of a more perfect union and the institution of an effective central government. To state the question plainly, Why did they need to be *whipped in* to the adoption of a measure, the good effects of which were almost instantaneous, and the expediency of which at this day does not seem to admit of a doubt? Perhaps Mr. Curtis might profitably have devoted an additional chapter to the answer to this question. It is hardly enough to say that the states were jealous of each other, because the confederation had made them rivals rather than friends, so that there had been a good deal of retaliatory legislation between them. Why should not this mutual jealousy and dislike have been allayed, rather than enhanced, by the prospect of a more perfect union, and the establishment of a central government to act as umpire between the contending parties? We can allude very briefly to but two circumstances which may assist us in resolving this problem.

First, the exertions and sacrifices of the states and the people during the war had been enormous, and a feeling of languor and exhaustion, an invincible disinclination to do or suffer anything more, had become well nigh universal. Industry had been unproductive, while the drafts of men and money had been fearfully great. Agriculture had been impeded, commerce had been destroyed, manufac-

tures were not yet in being. The paper currency having ceased to exist, because its value had fallen to nothing, the private debts, which had been contracted in this depreciated paper, had to be paid in gold or silver—that is, thirty or forty had to be paid for one. In looking back to those times, we remember that the government of the confederation was bankrupt and in distress, but we are apt to forget that the people were bankrupt and in distress also. The state legislatures were besieged with applications to pass tender laws, stop laws, appraisement laws, and a hundred other contrivances to relieve poor debtors; and many of the legislatures yielded to this pressure. An open rebellion broke out in Massachusetts, the sole object of which was to shut up the courts, to disable the constable and the sheriff, to hang the lawyers, and thus to render the collection of debts impossible.

Certainly it was right and just, that the claims of the army should be liquidated in full, that provision should be made to pay the interest, and gradually discharge the principal of the public debt, that payment of the debts due to British subjects before the war should be enforced, and that many other things should be done to maintain public faith and private credit. It was well understood that the immediate effect of the establishment of the new Constitution would be to enforce these claims and discharge these obligations. The exhausted and impoverished people, partially demoralized by the war, looked forward with dismay to the new burdens of taxation which would thus be placed upon their shoulders. They were well aware, also, that the new administration would enforce payment of private, as well as public debts; that the stern action of the federal judiciary would sweep away the whole fabric of tender and appraisement laws, would enforce the obligation of contracts, would prevent the states from issuing any more paper money, and thus, on every side, would increase their difficulties. They naturally shrank from a political change which would have such results. It is a humiliating but unquestionable fact, that the anti-federal feeling of those times derived much of its strength from the general desire for a repudiation of debts, and for public and private bankruptcy.

The second cause of aversion to the change was more honourable to the people, for it arose from an ill-directed and unenlightened attachment to liberty. They were fiercely impatient of anything which should seem to limit their newly acquired freedom. They had gone through all the dangers and sacrifices of the war to release themselves from a foreign yoke, and to secure the inestimable privilege of being taxed only by their own state legislatures. Were they now, of their own accord, to bend their necks to a new yoke, and

submit to be taxed, to be restrained in their commerce, to be deprived of half of their legislative power, to have the tribunals and the officers of a new-fangled government introduced among them? As well might they return to their former state of colonial vassalage. It mattered not, that the offices in the new administration were to be filled by men of their own choice; in the federal elections, the will of any one state would be overborne and beaten down by the united voice of the other twelve states. Each feared to find itself in the minority; each was apprehensive that it would be a vassal of the new government, rather than a member of it and a sharer in its privileges. In so far as the federal rule was a novelty, an untried experiment, it seemed foreign to the people. It was not a direct emanation from the state authority to which all were accustomed. It was a stranger in the land, coming to establish itself by the side of the dominion which all respected, and to rob it of half of its sovereignty. No wonder that many of the people resisted the change with as much earnestness as they had withstood British tyranny.

Again we must refer to Mr. Curtis's volume for a clear exposition of the causes, the pressing necessities and dangers, which finally overcame this reluctance, and established the new Constitution over the people almost in spite of themselves. We had proposed to say something of the character and labours of the eminent men to whom the formation and adoption of the new form of government are chiefly to be attributed; but our remarks have already occupied too much space, and we must close them with an extract, as a specimen of our author's manner, from his sketch of the character of Hamilton.

"Hamilton's relation to the Constitution is peculiar. He had less direct agency in framing its chief provisions than many of the other principal persons who sat in the convention; and some of its provisions were not wholly acceptable to him when framed. But the history, which has been detailed in the previous chapters of this work, of the progress of federal ideas, and of the efforts to introduce and establish principles tending to consolidate the Union, has been largely occupied with the recital of his opinions, exertions, and prevalent influence. Beginning with the year 1780, when he was only three-and-twenty years of age, and when he sketched the outline of a national government strongly resembling the one which the Constitution long afterward established; passing through the term of his service in congress, when his admirable expositions of the revenue system, the commercial power, and the ratio of contribution, may justly be said to have saved the Union from dissolution; and coming down to the time when he did so much to bring about, first, the meeting at Annapolis, and then the general and final convention of all the states—the whole period is marked by his wisdom and filled with his power. He did more than any other public man of the time to lessen the force of state attachments, to create a national feeling, and to lead the public mind to a comprehension of the necessity for an efficient national sovereignty.

"Indeed, he was the first to perceive and to develop the idea of a real union of the people of the United States. To him, more than to any one else, is to be attributed the conviction that the people of the different states were competent to establish a general government by their own direct action; and that this mode of proceeding ought to be considered within the contemplation of the state legislatures, when they appointed delegates to a convention for the revision and amendment of the existing system.

"The age in which he lived, and the very extraordinary early maturity of his character, naturally remind us of that remarkable person who was two years his junior, and who became prime-minister of England at the age of twenty-four. The younger Pitt entered public life "with almost every possible advantage. Inheriting "a great and celebrated name," educated expressly for the career of a statesman, and introduced into the House of Commons at a moment when power was just ready to drop into the hands of any man capable of wielding it, he had only to prove himself a brilliant and powerful debater, in order to become the ruler of an empire, whose constitution had been settled for ages, and was necessarily administered by the successful leaders of regular parties in its legislative body. That he was a most eminent parliamentary orator, a consummate tactician and leader of party, a minister of singular energy, and a statesman of a very high order of mind and character, at an age when most men are scarcely beginning to give proofs of what they may become,—all this History has deliberately and finally recorded. What place it may assign to him among the statesmen by whose lives and actions England and the world have been materially and permanently benefitted is not yet settled, and it is not to the present purpose to consider.

"The theatre in which Hamilton appeared, lived, and acted, was one of a character so totally different, that the comparison necessarily ends with the contrast which it immediately suggests. Like Pitt, indeed, he seems to have been born a statesman, and to have had no such youth as ordinarily precedes the manhood of the mind. But, in the American colonies, no political system of things existed that was fitted to train him for a career of usefulness and honor; and yet, when the years of his boyhood were hardly ended, he sprang forth into the troubled affairs of the time with the full stature of a matured and well-furnished statesman. He, in truth, showed himself to be already the man that was wanted. Everything was in an unsettled and anxious state;—a state of change and transition. There was no regular, efficient government. It was all but a state of civil war, and the more clear-sighted saw that this great disaster was coming. He was compelled, therefore, to mark out for himself, step by step, beginning in 1774, a system of political principles which should serve, not to administer existing institutions with wisdom and beneficence, but to create institutions able to unite a people divided into thirteen independent sovereignties; to give them the attitude and capacity of an independent nation; and then to carry them on, with constantly increasing prosperity and power, to their just place in the affairs of the world. It was a great work, but Mr. Hamilton was equal to it. He was by nature, by careful study, and by still more careful, anxious, and earnest thought, eminently fitted to detect and develop those resources of power and progress, which, in the dark condition of society that attends and follows an exhausting period of revolution, lie hidden, like generous seeds, until some strong hand disencumbers them of the soil with which they had been oppressed, and gives them opportunity to germinate and bear golden fruit. At the age of three-and-twenty he had already formed well-defined, profound, and comprehensive opinions on the situation and wants of these states. He had clearly discerned the practicability of forming a confederated government, and adapting it to their peculiar condition, resources, and exigencies. He had wrought out for himself a political system, far in advance of the conceptions of his contemporaries, and one which, in the hands of those who most opposed him in life, became, when he was laid in a prema-

ture grave, the basis on which this government was consolidated; on which, to the present day, it has been administered; and on which alone it can safely rest in that future which seems so to stretch out its unending glories before us.

"Mr. Hamilton, therefore, I conceive, proved himself early to be a statesman of greater talent and power than the celebrated English minister whose youthful success was in the eyes of the world so much more brilliant, and whose early death was no less disheartening; for none can doubt, that to build up a free and firm state out of a condition of political chaos, and to give it a government capable of developing the resources of its soil and people, and of insuring to it prosperity, power, and permanence, is a greater work than to administer with energy and success—even in periods of severe trial—the constitution of an empire whose principles and modes of action have been settled for centuries.

ART. III.—MR. MAURICE AND HIS WRITINGS.

1. *Theological Essays*. By FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE, M. A., Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn. Second Edition. With a new Preface, and other Additions. Cambridge, (England.) Macmillan and Co. 1853.
2. *The Unity of the New Testament: a Synopsis of the First Three Gospels, and of the Epistles of St. James, St. Jude, St. Peter, and St. Paul*. By FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE, M. A., Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn. London. John W. Parker and Son. 1854.
3. *Examination of Mr. Maurice's Theological Essays*. By ROBERT S. CANDLISH, D. D. London. Nesbit and Co. 1854.

THE first of the works on this list is the manifesto of Mr. Maurice's peculiar views, set forth systematically and pretty fully, and was the occasion of his dismissal from the professorship of divinity at King's College, London. The second has been subsequently published; but appears in substance to have been, for the most part, previously prepared, and contains no allusion, we believe, to the controversy and events which followed the publication of the "Essays." Our business in this article is primarily with the former work, and we shall only refer to the latter where it may afford peculiar illustration of views expressed or implied in the former. The third work on the list—Dr. Candlish's examination of Maurice's Essays—has been of some service in assisting us to form our judgment of the views propounded in those Essays.

No one at all acquainted with the previous writings of Mr. Maurice can doubt that the body of doctrines contained in the "Essays" had long been formed in his mind. Indeed, from his correspondence with Dr. Jelf it is certain, as we have seen in a former article, that for many years—even, as it would seem, from the period when he first emerged out of Unitarianism and took a deter-

mined position as a Trinitarian—he had held a system of opinions, partly negative and partly positive, identical in its main points and essential principles with that contained in these “Essays.” The occasion, however, which led to the actual publication in a systematic and developed form of his theological system was peculiar and characteristic.

A lady, once a member of the Society of Friends, left by will a sum of money in charge of Mr. Maurice in order that he might be enabled “to write, or procure to be written, some book especially addressed to Unitarians.” Of course the object of such a book would be to win Unitarians over to Trinitarianism. From the antecedents of Mr. Maurice it might be expected that such a task would have a special interest for him. The work to be accomplished, also, might seem all the less difficult in his case, inasmuch as he would not conceive that in winning them over to Trinitarianism it would also be needful to convert them to orthodoxy. He is himself as much opposed to evangelical orthodoxy as any Unitarian can be. He rejects as strongly as any follower of Priestley or of Belsham can have ever done the evangelical doctrine of atonement made by the blood of Christ. Though he feels no difficulty and sees no contradiction in the *natural* mystery of the Trinity, yet his heart refuses to accept the *moral* mystery of a guilty race and of atonement through the sufferings of a Divine Substitute; whereas the evangelical Christian receives in implicit faith both mysteries equally and alike on the supreme authority of the word of God. This, again, brings into view another and a fundamental point in regard to which Mr. Maurice would feel himself to be agreed with the Unitarian.

Though Mr. Maurice has changed the faith in which he was brought up, he has not abandoned the ground of Rationalism on which that faith rested, both as positively and negatively defined. He stands upon the same ground as the Unitarian in rejecting the faith of evangelical orthodoxy; he still stands, or supposes himself to stand upon the same in accepting the doctrine of the Trinity. According to his own statement, in his letter to a friend published in the correspondence with Dr. Jelf, it was on certain *à priori* grounds of reason, not on the authority of divine revelation, that he embraced the doctrine of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; so that Mr. Maurice and the Unitarian will not fundamentally disagree as to the method to be observed in theological controversy. An evangelical believer, when arguing with a Unitarian, finds it essential, in the first place, that the divine authority of the revelation contained in the Scriptures should be established; and then,

upon this basis, he rests his faith in all the doctrines of revelation. But, on this point, Mr. Maurice seems, on his own showing, to have never been anything different from a Unitarian. All, therefore, that *he* has to do, in arguing against Unitarianism, is to show that the Trinitarian doctrines—as apart from the evangelical doctrine of atonement—are accordant with the reason, consciousness, and necessities of man. If he can make this good, he has gained his point.

Certainly, as a supplementary buttress of the Christian faith, an argument making this good would, in some respects, be very valuable. So far as Mr. Maurice may have done this in any part of his volume he deserves the thanks of the Christian world. But it is important to observe that even if this were done to the conviction of all gainsayers, comparatively little might notwithstanding be effected. After all, the *mere* faith in a Trinity in Unity is not Christianity. A man who simply receives this abstract doctrine upon certain grounds of speculation and argument is very little more than a heathen philosopher. Apart from the humbling, yet exalting, doctrines of sin and grace, of guilt and atonement, there is no true Christianity. Even the doctrine of the Trinity loses its peculiar and transcendent glory when received apart from the relations of the Godhead—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—to the recovery, sanctification, and final salvation of man; and the incarnation, apart from the atonement, becomes comparatively unimpressive, and, in many respects, altogether unintelligible.

We have already indicated that Mr. Maurice is, at bottom, a Rationalist. His "Essays" amply illustrate this. Throughout the volume he appeals, in evidence of the doctrines which he teaches, and in opposition to those which he denies, not in any case to the authority of Scripture, but always to human reason and consciousness. Scripture he occasionally uses in illustration of his views; but this he does very seldom, and he lets it be clearly seen that when he does, it is *only* by way of illustration, not of authentication. The structure of the work, however, is not at all argumentative, nor the texture of the "Essays" by any means logical. The "Essays" are throughout didactic. Mr. Maurice explains, teaches his system. He lays out his views in order, and exhibits their harmony with each other, and, as he conceives, with human consciousness. Sometimes, also, though never very formally, he endeavours to show how they agree with the teaching of Scripture. But he does not logically deduce them from any premises or principles laid down; far less does he derive them by any evident process from Scripture. That he merely expounds his views, however, and shows their rela-

tion to the common thoughts and feelings of humanity, does not make him the less a Rationalist. He contemptuously discards logic as his instrument, it is true, but still his appeal throughout is to consciousness, to the voice of man's spirit, and thus to the final verdict and judgment of man's reason, of which the logical faculty is but a form. "The question," as he says (in the Preface to his Second Edition) in reference to himself and certain opponents of the new Unitarian school,—*"The question at issue between us is, not whether they are good reasoners and I am a bad one; but what gospel they have to bring to mankind, what light they have to throw on all the questionings and yearnings of the human spirit. On that issue I am willing to put their creed and mine."*

It is no objection to this general view that many parts of these "Essays" seem to be vague and mystical in their teaching. As the present bishop of Hereford (Dr. Hampden) says somewhere in his Bampton Lectures: *"Mysticism is but an insane Rationalism."* Faith appeals to the word of God—leaving to reason the office of apprehending the evidence which attests the divinity of that word—and faith, so far as it is a religious faith, rests alone and implicitly on that word; whereas Rationalism, whether it be logical, intuitional, mystical, or to be described by any other epithet, relies not on the authority of God, but on the wisdom of men.

It has been matter of universal complaint that, though the *style* of the "Essays," as of all Mr. Maurice's writings, is exceedingly simple and purely English, yet the sense of many passages is extremely dubious, and the general purport of the volume, in a positive sense, almost impenetrably obscure. Its negative and destructive sense is generally plain enough. We soon find out that there are a great many things which Mr. Maurice strongly dislikes, and in general that he cordially detests and almost everywhere misrepresents the peculiar doctrines of evangelical orthodoxy. His sneers and sarcasms are, for the most part, plain enough. But what Mr. Maurice himself believes it is by no means so easy to make out. He does not deal in definitions; indeed these could scarcely be expected from a writer who repudiates logic. His descriptions about a thing and its relations are often eloquent; but all the while we have not been able to ascertain the precise nature of the thing itself. We may know what ideas we have been accustomed to associate with the name by which Mr. Maurice calls it; but Mr. Maurice has probably denied and denounced most of these, and given us to understand something very different from what we have been taught; yet he has never plainly told us what, in his judgment, it really is. He has perhaps told us where it is, when it is felt or

seen; he has also told us what, and where, and when, and how it is *not*; but all the while—our old notions being put to flight—we are only the more puzzled and perplexed as to what it is. One reason of this vagueness and obscurity in these “*Essays*” probably is that Mr. Maurice’s faith is much more strongly defined negatively than positively. He knows what he dislikes and rejects, but has not clearly defined on some points what he actually accepts or admits. But the main reason is the real abstruseness of the principles of his Christianotyped philosophy. Some of his views are scarcely susceptible of popular statement. They require to be scientifically defined. But if thus defined, their scholastic abstruseness would repulse popular readers, while their lack of logical evidence would leave them powerless for the scientific thinker. A man can scarcely understand astronomy, even in general, without some systematic study of the elements of the science. So some logical and philosophical training is requisite if we would enter into the abstruse refinements of the Realistic philosophy. Now, strange to say, the doctrines of Platonic Realism lie at the bottom of all Mr. Maurice’s vague speculations, and form the substratum of these discursive “*Essays*.” For years past Mr. Maurice has been endeavouring to prepare the mind of Britain’s earnest and intelligent youth to receive, in a popular form, these doctrines. But for such doctrines to be received with any degree of real intelligence and conscious mastery a different sort of preparation is needful. Even the genius of Mr. Maurice cannot put into popular form what is so essentially abstruse. Hence the “*Essays*” have come upon a public still unprepared to receive them. No doubt the destructive criticism (if anything so unmethodical may be called criticism) which they contain will do much harm—their sarcasms upon doctrines long esteemed venerable will unsettle some minds—but the positive system of speculative heresy, (as we do not scruple to call it,) which they are intended to teach, will find few prepared to apprehend, much less to receive it.

We have implied that Mr. Maurice is a Realist, and that a philosophy of Realism lies at the bottom of all his theology. Of course we have no intention here of entering into the depths of the scholastic controversy between the Nominalists and the Realists, which occupied the over-subtle intellects and sharpened the everlasting logic of the great schoolmen of the middle ages. Let none, however, imagine that these obsolete controversies have no present or permanent interest for us of this age. Dr. Hampden has made it abundantly evident, by his Bampton Lectures, that scholasticism was the forge in which the forms and phraseology of modern Church

doctrines were shaped. Realism, in particular, forms the ground upon which the Popish and Anglican high-Church doctrines of sacramental grace and efficacy are woven. Mr. Maurice's Realism, however, is not derived from the scholastic doctors of the middle ages, but from Plato. "Plato," says G. R. Lewes, in his *Biographical History of Philosophy*, "was the first Realist, Pierre Leroux is the last." He is, however, mistaken. Mr. Maurice is the latest Realist we know, and is a true inheritor of the spirit of the old pagan Platonism. This popular modern is endeavouring to introduce into the circles of English society in the present age the pre-Christian and anti-Christian ideal philosophy of Plato, well trained, however, to use modern phrases, to accommodate itself to modern prejudices and sentiments, and to speak with a pure English tongue.

We should despair of rendering Realism thoroughly intelligible, even in its general principles, to any one who has not been more or less trained in metaphysical habits of thought. We may say, however, briefly, that by this philosophy, what metaphysicians call an *objective reality* is assigned to the general notions of the mind. There is held to be an actual original corresponding to every abstract idea, by direct participation of which original any subject becomes invested with the attribute or quality denoted by such idea. Every distinct faculty and quality of human nature, for instance, as originally constituted, is supposed to have its separate archetype and original existing from eternity in the nature of Deity, by direct derivation from which it exists.

"Thus all power, or wisdom, or goodness observed in the universe were actual derivations of qualities, intrinsically residing in God himself, and going forth as it were out of him into the works of his creation, not simply the *evidences* of the existence of such qualities in him as their Author and Giver; but the *real presence* of the divine qualities themselves analogically denoted by those terms. So again, the relations of human life, as that of Father and Son, were, according to their view, not original, as existing in human nature, but founded on their archetypes in God."—DR. HAMPDEN, (*Bampton Lectures*, Lect. iii, p. 109.)

This was the Realism of the schoolmen, but the description equally serves for the Realism of Plato, from whom undoubtedly this prime part of the scholastic philosophy, by means of which, as applied according to the logical and deductive *method* of Aristotle, such wonderful speculations were wrought out in the middle ages, was originally derived. That we have not erred in laying down this as a fundamental principle of Mr. Maurice's philosophy will be at once apparent from the quotations we are about to give. They occur in a sermon on the Creation, being the first in a volume of sermons on the Pentateuch, the first title of which is, "On the Old Testament."

Our readers will be puzzled by the passages as they read; but let them ponder them well. They will see that they make the Mosaic creation to have been a creation not of actual material things, but of the ideal archetypes of all things.

"First of all 'God made man in his own image; male and female created he them;' *afterward* it is said he made 'a man out of the dust of the ground, and breathed into *his* nostrils the breath of life.' If we follow the letter of these passages, and do not endeavour to put any notions of our own into them, we shall be led, I think, naturally to the conclusion that the former words have to do with the *species* as we should say, if we must have logical phrases, (which I would rather avoid if it were possible;) and that the other has to do with an *individual*—with the first man of the race. What I wish you particularly to notice is, that the part of the record which speaks of man ideally, according to his place with reference to the rest of the universe, according to his position with reference to God, is the part which expressly belongs to the history of CREATION; that the bringing forth of man in *this* sense is the work of the sixth day."—Pp. 3, 4.

"Extend this thought, which seems to rise inevitably out of the story of *man* as Moses delivers it, to the rest of that universe of which he regards *man* as the climax, and we are forced to the conclusion that in the one case, as in the other, it is not the visible material thing of which the historian is speaking—but that which lies below the visible material thing, and constitutes the substance which it shows forth. We are compelled, then, to consider creation of herbs and flowers as well as the creation of beasts and birds and fishes, which is recorded in the previous chapter [in chap. i] as the bringing forth of kind and orders such as they were according to the mind of God, not of actual separate phenomenal existences, such as they present themselves to the senses of man."—Pp. 5, 6.

Subsequently—but our space forbids us to quote more from this sermon—he teaches that the days and the week spoken of in Gen. i refer not to real, but ideal time. It is fit that the ideal creation (!) should take place in ideal time, which, of course, as indeed Mr. Maurice tells us, is no time at all.

Now this is pure Platonism, and Moses is thus made to speak Platonism to all men. Our readers will probably think it unintelligible; so, we must confess, do we: but it is Platonism notwithstanding. We do not wonder that an uninspired and heathen philosopher, matching his intellect, noble as it was, against the deep mysteries of being, and struggling in vain to solve them, should have invented speculations such as these. But we cannot but wonder at an English clergyman of the nineteenth century not only with the Bible in his hand, going back to Platonism, but positively finding his philosophy in his Bible.

But in what sphere have these invisible and impalpable "intelligibles" (as Plato used to call them) been resident? Some of the neo-Platonists held them to have had an independent subsistence from eternity; some even conceived of these abstract ideas as living

beings (!),* and as everlasting gods. Plato himself sometimes speaks of them as "eternal gods." Cudworth, however, Mosheim, and Maurice himself,† will not allow that Plato believed in anything so absurd as that these "intelligible ideas" had an independent existence. They were brought into being, and had their being, in the mind of the Deity. This mind of the Deity, the Divine Nous, is, moreover, so spoken of by Plato as to lead Cudworth and many before him, especially such as have themselves been inclined to Platonize, to conceive that Plato believed in a plurality of persons in the Divine Nature. Indeed it has been a not uncommon, though it may well be doubted if it is a just opinion, that he believed in something tantamount to a Christian Trinity,—The One or The Good, The Mind or Acting and Governing Reason, the Soul (Psyche), or Animating Principle, being the three hypostases of this Platonic Trinity, and the ideas of which we have spoken being undoubtedly connected by him especially with the Divine Nous, as their original, have been supposed to be, in the language of Cudworth, "all of them really nothing else but the noemata or conceptions of that one perfect intellect, which was the second hypothesis of the Platonists.‡ Now Mr. Maurice, undoubtedly, holds a correspondent view. Being a Platonist, he finds no difficulty in believing in what he calls a Trinity. With him the Son of God corresponds to the Divine Nous. In him all these preëxistent ideas are supposed to have been contained, and with him to have been identified. In particular, humanity is considered as having had its original in him, before all worlds. Mr. Maurice even speaks of all men as having been "created in him!" though, of course, this could not be except he were created. But in fact there seems to be no true idea of creation in the case. This philosophy is not one of creation, but of emanation. Nothing that exists is ever out of the Son of God, or separated from him. Hence Mr. Maurice uses, in the work from which we have been quoting, such language as the following:—

"I ask you not to believe that a man was able to frustrate the purposes of God, not to think that the world was created in Adam, or stood in his obedience, when the Scriptures of the New Testament, illustrating those of the Old, teach us that it stood and stands in the obedience of God's well-beloved Son, the real image of the Father, the real bond of human society, and of the whole universe, who was to be manifested in the fulness of time, as that which he had ever been," &c.—Pp. 40, 41.

* Hence Butler, in *Hudibras*—"If *bonum* be an animal."

† Moral and Met. Philosophy. En., Metrop., New Ed., vol. i. pp. 146, 149. Throughout this work Maurice appears as the *advocate* of the Platonic philosophy.

‡ Intellectual System, ii, 350. Tegg's edition, with Mosheim's erudite and invaluable notes, translated by Harrison. London.

Hence also the Son of God is spoken of as "He in whom God formed all men to be brethren, so that he who sheds the blood of another, sheds his own," as "he from whom came the life, the faith, the hope, the love of all who had strength to believe that God was their Creator, and Preserver, and Deliverer," "in whom God could look upon them, and they could look upon God."—Pp. 58, 59. But many more and much more remarkable passages in the same sense will be found in his latest works, and a few of these we shall give by and by. One more quotation from the same volume we give here, the meaning of which some deeper Platonist than ourselves must give.

"Do not be frightened by the word anthropomorphism, for there may be the deepest reason in the nature of things, in the laws of the universe, why God should only be known in and through a man."—Pp. 73, 74.

What we have now said will help our readers to understand our meaning when we say that the fundamental principle of Mr. Maurice's speculations in his two famous "Essays," is that all men are, by a real physical identity, one with the Son of God. The original of human nature, by direct participation of which all men are men, has from eternity been with and in the Son of God. Obscure hints of this doctrine had been given in some of Mr. Maurice's former works, especially, as we have seen, in some passages of his volume "On the Old Testament." But the "Essays" show how it is related to his whole scheme of speculation. It is not indeed explicitly assumed, or definitely stated, in any part of the "Essays;" but it underlies the whole and gives shape to every part. It is perpetually coming out in such expressions as, that the Son of God is "the root and ground of our humanity." Perhaps nowhere in the compass of one or two sentences is it so clearly implied as when Mr. Maurice says of St. Paul, on his receiving baptism:—

"How impossible, then, was it for him to receive baptism as if it were merely the outward badge of a profession, a sign which separated the sect of the Nazarenes from other Jews or other men! If it marked him out as a Christian, that was because it denoted that *he would no more be the member of any sect, of any partial society whatever, and that he was claiming his relation to the Son of God, the Head of the whole human race.* It must import his belief that *THIS SON OF GOD AND NOT ADAM, WAS THE TRUE ROOT OF HUMANITY; THAT FROM HIM, AND NOT FROM ANY ANCESTORS, EACH MAN DERIVED HIS LIFE.*"—P. 202.

So he says, (p. 94,) "*In him (the Son of God) and for him we were created.*" To learn, however, the full force of such language as this, when used by Mr. Maurice, it will be necessary to trace the influence of the principle we have stated upon the whole tissue of his speculations. No isolated sentence or statement will fully express

even its own meaning. There is generally more or less ambiguity in the mere words, which only an attentive consideration of the whole scope and context can altogether remove. We do not presume to say how far this ambiguity is designed; but it characterizes most of the volume. The ordinary reader feels himself to be in a perpetual maze of uncertainty, as if he could scarcely ever fix Mr. Maurice's sense or get at the bottom of his purpose. Only the initiated can see the principle and plan which consistently pervade the volume. In Mr. Maurice's later work, however, on the "Unity of the New Testament," he speaks occasionally more plainly if not more boldly. Perhaps there is less reason since his separation from King's College, why he should in any way veil his meaning. The whole of Mr. Maurice's general exposition of the Epistle to the Ephesians, in this volume, is full of the principle we have laid down. We shall have occasion hereafter to quote from this exposition some passages illustrative of the effect of this principle of Mr. Maurice on his general scheme of doctrine. Meanwhile the following brief but pregnant extracts will throw light upon our present point:—

"Here, [in the epistle to the Ephesians,] if anywhere, we may expect to find the ground of a spiritual society which has a deeper foundation than the Jewish calling or covenant, which has its foundation in the nature of God himself, which explains and supports all human relationships, which has all spiritual enemies to fight with set forth," &c.—*Unity of the N. T.*, p. 516.

"What St. Paul asserts on behalf of himself and the little band of those who had turned to God and believed in Christ, was a share in the privileges of humanity as that is created, elected, known by God in Christ."—P. 526.

"It had been shown him [Paul] that the Gentiles are [not should be, according to our version] fellow-heirs and of the same body. *Beginning from that highest ground before the fall, before the creation, he had seen God creating all things in Christ, God purposing to gather up all things in Christ, men standing only in virtue of God's election of them in Christ.* So the truth dawned upon him that all men, of whatever race or tongue, do constitute one body in him; that out of him, whether circumcised or uncircumcised, they must be divided; since in him, whether circumcised or uncircumcised, they are one, BY THE LAW OF THEIR CREATION, and become actually one, when they believe that law, and submit to it. Here was the foundation of a gospel, the gospel with which St. Paul was intrusted; good news to men, not of something which was coming to them, but of their actual state, of that state which belongs to them, but which they do not recognize."—Pp. 536, 537.

So, in his analysis of the Epistle to the Romans, especially of the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters, the same principle underlies the whole.

"I look," says Mr. Maurice, "upon Christ's death and resurrection as revelations of the Son of God in whom all things had stood from the first, in whom God had looked upon his creature man from the first."—P. 367.

Elsewhere, in the same work, when giving his view of the general purport of Matthew xxiv and xxv, Mr. Maurice says:—

"If we do believe that the Son of man is himself best able to tell us what sitting on the throne of his glory and the gathering before him of all nations are, let us listen to his own teaching; let us think that when he utters the words, '*Inasmuch as ye did it to one of the least of these ye did it to me,*' he proclaimed that which is the very truth of human existence, that with which it must be eternal life to be in conformity, and eternal death to be at variance. He actually is one with every man. He has come to proclaim that he is by his incarnation and his death. He did judge the old world according to this law."—Pp. 219, 220.

So again, speaking of the connexion between the passover and the eucharist, he teaches that—

"Beneath the Jewish kingdom there did actually lie another and a deeper one; its national sacraments contain the idea of some more real sacrament grounded upon an actual relationship between the Son of God and [not, be it observed, believers, but] human creatures, of the most intimate kind which language can express, a relationship implying the closest communion of inward life, of inward love."—Pp. 146, 147.

And here, to end these quotations, is a remarkable bit of Platonic Realism, directly bearing upon our present point. Mr. Maurice is commenting on the text, "In heaven their angels, &c.," in the eighteenth chapter of St. Matthew, and observes:—

"The little child, the humblest human creature, was dear to his Father in heaven. He did not look upon it merely as a fallen corrupted thing. Its angel, its pure original type, that which it was created to be, was ever present with him, was ever looking up into his face. To bring it to this state was his will."—Pp. 205, 206.

This, viewed by the light of the other passages we have cited, and connected with the scope of the whole volume, can only mean that every separate child, or human creature, had from eternity its archetype and original; that all these archetypes meet in and are identified with the Son of God; that in him they all—all these "angels"—are ever present with the Father, ever looking up into his face! Our readers will now perceive with what justice we identified the teachings of Mr. Maurice, notwithstanding his popular and somewhat fashionable air, with the abstrusities of a Platonic Realism.

We have been thus particular in establishing our fundamental position, partly because it wore a strong *primâ facie* appearance of improbability when held in regard to a writer so opposed in style and method to anything like philosophical abstruseness as Mr. Maurice; partly also because, so far as we know, none of Mr. Maurice's many critics hitherto has appeared to be aware of his Realism and Platonism, and it might be imagined, therefore, that we could have no sufficient ground for our assertions; and partly, again, because, this position once established, the work of anything like fundamental refutation of speculations resting on such a basis

is, as we conceive, rendered superfluous. There may still remain to be corrected misrepresentations of that evangelical doctrine which Mr. Maurice, of necessity, rejects; but the main work needful to dispose of Mr. Maurice's speculations will be to show how all these logically flow from the one principle we have explained; we say logically flow, for though Mr. Maurice eschews logic as an instrument of conviction or as giving method to exposition, we must do him the justice to say that there is a real and close logical connexion between all the parts of his theory. Mr. Maurice no doubt has acted wisely in avoiding a logical exposition of his views. To have done this would have compelled him to define, in bare matter-of-fact terms, the fundamental principle on which the whole of his speculations rests. But we imagine that this would at once have been fatal to his cause, since the modern public are hardly likely to concede so unaxiomatic a postulate as the truth of Platonic Realism.

It will at once be seen how incompatible such a principle as that which has been explained is with the whole tenor of orthodox Christian theology. It displaces or essentially alters every peculiar doctrine of Scripture. The first and most obvious effect is, that the relation of the Father to the human race is altered. It is no longer even that of a creator—properly or precisely understood—unless indeed the Son were created, or the human nature of Christ, as one with the Son, were created anterior to the formation of Adam, one of which suppositions would really seem to be required by several of the expressions we have quoted.* It is not by any means that of a sovereign ruler—it is merely that of a Father. The analogy of providential rule is no longer that of a general government under law, according to the will and mind of the ruler, and for the common weal. It is that of a family under the eye of a father. Nay, the relation between human creatures and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ becomes, on this hypothesis, even dearer, more intimate, and more unchangeable than this analogy might seem to imply. All men are essentially and always bound to the great Father in the unity of his infinitely worthy, endeared, and glorious Son. None of them possesses a separate and merely individual relationship to the Father. The being of all is one with the being of the One. None can be finally disinherited, because none can for a moment be severed from that One. The Son of God is and ever must be in and one with every man. This, as we

* For example: "In Him we were created." "Humanity is created, elected, known, by God in Christ." "Before the creation God created all things in Christ." So also at p. 204 of the *Essays* it is said of all men, as men, that "they are created, redeemed, justified in Christ."

shall by and by see, is not only a corollary from the fundamental principle of Mr. Maurice's theory—it is the express, reiterated, uniform doctrine of the "Essays." Law and justice, as the oracle and arm of the Divine Governor, are thus done away; love only remains. There may be disapprobation of acts, but never condemnation of the person. There will, therefore, be no great assize—no judgment-day. And if there be no general judgment, there can be no general resurrection either. So Mr. Maurice teaches; so, on his principle, he *must* teach. We may particularly refer to Essays II, IV, V, and XII, on "Sin," "The Sense of Righteousness in Man, and their Discovery of a Redeemer," "The Son of God," and the "Judgment Day," in proof and illustration of the representation we have now given. Of course the doctrine of the atonement vanishes on this theory. Mankind have never been far off, and therefore have no need to be brought nigh. All they need, as Mr. Maurice constantly teaches, is to see how near they *are* and ever have been. Neither could the Son of God become, by special covenant, the substitute for those with whom he is by nature and from eternity physically identified,—in the strictest and most intimate sense, already one. "Christ is actually the Lord of men, the king of their spirits, the source of all the light which ever visited them, the person for whom all nations longed as their Head and Deliverer, *the root of righteousness in each man*. The Bible speaks of his being revealed in this character; of the mystery which had been hid from ages and generations being made known by his incarnation. *If we speak of Christ as taking upon himself the sins of men by some artificial substitution, we deny that he is their actual representative.*"—Essays, p. 144. Indeed, not only the evangelical doctrine of atonement by the vicarious sufferings and death of Christ is done away, but no part of the Scriptural doctrine of Christ's mediatorship remains. Mr. Maurice does, indeed, regard and speak of the Son of God as mediator. But this is not in consequence of the covenant of grace. In his view, the mediatorship is not grounded upon the incarnation, but the incarnation is the manifestation in time and on the earth of that mediatorship which had existed before creation and before time. The Son of God has ever been the mediator between God and man, in virtue of his original relationship to both. This mystery, in the language of our last quotation, "was hid from ages and from generations, but was made known by the incarnation." See Essays V, VI, and VII, on "The Son of God," "The Incarnation," and "The Atonement."

Of course this relationship is not affected by what we call the fall of man. Had Adam never fallen, Christ would still have been me-

diator, in the same sense that he is now, and would equally have become incarnate. A careful reader will find that this is assumed throughout the "Essays." In the "Unity of the New Testament" it is very clearly implied, though we do not find it anywhere, in so many words, affirmed.

We may, however, particularly refer to the former part of the analysis of the Epistle to the Romans, and to the general tenor of that of the Epistle to the Ephesians. Mr. Maurice strongly and altogether rejects the view that "St. Paul's theology starts from the idea of human depravity; that he looks upon Christ and all the acts of Christ, [he, Mr. Maurice, is almost afraid of using profane language, but knows not how to avoid it,] as mere provisions against sin." Of course we do not regard the mediatorial arrangements as mere provisions against sin; but Mr. Maurice intends to deny that they were, in any sense, expressly adapted to meet the conditions and needs of a fallen world. Indeed, according to him, fall, in our sense, there has been none. There have been sins and evils; and these have, in many instances, and often for long periods of time, accumulated from age to age. There is also an evil spirit whose temptations have been the occasions of sin, and who has ever been prompt to take advantage of circumstances in planning and pressing his temptations. But, notwithstanding all this, righteousness has ever been more native and essential to man than sin. The Son of God has ever been in and with those whom he created in his own image; more intimately near to them, and more truly and vitally one with them, than the spirit of evil, however the evil spirit might, for a time, seem to triumph over them. This is the doctrine expressly taught by Mr. Maurice in two remarkable essays,—those on "The Sense of Righteousness in Man, and his Discovery of a Redeemer," and in "The Evil Spirit." (IV and III.) The former of these essays has been felt to be particularly obscure; we have not met with any of Mr. Maurice's critics who seemed to understand it; but the key we have given will be found to unlock its meaning.

Mr. Maurice's doctrine as to justification and regeneration, (Essays IX and X,) will, of course, correspond with his views on the subject of the mediation and the atonement. The justification of Christ by the resurrection was, precisely and literally, the justification of all men. "God having justified his Son by raising him from the dead, *in that act* justified the race for which Christ died," (Essays, p. 202,) Christ being "the *actual* mediator between God and man. His resurrection declared that God *confessed* him in that character, and thereby *confessed men to be righteous in him*," (Ibid., p. 203;) so that "it must be the right and duty of men at all times to turn to

him in whom they ARE *created, redeemed, justified.*"—P. 204. "St. Paul," we are told, "takes it for granted that this justification of the Son of God and the Son of man was his own justification—his own, because *he was a man*;" he "was assured that his justification was the justification of *each man*."—P. 201. And as all men are thus *justified*, collectively, in Christ, so humanity also derives from the incarnation of the Son of God a collective *regeneration*. The manifestation in the flesh of the Son of God, the root, and head, and exemplar of humanity, dates a new era for the race, and becomes the spring of new and mighty influences. "The Son of man . . . has come to claim men as spiritual beings, capable of this spiritual life, inheritors of this spiritual kingdom. Baptism declares this to be their proper and divine constitution in Christ. All who receive it, claim the kingdom which God has declared to be theirs. *They take up their rights as spiritual beings.* He bestows his Spirit upon them, that they may enjoy these rights." . . . "The light of God's countenance *is shining* upon them; the Spirit is with them to open their eyes, that they may take in the light of it."—*Essays*, pp. 229, 230. So we read of "the Church's faith in its divine birth, in its *regenerate position*, in God's calling," (p. 242,) and that "God has regenerated the world in Christ."—P. 244.

This being the state of the case, there being for men "this righteousness, a righteousness for them one and all, not as separate creatures, but as members of a body," (*Unity, &c.*, p. 543,) all distinctions between justified and unjustified—regenerate and unregenerate—men are done away. Only some may recognise what others as yet are not aware of. "The gospel with which St. Paul was intrusted was good news to men, not of something which was coming to them, but of their actual state—of that state which belongs to them, but which they do not recognize." "The danger lay in their thinking that they were to create a state for themselves, instead of accepting one and abiding in it." "All the exhortations which follow to the very end of the Epistle [to the Ephesians,] assume as their groundwork, that the true state of man, and, consequently, *their* state, is now revealed in Christ; that a divine illumination was all about them and within them; and that if they did not live in it, if their lives were not clear and orderly, it was because they were shutting their eyes."—*Unity, &c.*, pp. 536, 537, 540, 541. It follows from this, that there is no Church distinct from the world; no Spirit given to the Church, as he is not to the world; no inspiration of one class of men, distinct in kind from that granted to others, and, in some sense and degree, granted to all. So Mr. Maurice teaches, though his meaning is often involved in a strange mist, in the *Essays on the*

"Unity of the Church," on the "Holy Spirit," and on "Inspiration." (XV, XIV, XIII.)

We have seen that Christ's death, on Mr. Maurice's theory, was no atonement for guilt, no price of redemption, in no sense the meritorious and procuring cause of life for the world. It was but a noble and holy example; the last and crowning act of a life of self-sacrifice. We have seen, moreover, that the mediatorial dignity and glory of Christ are not to be considered in any respect as the reward of his "obedience unto death, even the death of the cross;" but as appertaining to him, because of his aboriginal and (we might almost say) natural relationship, before all worlds, both to God and to man. "The glorious ascension" of Christ to the right hand of the Father, loses, therefore, on this hypothesis, all its peculiar significance. It is no installation into office and dignity won by suffering and death; it is no assumption of royalty over a purchased people; no declaration of victory and dominion over the vanquished power of hell; it is no longer a glorious enthronization, which looks back to Bethlehem and Calvary, and forward to the final day of judgment; it is not to be dated in heaven and in earth as the commencement of a reign of surpassing glory, during which Jesus, the Son of God, is to bring to a full accomplishment all the divine purposes in regard to the race of man on earth; until, the last enemy having been destroyed, and the number of the elect being complete, he shall, as the closing act of his mediatorial royalty, gather all nations and ages into one concourse, to pronounce for every soul its final award, and then, delivering up the kingdom to God, even the Father, shall himself become subject unto him who had put all things under him, that God may be all in all.

We say, on Mr. Maurice's theory, the ascension of Christ is no longer related to any such dominion or glory as we have been trying with stammering lips to describe. We cannot wonder then, that, as Dr. Candlish shows, Mr. Maurice reduces and degrades this ascension to a mere passage from a visible to an invisible condition.

The ascended Christ means Christ removed from the conditions of sense and time. His throne is in men's hearts, but not in any final heaven. He descends as Judge continually into the thoughts and spirits of men, but will never be seen, in the presence of all worlds, and at the consummation of all things, as the universal Judge, nor thus appear to his saints the second time, without sin, unto salvation. In perfect accordance with all this, and with his whole theory, heaven and hell, as separate places of abode, are discarded by Mr. Maurice. Christ and his saints, Satan and his angels, may be any-

where and everywhere: they may be continually intermingled with each other, and both may, at this or any moment, be mingling on earth with men. Thus is Christ invisibly, yet really and *corporeally* present, Mr. Maurice would have us believe, at the eucharist; and thus the doctrine of the real presence is met without any approach to transubstantiation. See Essays VIII, XI, and XII, on "The Resurrection of the Son of God, from Death, the Grave, and Hell," on "The Ascension of Christ," and on "The Judgment-day."

We have said that Christ is invisibly, but corporeally present. This naturally leads us to speak of another of Mr. Maurice's peculiar notions. As there will be no general judgment, there will, of course, be no general resurrection. We cannot imagine an appointed period for the dead to rise again with their bodies, unless this is in order to judgment. Mr. Maurice, accordingly, does not believe that our bodies—that is, what other people call bodies—the flesh and blood we wear—will ever rise again.

According to him, our death is our resurrection—the last trump is the last warning of coming death—"the moment, the twinkling of an eye," is the instant when the spirit parts from the flesh. When our spirits pass, they go forth in refined vehicles, with and in which they shall live forever, and which Mr. Maurice chooses to call our "body." Thus our bodies rise. This "flesh and blood," this "corruption," this "disgraceful" appendage to our proper selves, which is laid in the grave, will never, under any form, nor will any equivalent for it, rise again. Mr. Maurice tells us that *this* has been added to us for our sins; see pp. 160, 169, of the "Essays;" though, how this should be, in a world which he will not allow to be, in any proper sense, fallen, we cannot understand. From this theory it must follow that the body in which our Saviour rose from the grave was not the very flesh and blood with which his disciples had been familiar. So startling a consequence, Mr. Maurice, indeed, does not state; but this *must* be his real and secret doctrine. It agrees well with all the negative indications of the Essays in the matter of our Lord's resurrection; and it also agrees, as we think, with the following extract from the work on the "Unity of the New Testament." We must premise that Mr. Maurice very explicitly makes in the Essays that distinction between what *he* calls the body and this corruptible flesh and blood, which we have stated above, and that in quoting the sixteenth psalm as a prophecy relating to our Lord, he reads, "neither his *body* [not *flesh*] did see corruption." See pp. 160, 169, 180. The passage from the "Unity, &c.," to which we have referred, is as follows: "The sense of a body," [the body of our Lord, considered as the type and exemplar of the human body in general,] "delivered
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from the chains of death, essentially the same as it was before, using naturally, as its own, powers which had been hidden, or had only occasionally come forth, is one part, not the only, or perhaps the chief part, of the revelation. Its capacity of vanishing and of reappearing is felt to indicate the possibility of a spiritual presence, which may be continually near, and in which men may be meant ever to abide."—Pp. 301, 302. See on the subject of this paragraph, the Essays last referred to—VIII, XI, and XII.*

As to the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, Mr. Maurice believes in it, much as it appears to us, as a Neo-Platonist might have done, apart from all faith in the *evangelical* relations and offices of the three persons. Hence he can afford to postpone his Essay on this subject (No. XVI—and in the first edition, the last) to the very close of the volume.

The concluding Essay, with reference to the teaching of which Mr. Maurice was dismissed from King's College, is an expansion of what was the last part of the sixteenth Essay. The subject is "Eternal Life and Eternal Death." Of course Mr. Maurice cannot believe in the final and judicial punishment of any. This Essay, accordingly, is an attempt to separate from eternal death, as spoken of in Scripture—and if from this, also from eternal life—the idea of finality and everlastingness.

The moral basis of all this theological scheme, Mr. Maurice attempts, as might be expected, to establish in the divine "charity." "Charity," accordingly, is the title of the first Essay. But the charity of which he speaks is not merely an attribute, the nature of which he does not define, but one in regard to the true idea and character of which he says, plainly, he does not think it needful to raise a point with any one, whether infidel or believer. A vaguer, weaker, more unsatisfactory essay than this first we never read. Of course, the argumentative worth of that which argues nothing, and attempts to define nothing, cannot be much. Evangelical divines also would found any theological scheme they might lay down upon the moral basis of the divine "charity," or love; but then, they would take care to define what is to be understood by this.

In a necessarily restricted article like the present, it is impossible for us to give a fuller outline than we have now done of the scope

* There is nothing against which Mr. Maurice more frequently speaks in his Essays than against Gnosticism and Pantheism, except, indeed, evangelical orthodoxy. Yet those who are acquainted with the characteristics of Gnosticism will at once recognise in such views as are referred to above, some curious points of coincidence with that early heresy; and as to Pantheism—his doctrine of the identity of all men with the Son of God is a manifest approximation to Pantheism.

and contents of Mr. Maurice's volume, or to attempt to establish and illustrate the correctness of the outline we have given by adequate quotations. But those who have the "Essays" will easily test the accuracy of our representations; and, indeed, the general scope of Mr. Maurice's doctrinal innovations is by this time so well known, that intelligent and well-informed persons will be able to judge, in general, of the consistency and probability of the view we have given. We shall proceed now to notice more particularly a few selected points.

We have said that, on Mr. Maurice's theory, God does not appear characteristically or properly as the Creator, or the Lawgiver and Ruler of men, but merely as their Father—their Father, not by grace, but by nature—and the Father equally of all, inasmuch as all are equally identified with the Son of God. In illustration of this, we shall proceed to quote some passages from Mr. Maurice's second Essay on "Sin." Here Mr. Maurice first misrepresents—distorts, we must say—and brands with harsh words, and biting sneers, the common theological view of sin, as an offence committed against the law of God, which God is bound to visit with punishment, (pp. 19-21,) and then he proceeds to give us his own impressions upon the subject. We wish we could give the whole of the passage in which he does this; it possesses much eloquence, much plausibility, and some truth, though it *seems* to be often more truthful than, taking Mr. Maurice as his own interpreter, we are at liberty to believe it really is, and the impression it produces would be very much weakened, if Mr. Maurice had not, according to a common device of "new lights," used orthodox language, such as finds an echo in every sinner's breast, to convey his own unorthodox sense.

But our limits force us to compress, and to quote nothing but what is essential. When Mr. Maurice says that, at some moment, the sinner "may be forced to feel, 'I did this act, I thought this thought; it was a wrong act, it was a wrong thought, and it was *mine* ;'" he of course expresses a truth of which every man is conscious, but throws upon this truth no light of his own. When he says, that, "at such a moment, there will come a sense of eternity, dark, unfathomable, hopeless," we must remember that by eternity Mr. Maurice, as he explains in his last essay, very particularly understands something out of and above sense and this world, but with which no idea of everlastingness, or of duration, in any sense or degree, is associated. When he tells us, that, to the awakened sinner, "anything is better than the presence of this dark self," and that "to be dogged by that night and day" is "torture and death," we must remember, that, a few pages further on, (p. 29,) he defines the "sense of sin"

as "essentially the sense of solitude, isolation, distinct, individual responsibility."

When we read, that the sinner having thus "arrived at the conviction, 'I am the tormentor—evil lies not in some accidents, but in me,' is no more in the circle of outward acts, outward rules, outward punishments"—we are to understand the plain sense to be, that the convinced sinner has no sense of an outward objective law, the law of God, which he has violated, and that he has no apprehension of any outward punishment for the violation of that law. He is in "a more inward circle—a very close, narrow, dismal one,"—that is, he is shut up to and in himself; he has a dark sense of solitude, isolation, distinct, individual responsibility," as to what he shall become, what he shall make of himself, whether he shall be lonely, or at large, selfish or loving, by and for himself, or one with God and with his fellows. Out of this circle, Mr. Maurice tells us, "he can only emerge, when he begins to say, 'I have sinned against some Being—not against society merely, not against my own nature merely, but against another, to whom I was bound.' And the emancipation will not be complete, till he is able to say—giving the words their full and natural meaning—'FATHER, I have sinned against thee.'"—Pp. 22, 23.

"Think of any sermon of a Methodist preacher, which roused the heart of a Kingswood collier, or of a dry, hard, formal man, or of a contented, self-righteous boaster of his religion, in the last century. You will say the orator talked of an infinite punishment, which God might inflict on them all, if they continued disobedient. He may have talked of that, but he would have talked till doomsday, if he had not spoken another language too, which interpreted this, and into which the conscience rapidly translated it. He spoke of an infinite *sin*; he spoke of an infinite *love*; he spoke of that which was true then, whatever might become true hereafter. He said, 'Thou art in a wrong state; hell is about thee. God would bring thee into a right state: he would save thee out of that hell.' The man believed the words; something within him told him they were true; and that for the first time he had heard truth, seen truth, been himself true. I cannot tell what vanities and confessions might come to him afterward, from his own dreams or the crudities of his teachers."—Pp. 26, 27.

This, then, was the secret of the amazing power and success of the early Methodist preachers! No single objective truth of Christ's gospel had anything to do with it. It was not the preaching of the law which was the means of awakening sinners; it was not the proclamation of salvation through the ransom price of Christ's blood, which brought these awakened sinners to faith and pardon. These things were but the "crudities" of the Methodist "teachers." No, it was the mere abstract truth that God is love. Love without law, pardon without satisfaction to holiness—this is the gospel which, Mr. Maurice says, roused the hearts of colliers, and of formalists and

Pharisees, whether dry and hard, or contented boasters. Does Mr. Maurice really know anything of the history of Methodism, that he thus speaks? or, can a man who knows anything of human nature believe that thus to exhibit the supreme Ruler, as a "mere image of good nature," will either awe or win any, whether publicans or Pharisees, to repentance and righteousness?

Throughout this essay, God is represented only as a Father. He is called by no other name but God and Father, "the Father of a family," (p. 29,) "a Father, actually related to us," to all alike, "by the closest, most intimate bonds," (p. 31.) This is what we were prepared to expect. The Scriptures, however, while they represent him as the Father of all who believe in Christ, represent him also as "the righteous Judge," "the Judge of all the earth," as him who is "just, and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus," as the "Holy One," as "glorious in holiness."

If Mr. Maurice holds such views as to the nature of sin, it will, of course, be anticipated that he is quite as remote from evangelical orthodoxy on the subject of depravity. He does, indeed, admit that there is a universal prevalence of sin, that there is in all men "pravity as a fact;" nay, having subscribed the thirty-nine articles, he does not hesitate to employ in his own sense the phrase "infection of nature," and to admit that this belongs to all men. But yet he denies *depravity of nature*, in any sense; he will not allow a con-natural *bias* in human nature, as fallen toward that which is evil. In a word, he plainly implies that men are born, essentially, in the same moral condition in which Adam was created; that human nature is the same, not only in its elements, but in the proportion and balance of those elements, as it was originally. Hence, in order to reconcile this position with his admissions as to the actual prevalence of sin, he throws all the blame and burden of the world's universal sinfulness at the door of the evil spirit.

"When I speak of the belief in the existence and presence of an evil spirit, as characteristic of the Gospels, I mean this:—that in them, first the idea of a spirit, directly and absolutely opposed to the Father of lights, to the God of absolute goodness and love, bursts full upon us. There first we are taught that it is not merely something in peculiarly evil men, which is contending against the good and the true; no, nor something in all men: that God has an antagonist; and that all men, bad or good, have the same. There, first, this antagonist presents himself to us, altogether as a spirit, with no visible shape or clothing whatsoever, &c. With these discoveries, another is always connected: that this tempter speaks to me, to myself, to the will; that over that he has established his tyranny; that there his chains must be broken; but that all things in nature, with the soul and the body, have partaken and do partake of the slavery to which the man himself has submitted."

"I simply state these propositions; I am not going to defend them. If they cannot defend themselves by the light which they throw on the anticipations

and difficulties of the human spirit, by the hint of deliverance they offer it, by the horrible dreams which they scatter, my arguments would be worth nothing."—Pp. 44, 45.

"When men in the old time would have said bravely, meaning what they said, 'We are engaged in a warfare with an evil spirit, *he* is trying to separate us from God, to make us hate our brethren;' *we* talk of the depravity of our nature, of the evil we have inherited from Adam. Now, that every child of Adam has this infection of nature, I most entirely and inwardly believe.* But to say that this infection forces us to commit sin, is to say what the Jews of old said, what the prophets denounced as the most flagrant denial of God:—*We are delivered to do all these abominations.* And it is the *very* close approximation which we make in some of our popular statements to this detestable heresy, which has called forth an indignant and a righteous protest from many classes of our countrymen, the Unitarians being in some sort the spokesmen for the rest. When we try to avoid this censure, it is by the very feeble and pusillanimous course of introducing modifications into the broad phrases with which we started, modifications that make them mean almost nothing. We maintain the 'absolute, universal, all-pervading depravity' of human nature; but then there are 'beautiful relics of the divine image,' 'fallen columns,' &c.;—pretty metaphors, no doubt; but who wants metaphors on a subject of such solemn and personal interest?"—Pp. 48, 49.

Mr. Maurice's theory, however, as Dr. Candlish has well shown, will not account for the facts of the case. How can it be that in the case of every man, if human nature still retains its integrity, "the tempter has established his tyranny over the will," so that "all things in nature, with the soul and the body, have partaken and do partake of the slavery to which the man himself has submitted?" Mr. Maurice attempts to explain *ignotum per ignotius*. We apprehend that to account for so "universal" and "absolute" a submission to the tyranny of the evil spirit, it will be needful to presuppose something equivalent to a "universal" and "absolute" pravity of will and nature in mankind.

Essays II and III, on "Sin" and the "Evil Spirit," are naturally followed by Essay IV, on "The Sense of Righteousness in Men, and their Discovery of a Redeemer." We have already intimated, that, in reference to the principles and bearing of Mr. Maurice's peculiar theology, this is the most significant and suggestive of the "Essays." We can only, however, afford to quote from it very sparingly. The whole essay is founded on the book of Job. The experience of Job is considered as substantially representative of the experience of every sufferer; and therefore, since all men, more or

* "Infection of nature." This is the phrase he has subscribed to. See the ninth article of the Church of England. Compare with this sentence what immediately precedes, and also the latter sentences of the quotation. Compare also what is said before, (p. 46,) "Neither body nor soul can be in itself evil. Each is in bondage to some evil power." But Mr. Maurice can go very far in using orthodox phrases.

less, are sufferers, of the experience, at some time and in some measure, of every man.

"Every thoughtful reader of the book of Job must have been struck by two characteristics of it, which seem, at first sight, altogether inconsistent. The suffering man has the most intense personal sense of his own evil. He makes also the most vehement, repeated, passionate, protestations of his own righteousness."—P. 54.

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"I believe most clergymen, most religious persons, who have conversed at all seriously with men of any class, from the most refined to the most ignorant, in any state of mind, from that of the most contented Pharisee to that of the lowest criminal, have another test of the authenticity of the book as a record of actual humanity. They hear from one and all, in some language or other, the assertion of a righteousness which they are sure is theirs, and which cannot be taken from them. They may call themselves miserable sinners; some of them may feel that they are so; some may tremble at the judgment which they think is coming upon them for their sins. But in all there is a secret reserve of belief, that there is in them that which is not sin, which is the very opposite of sin. When you tell them the feeling is very wrong, that 'God be merciful to me' is the only true prayer, that God's law is very holy, that they have violated it, and so forth,—they will listen—they may assent. From prudence, or deference to you, they may suppress the offensive phrase, or change their tone. Those will not be the best and honestest who do so." . . . "Each man has got this sense of a righteousness, whether he realizes it distinctly or indistinctly, whether he expresses it courageously or keeps it to himself."—Pp. 60, 61.

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"We say, we wish to bring the sinner, weary, heavy-laden, and hopeless, to Christ." . . . "Do we not really believe that Christ was, before he took human flesh and dwelt among us? Do we not suppose that he actually conversed with prophets and patriarchs, and made them aware of his presence? Or is this a mere arid dogma, which we prove out of Pearson, and which has nothing to do with our inmost convictions, with our very life? How has it become so? Is it not because we do not accept the New Testament explanation of these appearances and manifestations; because we do not believe that Christ is in every man, the source of all light that ever visits him, the root of all the righteous thoughts and acts that he is ever able to conceive or do?"—Pp. 63, 64.

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"We say boldly to the man who declares that he has a righteousness which no one shall remove from him—'That is true, you have such a righteousness. It is deeper than all the iniquity which is in you. It lies at the very ground of your existence. And this righteousness dwells not merely in a law which is condemning you, it dwells in a Person in whom you may trust. The righteous Lord of man is with you, . . . nigh you, at your heart.'"—P. 66.

The same idea underlies the following essays (V and VI) on "The Son of God" and "The Incarnation," and is in some parts, especially pages 81–84, and page 117, very explicitly restated. We cannot, however, attempt to trace the line of speculation which runs through these essays; neither shall we analyze the following essay on "The Atonement." We have already indicated the position which Mr. Maurice of necessity maintains on this subject. Per-

haps, however, this may be the fittest place to refer specifically to those sad and shameful misrepresentations of the evangelical doctrine of "atonement," which so unhappily distinguish this work, and abound in every part of it. At page 126, Mr. Maurice speaks of evangelical views on the subject of the relations between God and man, as "dark and horrible thoughts respecting our Father in heaven and our fellow-creatures on earth, which exist among us, and which we have adopted from heathenism." This is about an average sample of the phraseology which Mr. Maurice is accustomed to employ in stigmatizing the views of the vast majority of earnest Christians throughout the world. In this sort of thing Mr. Maurice is a worthy follower of Priestley and Belsham. So far, indeed, from having, when he left the fellowship of Unitarians, lost their principles and *animus* in reference to the peculiar evangelical type of theology,—the theology of Cowper, and Wilberforce, and Buxton, and Archbishop Sumner,—he gives ample proof in this volume that he has fully inherited their spirit, and highly cultivated his inheritance. We may particularly refer, in proof of this assertion, to pages xiii, xxiii, xxv, 10, 12, 30, 48, the whole of the essay on the Atonement, to pages 205, 206, and the concluding essay on Eternal Life and Eternal Death. The most Antinomian type of ultra-Calvinism, as conceived and adopted by men of the grossest minds and the most fierce and fanatical tempers, does not come up to his representations of the ordinary doctrine and feelings of evangelical Christians of the nineteenth century. We shall not take upon ourselves the irksome and disgusting task of quoting his misrepresentations; but shall merely give one admirable passage from Dr. Candlish's examination of the essay on the Atonement, in which most of them are briefly but sufficiently corrected:—

"There is nothing new in these objections against the doctrine of a vicarious or expiatory sacrifice. They have been urged by Unitarians, and fully answered, times without number. The novelty is to find them in a defence of the doctrine of the atonement; and the surpassing wonder is to see an English theologian, at this hour, so thoroughly ignorant of what really is the doctrine of 'Archbishop Magee,' and those who hold in substance his views, and at the same time so dogmatic in claiming for himself the authority of the Bible and the creeds, without once glancing at the texts, or at the articles which directly bear upon the question at issue. (P. 148.) Let the case be fairly stated for the defenders of the current evangelical belief. We do not hold that Christ, in any sense, changed the will of the Father. We do not hold that the atonement moved the Father to love the world, but that the Father so loved the world as to provide the atonement. We do not admit the substitution of Christ in the room of the guilty to be artificial; we believe it to be real and actual; we believe it to be the gracious appointment of the sovereign will of God; and we believe that, because Christ is the actual representative of men, he is on that very account qualified to be their substitute. We do not put Christ's endurance of inconceivable sufferings as our substi-

tute, instead of his entering into our actual miseries and bearing our griefs; we believe both. We believe in the sympathy of Christ with us, as well as in the substitution of Christ for us; and we believe the sympathy to be all the more tender and true on account of the substitution. We do not believe that he rescued men out of the hand of God, by paying a penalty to him; but as little do we believe that he rescued them out of the power of an enemy by yielding to his power. We believe that he did not yield to the enemy's power, but triumphed over it. He yielded to death, not because the enemy had any power over him, but because the Father gave him the cup to drink. We do not put 'penalty for sin' instead of 'sin' in the passage about the Lamb of God taking away the sin of the world. But we ask, what persons accustomed to the sacrificial language and ideas of the Old Testament would understand by that phrase? And we ask, what that other passage means, 'Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us'? We do not suppose that Christ has destroyed the connexion between sin and death. We hold, that he has ratified and confirmed it more emphatically than if all sinners had perished. The Holy One, taking the responsibility—the guilt—of our sin upon himself, accepted the wages of sin, which is death. We do not say that the law must execute itself. The Lawgiver must execute his own law; and it is for him to judge if, in any instance, a substitute may stand for the guilty. We do not represent God as satisfied by the punishment of sin. We speak, indeed, of the justice of God, or his holy law, being satisfied,—its claims being met,—its violated majesty being vindicated,—when sin is punished. But this is a very different thing from representing God as feeling a personal satisfaction in punishing a sin; which is clearly what the author means to ascribe to us. We hold strongly, that God can be satisfied only when he beholds his own image in man, as he did at first, and in Christ Jesus does again. We believe, finally, that the death of Christ is a sacrifice, both because it is the entire surrender of the whole spirit and body to God, and also because this surrender implied that 'he bore our sins in his own person on the cross.' We believe that it is not a sacrifice of man to God, but a sacrifice for man; the sacrifice, the vicarious and expiatory suffering of the representative of man, the substitute for man,—the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all,—who gave his life a ransom for the many.

"It moves one's deepest sorrow to see a man like this author trying to gain his case by mere abuse of the opposite counsel. Let it be granted that in popular statements of the doctrine of the atonement unguarded expressions may be found. Surely one so learned and so charitable ought to know that he is fighting against a wooden Soldan,—a mere man of straw; and that he is offensively caricaturing a belief, which to the very many poor afflicted ones is the very life of their souls. Is he not aware, that the true and only idea he has to deal with is the idea of substitution? Let him expunge that idea,—not loose declamation about it,—not ignorant perversions of it,—but the idea itself,—out of the Bible, out of the creeds. Let him expunge it out of the great conscience of mankind. Then his cause is won."—*Candlish's Examination*, pp. 228–231.

Passing over all the intervening essays, VIII to XVI, on the Resurrection, Justification, Regeneration, the Ascension, the Judgment Day, Inspiration, the Holy Spirit, the Unity of the Church, and the Trinity in Unity, we come to the last, the subject of which is "Eternal Life and Eternal Death."

On this subject the only question with us is, "What saith the Lord?" The problem of the government of the universe is too

vast for us to undertake to investigate it *à priori*. When the Divine Governor has himself revealed to us his method and principles, we think *a posteriori* arguments may be found to justify the ways of the Almighty. But such arguments should always be kept in their right place; and the ablest and most comprehensive system of argument must always leave very much unconsidered—because there must ever be very much unknown by us in our dim and distant seclusion—that is most essential to a right understanding and satisfactory determination of the whole question. Besides, if we were disposed to discuss this question with Mr. Maurice, we should at once be stopped by the fact that he and we disagree upon fundamental principles. It is certain that he must reject the doctrine of the eternal punishment of the wicked, because he does not believe in punishment at all. In fatherly chastisement he does believe, but not in punishment. On his principles, the government of the universe is carried on without law—in the proper sense. He knows nothing of any outward objective law; the only law he believes in is an inward, instinctive, impulsive principle of love. His scheme does away with probation in any sense, unseats the Supreme Judge from his tribunal, and resolves into powerless metaphor and periphrasis the judgment day. Judicial sentence and punishment can, therefore, have no place in his theory. The eternity of punishments, then, is not the question in controversy with Mr. Maurice.

Mr. Maurice does not plainly state this. To discuss or argue is not his vocation—only to teach; as he thinks his audience may be able to bear it, and to denounce what he dislikes. He follows in this essay his usual plan. With fearful profanity he exhibits a gross exaggeration and caricature of the most repulsive and materialized type of supralapsarian Calvinism, and denounces this as the common faith of evangelical Christendom. Thus he endeavours to effect his purpose by a most unfair and discreditable *argumentum ad invidiam*. In this, however, there is nothing new. It is the old device of infidels and semi-infidels in every age. It would not have been surprising in a coarse Unitarian of the last age. But it is surprising—in this respect it is something new and passing strange—in a cultivated clergyman of the orthodox Episcopal Church of England, in the middle of the nineteenth century.

The only point in Mr. Maurice's last essay which calls for notice from us in this article, is the criticism, if such it may be called, by which he endeavours to explain away from the word *eternal*—particularly as used in Matt. xxv, 46, to designate the life of the righteous, and the punishment of the wicked—any idea of everlastingness.

Mr. Maurice admits that the word *αἰώνιος* would very naturally have conveyed the sense of everlastingness to the ordinary Greek; but inasmuch as it is used in Scripture to designate the nature of God, and of that life which consists in the knowledge of God, he holds that the signification of everlastingness must be quite inadequate to the word as employed by the sacred writers. Neither will he allow that, as applied to the nature of God, the word may have the high sense of "without beginning as well as without end," and in other cases merely the sense of "endless" or "everlasting." He affirms that, to whatever subject applied, the adjective must of necessity signify the same quality. He therefore contends that the true sense of the word *eternal*, as used in Scripture, is *that which is fixed and absolute, above and apart from time, altogether aloof from the idea or sphere of duration, change, or succession.* This is the eternity of God; this is the eternity of holy life; this is the eternity of punishment for the wicked. But, surely, Mr. Maurice does not think that the same quality of fixedness and absoluteness, apart from and above all change, succession, or duration, which belongs to the self-existent God, also belongs to the derived life of the saint, and to the punishment of the wicked. If this could be the case, we do not see how the prospect would be at all less dark for the wicked than on the common interpretation. But the idea is most incongruous and monstrous. Let Mr. Maurice try as he will, he must apply the word *eternal* in a different sense to the life of saints and to the punishment of the wicked, from that in which he would apply it to qualify the nature of God. Mr. Maurice's proof-text from Scripture in favour of his view is John xvii, 3: "This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God," &c. Here he assumes that *eternal* is defined to be that which consists in the knowledge of God. If this were the case, it would utterly upset his theory; since how can the *punishment* of the wicked be eternal in this sense, or how can the eternity of the Father of spirits be said to consist in such knowledge? But, in fact, all that St. John teaches us is, that the knowledge of God is life, and that this life, as it stands essentially related to the immortal spirit and the eternal God, is in its nature and reach eternal.

As for the assertion that the popular sense of *eternal* is modern, and owes its prevalence to the sensational philosophy of Locke, it is too futile to require examination. Indeed, Mr. Maurice's admission, that *αἰώνιος* in Greek and *æternus* in Latin bore this sense in ordinary, is a sufficient refutation. Mr. Maurice's sense of *eternal* was never the popular sense, and never could have been. Scholastic philosophers and divines have often propounded some

such sense; but the popular mind has never been able to conceive it.

We need scarcely remark that even if Mr. Maurice had succeeded in invalidating the force of that one text, (Matt. xxv, 46,) which so distinctly teaches the everlasting punishment of the wicked, the doctrine he wishes to get rid of would still remain inextricably bound up with Scripture teaching. The abiding continuance of future punishment—the hopelessness and helplessness of all who die in impenitency—is taught in a multitude of passages in Scripture, where no word equivalent to *eternal* occurs; and, if we deny this, we must cease to seek for our doctrines in the revelations of Scripture.

Mr. Maurice declines to say distinctly whether he believes in universal salvation or not. The fact is, he hardly *can* say, because he does not believe in damnation in any sense. On his theory, probation is prolonged indefinitely, if we should not rather say that probation is altogether done away. Men may be rebellious children, and therefore unhappy; but they are never condemned, and never incapable of turning to God and being happy. At their worst estate, the Son of God is with them and in them. The following remarkable passage has a bearing upon this subject. It occurs in Essay VIII, in the course of Mr. Maurice's explanation of our Lord's descending "into hell."

"I accept [these words] as news that there is no corner of God's universe over which his love has not brooded, none over which the Son of God and the Son of man has not asserted his dominion. I claim a right to tell this news to every peasant and beggar of the land. I may bid him rejoice and give thanks, and sing merry songs to the God who made him, because there is nothing created which his Lord and Master has not redeemed, of which he is not the King."—P. 162.

We feel tempted to remark upon the fact, that such views as we have now exhibited have emanated from a clergyman of the Church of England, who holds by and expounds in his own sense the Creeds and the Articles; but we must come to a close. Our readers will understand that we have only followed the main line of thought in this scheme of heresy. There are hundreds of slanders and fallacies which were lodged—often in shoals together—in every direction, right and left, of our course; but we could not go out of our way to refute or expose them. Those who wish for a detailed examination and refutation of these should procure Dr. Candlish's able volume; the only fault of which is, that having failed to perceive the principle which lies at the bottom of Mr. Maurice's theosophy, as we think we may call it, the writer has not enabled his readers to attain to a synthetic and comprehensive view of the whole scheme.

ART. IV.—WILLIAM JAY.

The Autobiography of the Rev. William Jay; with Reminiscences of some Distinguished Contemporaries, Selections from his Correspondence, and Literary Remains. Edited by GEORGE REDFORD, D. D., LL. D., and JOHN ANGELL JAMES. New-York: Carter & Brothers. Two vols., 12mo., pp. 418, 336. 1855.

IN the preface to the Life of Rev. Cornelius Winter, written by his early protégé and steadfast admirer, William Jay, of Bath, is found the following significant sentence:—"For the purposes of biography, those lives are the most eligible that are the most imitable; and these are derived from characters that belong to our own community, that are formed in the same relations and conditions with ourselves; whose circumstances make us feel, for the time, the emotions which would be excited by the same good or evil happening to ourselves; whose attainments, while they resulted from the divine blessing, appear not to have been preternatural, but were made under no greater advantages than our own; whose progress was not less owing to the stroke of the oar than the favourableness of the wind; whose excellences, while they do not discourage us by their perfection, animate us by their degree; whose success teaches us, not how to be great, but how to be good and happy; whose piety is not fluctuating, but steady; not visionary, but producing a beautiful correspondence to all the claims of the station in which they are placed." This ideal character which the admiring young biographer supposed he saw so nearly realized in his subject, found a much more complete realization in himself, as he now appears in the records of his protracted and well-ordered life.

An active ministry of seventy years, and an uninterrupted pastorate over the same Church and congregation of more than sixty, are themselves things of very unusual occurrence in our changing and uncertain times. But wonder is changed to admiration when we learn that the subject of this unusual stability and continuity of action so husbanded his resources and concentrated his efforts upon his high calling, that with only moderate natural parts, and in spite of a very inadequate early education, he not only attained to eminence as a preacher of the gospel, but became a voluminous writer; so that when now his voice is hushed in death, he still speaks to multitudes of the way of salvation. When the present generation came upon the stage of action the minister of Argyle Chapel, in Bath, was in the strength of his manhood, and had already attained to eminence and notoriety, to which increasing years, without dimming

the lustre of the reputation before attained, only added the soft radiance of a long-delayed summer's sunset.

Such a character presents an unusually inviting theme for the pen of the biographer. The whole Church has a heritage in the memoirs of such a man, and universal humanity presents a claim to those to whom the work belongs, for a properly prepared record of his illustrious career. But the very excellences of character which invite us to contemplate and admire, render the task of just delineation especially difficult. Ordinary themes may be treated by moderate talents, but greatness in the subject requires corresponding qualities in him who would portray them for our admiration. And as those objects whose beauty consists in the symmetry of all their parts rather than in some single striking feature require the greatest skill in their delineation, so a character distinguished for no one striking trait, but great in the possession and exercise of whatever contributes to a perfect man, is less easily sketched than that of the hero, statesman, or orator, whose characteristics are given in a single word. It is not wonderful, therefore, that although the good old man has gone to his final recompense, leaving an admiring world gazing upon his vacant place, or contemplating his memory, as yet no biography of him, at all answering to the demands of the case, has been given to the public.

In making this remark, we intend not to express any disrespect to the volumes named at the head of this paper. They are, indeed, a valuable contribution to religious literature. But whoever shall take them up, expecting to find in them a history of the eventful career of their nominal subject, and a satisfactory estimate of his character, is doomed to be disappointed. A little more than half of the first volume is made up of what purports to be an autobiography of Mr. Jay, but is rather a rapid sketch of his early life, and some remarks upon his manner of life as a preacher, a pastor, a student, and an author. These remarks, and the particular information they convey, must be very satisfactory to those who, like the persons to whom they were addressed in the form of familiar letters, were already well informed as to all the general facts of the writer's history; to all others they cannot fail to be unsatisfactory. Some amends for the manifest barrenness of the autobiography are made by the appended "observations" by the editors on the character of the subject, as a preacher and a writer.

Greatness comes seldom by inheritance. It is sometimes innate, but oftener accidental, or at best incidental. With Mr. Jay it was certainly not of the first, for his ancestry is unusually obscure. In entering upon his autobiography he felicitates himself that he has

"not to trace a long and proud lineage;" and adds, "If any great and illustrious individuals have been found among my ancestors, they have not been ascertained in my family, in my own time." The name of Jay, so renowned in American history, is well known to be of French origin, the family being descended from a branch of the banished Huguenots, who, nearly two hundred years ago, found an asylum in the new world. It is not altogether improbable that the family of the good old man of Bath was from the same original stock, but removed to England by an earlier emigration.

His father was the son of a small farmer, but was himself a mechanic,—a stone-mason; and both the parents of our subject are described as persons of ordinary natural endowments, of humble education, and plain, practical common sense, "upright, conscientious, kind, tender, charitable according to their means, and much beloved and esteemed in all the neighbourhood." It is not at all wonderful that such a son should come of such parents. Not only does Providence disregard our artificial social distinctions in the endowments of the mind, but, on account of the simpler and more inartificial modes of living which prevail among the moderately poor, they often enjoy peculiar facilities for a vigorous mental development, whenever opportunities are afforded them. Wherever society is left free to adjust itself according to its own inherent laws, there will be a steady elevation of the lower (not the lowest) classes, and a like deterioration of the higher; while frequently individuals, outstripping the tendency of their own class, will either ascend or descend out of it, according to their own peculiar tendencies. Of this rule, on its better side, Mr. Jay's case is an illustrious example.

The story of the early school-training of celebrated scholars, statesmen, and divines, often affords strange and deeply interesting lessons. Of Mr. Jay's education, beyond the family circle, or rather of the two great agencies of that education, the Church and the school, he gives this account:—

"The Presbyterian minister on whom we attended was a Clarkian Arian, (but he never dealt much in doctrines,) a very dry and dull preacher, but a lovely character, and exceedingly tender-hearted, kind, and generous. . . . From my earliest remembrance he kindly and gently noticed me, and when I was able to read he presented me with the first two publications I ever called my own. . . . Books were then very scarce in villages; at least few came in my way.

"The schooling of the village was of course very limited, and had nothing to awaken or expand the mind beyond the commonest elements of reading, writing, and vulgar arithmetic. In this humble education I shared; but I can say nothing more: to any literary or intellectual advantage or excitement I was a stranger."—Pp. 21, 22.

His early life gave no indications of his future career. He learned to read with difficulty; and having few opportunities to advance any further, this was for a time the extent of his attainments. He was a lover of nature, as are most children who are kept from vicious indulgences and associations; and his childish fancies, like those of others, amused themselves in building airy castles of future greatness. At this point it seems probable he would have remained fixed, to live and die as his predecessors had done,—unconscious of the powers within him, unknowing and unknown,—had not an occurrence, quite accidental as to himself in its procurement, arrested his attention, and thenceforth permanently determined both his character and course of life.

The state of religion in Tisbury, at the time in question, as in the generality of English villages at that date, was not prosperous. Yet the awakening which had begun to be felt a quarter of a century before in various parts of the kingdom, and had now reached almost every hamlet, had come to this place also. A wealthy gentleman, formerly a resident of the village, aware of the spiritual destitution of its people, procured and licensed a place of worship in it, to which the itinerant evangelists, then becoming somewhat numerous, and all known by the common name of Methodists, were invited. With this event the early religious history of our subject is intimately connected. But before proceeding to the statement of facts in the case we will pause to consider a passing remark, giving his own views of the subject thus brought to our notice:—

“Some people love to talk of being born again, and of their being made new creatures, with a kind of physical certainty and exactness; and refer to their conversions, not as the real commencement of a work which is to continue increasing through life, but as something which may be viewed as a distinct and unique experience, immediately produced, originated, and finished at once; and perfectly determined as to its time, and place, and mode of accomplishment; but I hope this is not necessary, for *I have no such narrative or register to afford*. A distinction is not always made between depraved nature and actual transgression. All are sinners, and all have come short of the glory of God; but all are not profligate, nor, in *this* sense, do all speak of themselves as they had been the chief of sinners. *Restraint from evil is a mercy*, as well as sanctification and good works. I cannot speak, as *some do*, of going great lengths in iniquity, and thereby rendering a work of grace more sure and more divine. I bless God, I was from my childhood free from [gross] immoralities.”—P. 26.

Probably some who have read, or may hereafter read this paragraph, will be offended with its seeming superficialness, and especially with its apparent reflection upon the experience and confessions of others, whose convictions for sin have been more pungent

than his seem to have been, and whose sense of the change, when pardon was sealed upon their hearts by the divine Comforter, was more clearly and pointedly indicated. The subject is worthy of a careful examination; and its proper adjustment requires the exercise of mutual candour. Mr. Jay's language in this case may be a little unfortunate; but we are unwilling to believe that anything is intended that ought to offend any real child of grace. The terms "born again" and "made new creatures" are certainly Scriptural expressions, employed by divine inspiration to indicate a most important fact in individual religious experience. The terms themselves, therefore, as well as the facts and phenomena which they *necessarily* imply, should be accounted sacred, and carefully preserved from contempt. But it is plain, beyond a question, that many of the phenomena of religious experience are variable, and subject to great modification, both from original constitution of mind and from the facts of individual history. Some minds are more susceptible to conviction than others, and especially is there a wide difference in the emotional exercises of different minds, under the influences of such convictions. Perhaps there never was a case of religious awakening in which its subject was not somewhat instructed in the gospel way of salvation, so that the bitterness of remorse and the anguish of guilty fear were modified by the hopes of forgiveness, and the assurance of the divine placability. In all such cases there is a conflict between the desponding and hopeful tendencies of his nature, and the prevalence of the one or the other is affected by a variety of facts and circumstances. With the fearful and hypochondriacal the sense of guilt often produces the most fearful agony of spirit, while the more hopeful and buoyant look with a comforting assurance to the provisions and promises of grace. So, too, where the natural depravity of the heart has been but partially developed, and where the conduct has been steadily under the influence of moral restraints, and the character partially formed on the basis of truth and right, we may not expect the same deep compunctions and self-condemnations as in the case of an awakened profligate, or long-practised transgressor. And as in that case the outward change of manners is less remarkable than in this, so, since the internal conflict is less violent, the point of transition will be less surely determined, and even the spiritual revolution will not be so clearly a matter of immediate consciousness. These remarks, however, can be applied only generally, as doubtless there are many cases to which they would not be pertinent. We are far from pretending that the operations of the divine Spirit are all governed by laws as fixed and invariable as the forces

of nature. "The wind bloweth where it listeth . . . so is [it with] every one that is born of the Spirit."

It is certainly no cause of surprise, nor just occasion of doubt as to the genuineness of his conversion, that the experience of our young villager was not marked by those clear and sharp outlines that have distinguished the moral transition of others. And while we extend this candour to his case, we claim the like for those whose experience has taught them that such references to the time and circumstances of their conversion deserve better treatment than they often receive. That there was formerly, especially among the old Puritans, and to some extent among the early Methodists, both in England and in this country, a tendency to an excessive valuation of the mere incidents of conversion, is granted; but the time of danger from that cause is wholly past. Our cause of fear lies now on the opposite extreme—the tendency to treat only of generalities in this thing renders it dangerous lest the speciality of that great work, in which lies its essence and only value, should be overlooked and forgotten.

The causes that led immediately to his making a profession of religion, according to the evangelical notion, are thus stated:—

"The private dwelling which Mr. Turner had purchased and licensed was first used for worship on the Saturday evening. I attended. The singing, the extemporaneousness of the address, and the apparent affection and earnestness of the speaker, peculiarly affected me; and what he said of the 'faithful saying and worthy of all acceptance, that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners,' was like rain upon the mown grass, or cold water to a thirsty soul. I scarcely slept that night for weeping and for joy."—P. 27.

He now continued to frequent the humble chapel, and soon, of course, came to be recognised by its little society as a professor of Christianity, after the new way. He mingled with them in their social devotion, and was presently called to lead in the exercise of prayer; and by his zeal and the correctness of his life he presently attracted the notice of those who were more specially charged with the oversight of this little band of believers.

It was some time in the year 1783, when William Jay was about fourteen years old, that the Rev. Cornelius Winter, of Marlborough, who, according to the practice of many evangelical ministers of his time, itinerated through a considerable region of surrounding country, having his "appointments" arranged in a continuous "circuit," added Tisbury to the number of his preaching places. Here the youthful mechanic was among his constant and deeply interested hearers—often attending in the same dress in which he prosecuted his trade—and, by his apparent interest and evident intelligence,

attracted the good man's notice. Among other methods of doing good, Mr. Winter was accustomed to receive a few lads of promising character into his family, to be educated for the ministry. As he was from the first very much prepossessed in favour of the boy, he presently proposed to himself and his parents the project he had formed of removing the lad to his free seminary, or, more properly, clerical gymnasium. The proposed arrangements were not difficult of accomplishment,—for poverty makes all changes easy,—and the youthful stone-mason became an inmate of the dwelling of the itinerating evangelist—the youthful William Jay was domiciled with the family of the good Cornelius Winter. From the beginning, the attachment between the two seems to have been unusually strong and steady, and quite reciprocal. The instructor fancied he saw in his youthful protégé the germs of future greatness, while he in turn seemed to see all manner and degrees of excellences in his patron and benefactor. The biography of Mr. Winter, the result of Mr. Jay's earliest attempt at proper authorship, is a monument of their mutual and deathless affection,—recording at once the excellences of its subject and the lively gratitude of its author.

In his new position, young Jay was apprenticed to a new calling. He had laid aside the hammer and trowel, and taken up the word of the Lord. He was now to be taught and disciplined to become a wise master-builder—building up the foundation of prophets and apostles. And as his instruction in the rudiments of the material art had been rather practical than theoretical, so now he was to learn the business of preaching the gospel less by didactic instructions than by actual practice. At sixteen, such had been his proficiency, that he was regularly employed by Mr. Winter upon his "circuit," and everywhere his coming was hailed with admiration and pious joy.

At nineteen, impelled by his poverty to make some provision for his own maintenance, he reluctantly consented to assume the responsibilities of pastor of the little Independent society at Christian Malford, in whose obscurity he hoped to be hidden till increased age and experience should fit him for a wider field. But his concealment was very imperfect. He was frequently called to officiate in the larger towns of his vicinity; and at length, having made the acquaintance of the celebrated Rowland Hill, then at the height of his reputation, he was invited to preach in Surrey Chapel. The occasion of his advent to the metropolis was one of no little interest both to himself and his audience. His fame had gone before him, and expectation was on tiptoe. So great was the eagerness to hear him that only a moiety of the congregation that assembled could gain

access to the interior of the vast edifice; yet they lingered about the doors and windows, and after the services within he was persuaded to address the multitude without from one of the windows. But few young men could escape such temptations with impunity.

We yield to the temptation which the subject offers, and turn aside from the narrative to consider the question suggested by it, as to the best manner of preparing for the work of the ministry, and the propriety of allowing partially educated men to assume its functions. It has been so often and steadily asserted, almost entirely without dissent, that scholarship is highly desirable, if not absolutely essential, as a qualification for the sacred office, that to call it in question may seem like temerity, if indeed it escape the suspicion of madness. Nevertheless, we venture the opinion that great scholarship is neither needful nor desirable for one whose chief business in life is to fill the offices of a Christian pastor. That the Church needs scholarship in her ministry is granted; and that all ministers should "study to show themselves approved workmen that need not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth," is also conceded. But it is not a legitimate inference to assume that therefore all ministers ought to be ripe scholars. The pastoral office is itself a work sufficient to fill the hands and the heart of any man; but he who would be a scholar must make study the great business of his life. A man may be an able minister of the New Testament without such an amount of study as would seriously interfere with his pastoral duties; but to become a scholar that shall be worthy of the name, or successful in his scholarship, he must sacrifice his pastoral work to his studies.

On the question of permitting young and partially educated persons to preach, Mr. Jay suggests certain considerations, which, on account of their practical wisdom, we copy and commend to the reader's consideration. After granting that some disadvantages result from this course, especially among very young men, and with students, he gives the following list of "compensatory advantages":—

"*First*, Hereby good was done in the conversion of sinners, in many instances, some of which were very striking; and what is the gain of the whole world to the value of one soul?

"*Secondly*, The usage tended by its exercise, and by the preparation for it, to keep the minds of the students in things of God.

"*Thirdly*, It was a great advantage to the young pupil to begin before he knew too much, to feel certain difficulties, and to gain confidence and facility by practice. And thus, though the scholar was injured, the preacher was benefitted."—Pp. 41, 42.

These views were the settled convictions of their author, which the observation of a long life, passed in circumstances peculiarly favourable to the formation of a correct judgment in the case, seemed

only to confirm. In a letter to a friend, written in 1846, he remarks:—

“Our preaching is too commonly of a cast, I am sorry to say, not the most calculated to do good. The mathematics and classics are good in their places; but unless men have something else, they will never make ministers of the New Testament.”

After a little more than a year's residence at Christian Malford, while on a visit to Bristol, he became acquainted with Lady Maxwell, to whom belonged Hope Chapel, at the Hotwells, then recently opened. At the earnest solicitation of her ladyship, Mr. Jay consented to supply the pulpit temporarily, which he accordingly did for nearly a whole year. He was strongly urged both by the lady-patroness and the principal persons of the congregation to become the settled pastor, which at first he was inclined to do, but afterward changed his purpose. According to the usage of the times, a “minister's house” was attached to the chapel, at which the patroness kept a kind of family establishment, residing there herself when in those parts, and leaving it in the charge of a governess in her absence. This governess Mr. Jay believed quite transcended her rightful authority, and interfered with his by meddling too freely and dictatorially with the spiritual affairs of the society and congregation. In recording this part of his history he confesses that the fault in the case may have been mutual, and confesses the many excellences of his fair antagonist, but adds significantly:—“With all my regard for the sex, and submission in domestic affairs, I do not plead for female ecclesiastical rule, whether supreme or subordinate.”

While Mr. Jay was yet at Christian Malford he was called to fill the pulpit of the Independent chapel at Bath, during the temporary illness of its minister, the Rev. Mr. Tuppin, where he found great favour with the people. The next year Mr. Tuppin's health entirely gave way, and Mr. Jay was again often in his pulpit. During the period between the two seasons of his temporary service at Bath, Argyle Chapel was erected for the accommodation of the largely increasing congregation that had been gathered by Mr. Tuppin's ministry; and when it was completed, its opening was for some time delayed on account of the sickness of the minister,—it being the common wish of his people and himself that he should perform that service. But as his recovery at length became quite desperate it was deemed inexpedient to wait any longer, and, with a kind of prophetic fitness, that service devolved on Mr. Jay. Soon after this event occurred the demise of the good pastor, who with his expiring breath named the young man from Bristol as his most eligible successor, a nomination which the officers of the Church and the

society and congregation heartily approved; and the invitation that soon followed was accepted without much hesitation by the pastor elect. The ceremonies of ordination and induction took place without unnecessary delay, and the hitherto young itinerant and village preacher became, once for all, the pastor of Argyle Chapel, Bath. The Rev. Mr. Winter, who for seven years had watched his upward progress as that of a star of peculiar radiance, now seemed to see his fullest expectation realized, as he offered the prayer of consecration and delivered the usual charge to his beloved son in the gospel.

Hitherto the life of Mr. Jay had its share of vicissitudes; but thenceforward to the end,—a period of more than sixty years,—his history is as barren of startling incidents, as it is rich in treasured memories of unostentatious goodness, and the records of a life of almost unparalleled ministerial usefulness. Into the details of that history we do not purpose to enter, though it might be agreeable to retrace a history so replete with blessings, both domestic and social, and a ministry so abundantly crowned with the blessings of Heaven. Few men could with equal propriety appropriate the language of the ninety-first Psalm,—especially its closing declarations.

Our further remarks must be confined to the consideration of the more general features of the subject before us,—his character as a man and a preacher, and especially the means and agencies by which he achieved such wonderful results.

In examining Mr. Jay's character, one is not so much struck with any one commanding feature as with the symmetry of the whole, and the almost perfect harmony of its parts. His intellectual powers, though respectable, were not extraordinary. No one capable of forming an intelligent opinion on the subject, would set him down as either a profound thinker or an acute reasoner. In these particulars he made no pretensions himself, for he knew himself, and seldom or never ventured beyond his measure. Nor, as has been shown, was he a man of much learning. His early opportunities (if that term can be applied to the provision for instruction enjoyed in his childhood) were exceedingly meagre; and when at fourteen he went to reside with Mr. Winter, he was rather apprenticed to the business of preaching than put to school to learn the sciences. Of scholarship neither he nor his preceptor had any very precise notions; while he learned from the Bible and a few books of devotional theology, and from the conversations of his revered teacher, the matter of which he made up the body of his village sermons. Before he had reached the years of his majority he was charged with the care of a society, which, with constant

preaching, afforded him but little opportunity for general reading and study. And these things, made probable by his early circumstances, are abundantly confirmed both by his subsequent history and by his written works.

Yet in one particular evidently his mind was strongly marked. He had great steadiness of purpose and a commendable degree of independence of character, and this gave him great efficiency of action. This is observable in every part of his history, and tempered, as it was, by a sincere though not remarkably ardent piety, it made him really a greater man than many others of greatly superior parts. To this trait of his mental character his physical constitution contributed its part. The child of plain and honest parents, he inherited a sound frame of body, which served him as the efficient agent of an earnest and active mind; and by the healthful flow of life's current his spirit was raised above hypochondriac vapours, and his capacity for both action and enjoyment greatly enlarged. Men are generally but imperfectly aware of the extent to which the condition of the body influences the states of the mind, fashioning the character and determining the career of the person. We accordingly find that during his long life Mr. Jay enjoyed a large share of good health,—that he was accustomed to take hopeful views of all subjects,—to see the bright side of every object,—and so by expecting only good, as well as appreciating the present possession, he was fitted at once to contribute to the happiness of others, and to accomplish his own purposes. To these things we are doubtless to look as some of the chief causes of his success in life; though others, while acting a subordinate part, aided essentially in that work. Gifted by nature with a pleasing elocution, he found a ready access to the hearts of the people,—for nothing so readily secures the favour of the hearers to the speaker, as to be enabled to listen without effort, and to understand without study, and at the same time to be gratified with beauties, and have the mind elevated and carried forward by a pleasing succession of images. Probably his want of profound learning rather helped than hindered his acceptance with his hearers, for people who have never taught themselves to think,—that is all but one in a thousand,—do not wish to be compelled to the unwelcome duty, nor will they be interested with discourses that rise far above or extend much beyond their own narrow range of thought. They who watch for souls, ought to remember that most persons will not consent to be taught much at once; and if the preacher, taking advantage of his position, attempts so to teach them, they in turn will avail themselves of their liberty of with-

holding their attention or attendance from the unasked-for lessons. Readiness of utterance, a chaste but active imagination, and a genial but not exuberant fancy, all aided in making him a favorite with the "common people;"—and distinguished by this trait of character, that class is almost universal. But happily for the permanence of his popularity, Mr. Jay did not rely upon these fortuitous advantages to the neglect of mental culture and steady efforts to store his mind with the needed intellectual furniture. Upon this rock many a promising young minister has made shipwreck. Elated with the manifestations of public favour, and forgetting the evanescent nature of their means of commanding it,—that beauty soon cloy, unless it is associated with intrinsic worth—that the fascinations of youth quickly pass away, and that the crowd which has been drawn together by novelty and occasional excitement, can be detained only by something more substantial,—how many have studied only to please with meretricious beauties when they should have been chiefly solicitous to profit by wholesome truth, while the starving multitude have been fed on flowers instead of fruits, and made to breathe delicious but enervating perfumes instead of the life-giving breath of heaven. A career conducted in this wise is doomed to a speedy and inglorious termination;—a descent more rapid than their ascent is as certain to all who rely on such means of popularity, as the relations of cause and effect,—a result that cannot be long delayed by the repetition of worn-out anecdotes, and overwrought figures of speech, and a profuse use of high-sounding expletives, set off with a due proportion of *pro tempore* emotion. Of this worse than folly William Jay was never guilty.

Aware of the defectiveness of his education, and stimulated by the favour shown toward his preaching, he from the beginning of his public career made his preparations for the pulpit the great business of his life. For this end he thought, and conversed, and read, and wrote. He who, if any man might do so, might have relied on his peculiar gifts, conducted himself as if he was ignorant of possessing any such unusual attraction. Each Sabbath found him in his pulpit with a message to the people prepared for that occasion. The constant attendants upon his ministry heard at each coming what they had never before heard, and the stranger who heard him for the first time discovered an earnestness and freshness in the discourse that made him desire to listen again to the same voice. Perhaps he had an ambition to be great; but it was at once a lofty and a holy ambition, and well did he choose his course to accomplish its purpose. "He clearly saw," says one who both knew and

appreciated his character, "that, if he would do one great thing well, he must concentrate his powers upon *that*, and make everything else give place, or become subservient to it." This he did, and the result is seen in his extensive usefulness and eminent success. Had he divided his efforts, and sought to be a man of general information,—a scholar as well as a preacher,—he would probably have attained to eminence in neither. And is there not cause to suspect that the opposite course is too often the one pursued by the more active and intelligent portion of our young ministers, to the detriment at once of themselves and of their congregations?

A reference to some of Mr. Jay's characteristic peculiarities as a preacher, will illustrate both our general subject and the point more specially under notice. As to his *manner*, we avail ourselves of the remark of one of the editors of these volumes:—

"Mr. Jay's voice was certainly one of the charms of his preaching. It was sonorous, but not loud, alternating between bass and tenor; strong yet soft; musical and flexible; and more adapted to give expression to what is tender, pathetic and solemn, than to what is lively, impetuous and impulsive. If it did not stir you as with the blast of a trumpet, it soothed and delighted you, as with the soft tones of a flute. This indeed was the general character of his preaching, in which the manner was suited to the matter."—Vol. ii, p. 290.

Mr. Jay was evidently, in the fullest sense of the word, an INDEPENDENT minister. He belonged to no particular class or order, either in manner, doctrines, or specific Church discipline. In prayer, his manner was the very opposite of that which distinguished the old Nonconformists, and still more the public exercises of many of their successors. Here again we quote from the editors' remarks with approbation:—

"Occasionally there is *too much of preaching* in prayer; too much of [dogmatic] theology; too little of petition and confession. . . . We do not wonder that Church people of refinement who occasionally attend dissenting worship, complain of a want of solemnity and devout feeling in our prayers; yet were *extempore* prayer performed as it should be, they would retire with a conviction of its superior appropriateness, earnestness and adaptation to the various classes of the congregation, and the changeless experience of the Christian heart."—Vol. ii, pp. 291, 292.

In preaching too he was equally his own model. Indeed, he probably heard very little preaching in his whole life-time, since from very early youth he was constantly engaged in preaching to others; and because he always had a purpose beyond the mere *performance* of the work, he gave less attention to the manner of execution than to results. He preached for effect, and so intuitively adopted the most effective modes of address. Hence he became eminently a *natural* speaker. The inflections of his voice

and the motions of his body were all quite inartificial; and as nature is always consistent with herself, his naturalness found a response in every hearer whose tastes and feelings had not been vitiated by a false education. Herein consisted that faculty which he possessed in so eminent a degree of interesting and pleasing at once the most refined and cultivated, and the most unlettered and rustic hearers. He spoke from nature, and nature responded to his voice.

Another fact that no doubt contributed largely to his ministerial success was his method of comprehending but a little in a single sermon. Generally a single point or truth constituted the matter of a discourse,—except when he made no attempt at sermonizing, but simply gave a running commentary upon the sacred text,—and this was presented in its various aspects and viewed in its several relations, and the whole presented and urged upon the hearts of the hearers as “a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptance.” Especially were his discourses rich in illustrations from familiar objects in nature,—things familiar to and therefore always appreciated by the unlettered, and suited at once to arrest their attention and inform their understandings. His editor remarks:—

“This talent for illustrative allusion was extraordinary. His sermons were not only, by his beautiful fancy, illuminated like the ancient missals, but illustrated like modern books, by descriptive scenes. They contained all the glowing colouring of the one, with the more correct and graceful forms of the other. Here his naturalness constantly appeared, and in close resemblance to that of our Lord, who drew his similes and metaphors from the works of nature and the relationships of humanity.”—Pp. 296, 297.

Intimately related to the foregoing, and equally felicitous in its effects, was his constant and free use of Scripture facts and Scripture language. It is wonderful how strong is the veneration of the mass of a Protestant community for the very words and phrases of the sacred volume. Its language, though used only by accommodation, and its facts, when introduced merely as illustrations, are generally more decisive than the most perfect logical demonstrations; so that the preacher who deals freely in Scripture quotations and illustrates liberally by the facts given in the Bible, is almost sure of the assent of his hearers to the matter of his sermons. This was Mr. Jay's *forte*, continues the last-quoted writer.

“This great preacher threw a sacred charm over his sermons by a profusion of Scripture phraseology, and allusion to Scripture facts. They were adorned with the beauty and redolent with the fragrance of flowers culled from the garden of inspiration. Indeed, the beauty and the perfume were almost in excess. The passages were not so much selected for proof as for illustration; they were brought forward as classic quotations are by public orators, to grace a speech and to convey the speaker's idea in the apposite language of a high authority.”

But all these things would probably have failed of their purpose, had he not used his characteristic discernment and independence, by eschewing the fashion of his times and associates, of delivering their sermons from manuscripts. A congregation of scholars might possibly find both pleasure and profit in written sermons; and those who do not listen at all, and they who render all their religious services as a kind of penance, may tolerate such a substitute for preaching. But to have public discourses attractive, so that they will both arrest attention and directly move the sensibilities, sermons must be delivered *ex tempore*. This was Mr. Jay's course through the whole period of his ministry, and on no other particular, in the method of his public ministration, did he lay more stress than on this. He remarks:—

"Persons of education may be approached through the intellect, but the poor generally are like women, whose heads are in their hearts. They are like poets, who feel before they think. Application is with them an effect rather than a cause. They attend not to feel, but must be made to feel in order to attend."

"Extemporaneous speaking will always be more effective than what is read from composed documents, or doled forth from mere recollection. Animation is desirable, and with ordinary minds no other quality will fully supply the want of it."

"Nothing that requires a lengthened connexion of argumentation will succeed with ordinary hearers. They are not accustomed to unbroken trains of thoughts or discussions. With them, if the preacher be wise, he will find out acceptable words; for the words of the wise are as goads and as nails. The mass are not mathematical; they are not logical. The deep and the subtle in reasoning will commonly escape them. Yet there is often in them largely the principle of common sense; and they are capable of taking in even a profound proof or argument if it be despatched with brevity and plainness."—*Autobiography*, pp. 158, 159.

It must be further noticed that Mr. Jay's independence of character extended further than to the manner of his public ministrations. In forming his creed he called no man master; and accordingly he seems to have belonged to no school or class of theologians. He was indeed commonly reckoned a moderate Calvinist; but if so, his Calvinistic creed had been most thoroughly eviscerated. It was like the play of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet left out. But some people, who are very fond of the name of Calvin, have little favour for whatever is peculiar to the Geneva theology, and so, extending the name of Calvinism over the entire body of the doctrines of the Reformation, they are able to strip their system of all its offensive peculiarities, and yet retain all that is really excellent under its name. But this course is equally disingenuous and unwise. A system of theology, distinguished by some specific name, must retain its specific traits, or forfeit its just claims to the name so used. Judged by this rule, Mr. Jay was not a Calvinist. From his associations and his

reading, his forms of expressions were often borrowed from the terminology of that school of theology; but he either steadily ignored, or else explicitly disavowed the peculiarities of that system. He confessed, as every wise man will, that there are mysteries in the divine administration which he could not solve; that the absolute sovereignty of God, and the free moral agency of man, were both truths plainly taught in Scripture; and while he confessed that he could not explain the mode of their harmonious co-existence, he nevertheless believed both, and left the matter of their adjustment to Him who sees and knows all things. Hence the God whom he worshipped, and whose law and grace he proclaimed, was to him and to his hearers at once glorious in his perfections, and infinite in mercy and goodness.

Most hearers dislike controversial preaching, and are not very scrupulous about points of doctrine. This is perhaps a fault, and it presents one of the difficulties with which a faithful minister is often called to contend. It is probable that Mr. Jay, in too great a degree, fell in with this unwise but prevailing sentiment,—not, however, from any temporizing spirit, but for the want of more definite convictions of the utility of the better course. Yet, though this defect detracted from the value of his ministry, it doubtless contributed much to its acceptance with his hearers.

Another element of success in Mr. Jay's preaching is liable to a still more direct reprehension than his want of definiteness in doctrinal statement. We allude to his not unfrequent violations of the gravity and decorum that become the house of God, and the worship of the sanctuary, by quaintness of manner and expressions, and by evidently studied attempts at small witticisms—a habit which grew upon him with his increasing years—indulged, it has been thought, to compensate for the decline of his mental vigour and the force of his imagination. Such a habit, if involuntary, is at best an unhappy tendency of mind—if cherished and cultivated, it becomes a fault, deserving our decided condemnation; for no momentary applause can excuse for such desecrations. The apology which he offers for this infelicity of manner, in his Preface to his "Short Discourses," is lame and unsatisfactory. We quote it for his benefit:—

"Though he does not wish to indulge a bad taste, the author would ever remember that the preacher ought to have compassion on the ignorant, and on them that are out of the way. That which is too smooth easily slides off from the memory; and that which is lost in the act of hearing will do little good. It is desirable to get something that will *strike* and *abide*; something that, recurring again and again, will employ the thoughts and the tongue; and if this cannot be accomplished in certain instances [except] by modes of address which perhaps are not classically justifiable, should not a minister prefer utility to fame?"

It is not true that quips and oddities help to the recollection of the accompanying gospel truths: they rather unfit the mind for useful meditation at the instant; and also, either cause the entire forgetting of whatever of good was uttered, or else, by associating it with the strange and ludicrous, actually bar its future efficiency. To resort to their use, therefore, is not to "prefer utility to fame," but often precisely the reverse. It may be laid down as a general rule, with very few exceptions, that whatever tends to excite the risibility of the audience in public worship, is, in so far, an evil to be deprecated both for its own sake and for its effects, in opposition to the better tendencies of the accompanying services.

We have written the more fully on these defects or infelicities of this great preacher, from the conviction of danger, that so great an example might be plead in their favour, especially of the latter. Unhappily, imitators generally copy the worse rather than the better traits of their pattern; and as there is a fearful possibility—one indeed too often realized—that buffoonery may be mistaken for wit, and a grin construed as evidence of successful pulpit oratory, it becomes all who have any regard for the honour and efficiency of God's house to sedulously guard them against this form of desecration.

These defects were in him, however, so overbalanced with great and commanding excellences that they seemed comparatively of little account—though they were not altogether unlike the "dead flies" in "the ointment of the apothecaries"—his hearers much more frequently wept than smiled, and oftener remembered their own sins than the preacher's witticisms. A few specific points we have ventured to reprehend, while, as a whole, we admire and reverence the character here presented to our contemplation—entirely coinciding with the following observation, with which we close this paper:—"If the publication of Mr. Jay's life should serve no other purpose than to stir up the ministry to a more earnest and anxious endeavour to excel in this, their momentous sphere of official duty, and to present to them a model which they shall aim to copy, then it will be a subject of congratulation and thankfulness, that to the world has been given this memoir [though imperfect] of one whom Foster designated *the Prince of Preachers*."

C.

INDIANA ASBURY UNIVERSITY, Jan. 20, 1855.

ART. V.—LIBERAL AND EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANITY.

Natural Goodness; or, Honour to whom Honour is due. Suggestions toward an Appreciative View of Moral Men, the Philosophy of the Present System of Morality, and the Relation of Natural Virtue to Religion. By the REV. T. F. RANDOLPH MERCEIN, M. A. New York: Carlton & Phillips. 1854.

WE give a hearty welcome to this volume. In the way of professional criticism alone, we should find a great deal in it to gratify our sense of intellectual merit. The spirit of secular literature, seeking the aroma of art for the simple sentiment of pleasure, might enjoy the present effort for its manly and graceful characteristics. There are thoughts here that certainly rise above the common region of mind. There are indications of analytic power, of subtle penetration, of far-reaching perception, that deserve the warmest appreciation. But apart from this the work has other recommendations. It addresses a refined, Christian taste, a sound, Christian scholarship, a truthful, Christian sympathy. Throughout the book there is a sensitiveness to the claims of honest thinking—a fraternal kindliness of temper—a genial air, that we admire exceedingly; and, at the same time, it is free from those amiable excesses, which so often make dangerous concessions to the latitudinarianism of the age. There are peculiarities in it that remind us of the clear, keen eye of Fletcher, of the muscular grasp of Chalmers, of the liberal culture of Arnold, of the sturdy strength of Foster. But nevertheless, it is marked by a tone of decided individuality. The independence of the volume is one of its prominent features. It follows its own line of argument as distinctly as a river traces its channel to the sea. It is not difficult to see the effect of contributing influences. Along the map of its course, we can locate mountain-springs and valley-streams, that have swelled its volume of waters, but they are tributaries only; the strong current flows from its own fountain and determines its own progress to the awaiting ocean.

First of all, then, we like "*Natural Goodness*," because the author has evidently laboured to be a just and a generous thinker. If any man supposes that these attributes of thought can be separated in the higher contemplations of the mind, he has been betrayed into the servitude of a selfish and debasing philosophy; for no one sentiment is a sufficient guide to the intellect. The claims of justice are not to be settled without reference to the cultivated instinct of benevolence, nor is benevolence to assert its authority with an eye blinded

to the stern requisitions of justice. Where the mind is most open to the mutual interests of these great principles, acting in full view of their respective demands, and striving to conform to their wise precepts, it is best fitted to discover and enforce truth. The man of narrow views cannot appreciate this acute sensibility to whatever is broad and catholic in literature. And yet it is one of the fundamental conditions of all spiritual power. There is a chivalry in intellect as well as in life; there is a sense of others' rights—a lofty bearing, in which the most genuine humility takes the dignity of moral grandeur—a grace of manner in the sharpest thought and the boldest utterance that is worthy of cordial praise. Noble feelings always inspire noble sentiments; the imagination transfers the heart into the brain and animates the reason with its borrowed fervour. And especially is this the case in polemical writing; if the polemic is to be subordinate to the man, if the casuist is to be controlled by the philosopher, if the enthusiast is to be directed and restrained by the Christian, the whole nature of the writer must be brought under the dominion of truth and love in all their multiplied relations. Our author impresses us as a man of this cast. Reverencing the standards that we have been taught to venerate, and yielding nothing that might compromise the strict claims of Christian doctrine, he is yet modest, temperate, and charitable in his discussions. Whenever difficulties are apparent, they are frankly acknowledged and calmly considered; objectors are heard with fairness and patience; antagonists are treated courteously; and in no case does the author resort to those low arts which are sometimes honoured with the name of logic. Indeed, his constant aim appears to be to remove the subject out of the domain of scholastic logic, and unfold it on the ground of a simple and sincere Christian philosophy. His method is singularly free from the taint of suspicion. There is no studied effort to depreciate opposing views, or to ridicule hostile arguments. There is none of the strategy of literature in his tactics. The stealthy art, that kindles the false camp-fire or muffles its footstep in the advance of death on the enemy's line, is righteously disdained.

The spirit of the volume has, therefore, reached our heart. It is open, manly, ingenuous: it practises no cunning evasions; seeks no subterfuges; relies on no doubtful dexterity; avails itself of no disguises. It must be classed among controversial writings, but it is exempt from those vices which have defaced so large a portion of this department of religious literature. Men have been slow to learn that malignity can give no real strength to the intellect. If they look at the truth in its native excellence, armed with the strength and adorned with the beauty of God—mighty, alike in its

energy and repose—they are ready to admit, that in itself it is an all-conquering force by the emanations of birth and the glory of its commissioned ministry. But the moment it becomes their instrument, they are too prone to forget that they are God's agents. The warfare is reduced to carnal rules; and, in the heat of conflict, the religion of the understanding is often violated. The evil here is two-fold; not only is there a sacrifice of Christianity on its own altars, but the intellect engaged in the defence of its truths is positively weakened and practically dishonoured. It is a tacit confession both of ignorance and imbecility to use such weapons. Logic and argument cannot dispense with feeling, but they are enfeebled by earthly passions. Selfish prejudices and morbid desires curse the mind whenever they are permitted to affect its operations. The lessons of material nature are never more eloquent than in those silent teachings that point out the firmament high above the world as the throne of light—a serene glory that the turbulent earth cannot interrupt. Nor does our planet hold the ascending clouds firm to its gravitation without an expressive symbol of the tranquil sanctity of that circling sky which dwells apart from the fellowship of things beneath. And yet Christianity is far nobler than these; it is God's image in thought and love—a perpetual witness of his moral majesty. Men must employ it as such, or its vigour and blessedness wither in their hands. If, indeed, the authority of Christianity as a revealed religion were to be set aside, and the intellect were merely to deal with it on the conditions of human art, it would be absolutely necessary to bring to its doctrines and precepts, a gentle, humble, loving temper; for in no other way could it act upon our instincts and quicken our comprehension. Wherever beauty, sentiment, truth in love, and truth in aspiration are to be embraced, the intellect must put off its earthliness, subdue its grosser passions, and rise into a purer atmosphere. It is the law of success in art no less than of obedience in religion; and hence we are sincerely gratified to find this volume conformed to such correct principles of taste as well as Christian virtue. The spirit of which we speak, may not of itself discover and exhibit the wonderful breadth and harmony of the gospel; but nevertheless, it is an invaluable power; for it does so order and arrange the action of the meditative mind, so discipline its faculties, so suggest the paths of heavenward inquiry, as to place it in the best possible position to acquire a sound and substantial and satisfactory knowledge of the wisdom of God. Let it even go beyond the limits of clearly-revealed truth and enter into the mystic realms of devout speculation, and there, amid the dim nebulae of forming worlds, where chaos is repeating its ancient

struggles, and light is slowly evolving its drapery of splendour for the adornment of new spheres, it will trace the footsteps of Jehovah by the sure tokens of its own quick instinct.

Another feature of this volume is worthy of notice; it is written from the right point of survey. Believing that the doctrine of depravity, as held by evangelical Christians, is the doctrine of the Bible, and that the facts of experience are in perfect agreement with it, the writer endeavours to show the ground on which they meet and support each other. If one wishes to treat this subject properly, he must take such an attitude, for in no other can he embrace all its connexions. The statements of the Scriptures are authoritative and final; no appeal can be made from them. But they address our active faculties; they invoke attention, carefulness, and intelligence in our investigations; they put the working mind on its best processes and tax its profoundest skill. Every man is obliged to recognise his senses, experience, and consciousness in the study of the Bible, for these are constituents in his existence, and elements in all his calculations; and every man is equally bound to harmonize the facts of the one with the facts of the other. The relations of truth are parts of the truth itself, and hence the earthly and the divine aspects of Christianity are both to be estimated and felt.

We have, then, two classes of phenomena: side by side they are arranged before us. Revelation and reason—miracles and common facts—naturalism and supernaturalism—God above nature and God in nature—are in strange association. A system is developed, that emerges from mystery and enters on the clear, open field of human cognizance; it introduces itself among the most familiar objects of daily interest; it meets us in the street, in the marts of business and pursuits of knowledge, at the fireside, in the sanctuary, in all places and at all times; it never changes its tone, demeanour, symbols; it never abates its claims or compromises its sovereignty; and yet, amid all this freedom of intercourse, intent on ceaseless companionship with mortal men and conversant with their minutest concerns, it maintains its two-fold relation to earth and heaven; it is with God and with man at the same instant, in the same perfection. And in consequence of this singular position, our minds are brought into connexion with two worlds. The facts are apparently irreconcilable. But it is just here that the great work of intellect, awakened and cultivated by Christianity, is found. The discord is to be healed; the seemingness of contrariety is to be explained; disturbing forces are to be adjusted; and the new machinery, reducing the will of the race—the science of the race—the power of the race—into subjection to the authority of God, is to exhibit its beau-

tiful union with the universal system of moral government. It is man's task to ascertain and demonstrate this harmony between Christianity and the facts of his condition. Philosophy has no right to ask Christianity to explain this enigma. There is no reason why Christianity should undertake to do such a work; there is every reason against it. The only thing that it could rationally be expected to prove is its divine origin. If it furnish evidences of its heavenly birth; if it wear the robes and show the stamp of an unearthly royalty; if it speak the language of eternity and command the resources of infinity in authenticating its claims on the reverence, faith, and service of mankind, it has thoroughly exhausted all demands that sober reason can have. No sooner has this been accomplished than it takes its position among the common phenomena of the world, in so far as its connexions are involved, and the offices of intelligent science are then to be exercised in establishing its relations with other known and accepted truths. And precisely such is the method that God has ordained in the history of Christianity. Miracles were wrought to show the presence of omnipotence; to exhibit its alliance with those august and majestic forms of power that everywhere signalize the material universe; to arouse the mind by its sensibility to exceptional instances of wonder and amazement, and to fasten its sublimities deeply in that sense of mystery, of nearness to a surrounding awe, of involuntary sympathy with whatever transcends the limits of human measurement, which is so active a sentiment in our constitution. On this external proof Christianity was founded. Its title to a place in the phenomena of the universe was thus made good; its location was determined; its *paternity* was put beyond all doubt. If, now, in this primeval period of Christianity, an inquiring intellect should be suddenly thrown on the profound moral sentiments of its creed, how would it act? Suppose that some mighty grief, cleaving its affectionate nature as with a lightning-shaft, should reveal a hitherto undreamed depth of tenderness and love, or any other summons, like a blast from a distant sphere, should intensify its sense of affliction and transform the whole universe into a symbol of woe; it is obvious that its Christian sentiments would receive a terrible shock. And why? Because its taste, feeling, and hopes, had just before been vivified and elevated by the cardinal idea of *goodness* in the governing authority of the world *without any adverse experience to counterbalance the primary emotion*. But in a healthy state of the mental faculties, it would soon recover itself, and a *counterpoise*, springing from the play of interacting elements that did not previously exist, would be established. Such a mind would have the fresh recollection of mir-

acles to restore its equanimity. It would have a great fact—one that came to it with more pomp and significance than anything in its earlier history—to lift itself up before its wavering faith and silence its anxious questionings.

But let us imagine a different state of things; let us take the man of our day. There is a distance of nineteen centuries between him and the miracles which were displayed in the East, for the attestation of Christianity; but, nevertheless, they are evidences for him. A wonderful literature, contained in a single book, pregnant with every form of earnest and inspiring life, confirmed by numerous outward incidents, and holding a scarcely disputed mastery over all that is elsewhere magnificent in thought, preserves the testimony of those who were the chosen witnesses of these signal events. And yet assurance is still further strengthened. For the existence of Christianity in a hostile world—a foreign power, creating its own hospitality, and receiving no friendship that it does not originate and keep alive—is the daily repeated miracle of his observation. Now, it must be apparent, that such a man will be exposed to his peculiar temptations, growing out of the circumstances of his position. If there be any debate in his mind, it will be on the ground of reconciling Christianity with the facts of experience and consciousness. The cause of the struggle may, probably, be explained. The constant tendency of Christian experience is to withdraw its subject from the outward world—to weaken the dominion of the senses—to familiarize him with spiritual conceptions—to secure a firm and cordial sympathy with those objects that derive the grandeur of a transcendent importance and the charm of a most attractive loveliness from the interests of eternity. And by these means, as the processes of inward life are continued, there is a steady enhancement of consciousness, a vigorous quickening of individual relations to the divine economy. One would not think that this cultivation of consciousness would involve danger. But the deep insight that it gives into the soul; the lofty aspirations it excites; the earnest strivings for the perfect mastery of its cherished sentiments that it maintains; the painful contrasts between the purity promised and attained, which are ever recurring in its meditative hours; and, above all, the frightful enigma of evil, following its progress, challenging its study, baffling its skill, and mocking even revelation itself, press sorely, heavily upon it. Hence, it would seem that the development of consciousness, raising man to a higher sense of his inheritance, renders him more sensitive to the mysterious facts of his existence. A passing breath of wind plays upon his heart-strings, and a portentous meaning comes from the strange

music; but if that breath had not proceeded from heaven, what more would it be than the idle zephyr of a summer eve?

The moral world must consequently be the battle-ground of Christianity. The great chord was struck when Nicodemus asked, "*How can these things be?*" A thousand times the heart repeats that memorable question—not only about the new birth, but in respect to every wonder with which Christianity makes it acquainted. The real problem of life is the reconciliation of Christianity with the phenomena of the moral world, and Providence devolves this task on us as the surest method to train us to the final comprehension of its purposes. Nowhere are there so many seeming contradictions—such sharply-defined inconsistencies of appearance—such unremitting warfare between light and darkness—such discordant elements—as here; and nowhere are there so many effective instruments to discipline us to the intelligence and virtue of Christian character. And how does Christianity propose to conduct this struggle? It distinctly asserts the incompetency of knowledge to settle the difficulty, and announces the partialness of its revelations as a fixed principle in its administration of human affairs. We "*know in part*,"—"prophesy in part,"—is its declaration. Where, then, are the compensations? Where are the operative forces, girded for the mighty achievement? "And now abideth faith, hope, charity—these three." A divine emphasis is laid on "*these three*." And because of this law—the law of "*these three*,"—all the conflict and trial ensue. If in the place of faith we had the knowledge of reason—if for hope we had certain possession, and for charity, the higher forms of angelic love, the sources of perplexity and distress would be instantly removed. The nature of these principles evinces the painful strife to which the progressive mind, imbued with the spirit of Christianity, is doomed. Unbelief, despair, malignity—*these three*—are the mighty ministers of evil. *These three* are the emissaries of perdition; *these three* are the oily-tongued sophists and veiled deceivers of iniquity; *these three* are the shrewd speculators that wander on the shores of dark and stormy oceans, and throw the line into fathomless depths; *these three*—what allies of the tempter, what ruthless intruders into the sanctuary of sorrow, lighting the dim eye of grief with a wild glare, and adding a keener pang than bereavement to the anguish of a desolated heart! No wonder, therefore, that the moral world gives birth and scope to such a fiery contest; no wonder that unresting feet press its burning sands, and feeble nerves quiver in its terrible whirlwinds. The legions of heaven and hell meet on this field, and that combat which decides the results of the incarnation, life, death, resurrection, and

glorification of Jesus Christ, Mediator between God and man, and princely Head of the universe, is here conducted.

Our remarks on this point have been extended, because we believe that the indications of the age show a strong tendency to transfer the argument of Christianity to this ground. Infidelity can never gain any advantage from physical science: for, just in proportion as scientific truth advances, it is found that the human mind is advancing in the same line of movement with Christianity. The present forms of scepticism are generally marked by the traces of spiritual solicitude, which no art and ingenuity can disguise; and whatever may be the dangerous fascinations lurking in them, no man can mistake those violent revulsions of soul, that never fail to occur whenever the foundations of belief, solace, and strength are overthrown. Infidelity is ordinarily a reaction from the course on which Christianity is proceeding, and hence it is not difficult to read the progress of the one in the historic exhibitions of the other. The angles of the shadow must correspond with the angles of light; and as Christianity enters on any given portion of our diversified nature, it must provoke a counter struggle in the same department of thought and experience. Nor is this awakening of resistant forces limited to infidelity. The latent elements of unbelief, ready at any time and in any way to break forth in the partially sanctified Christian, are easily quickened by those modes of meditative inquiry which a cultivated period encourages. Materialism cannot disturb them. The difficulties of physical science arouse no doubts and fears. A single sublime sentiment, a moment of divine communion, a glimpse of the better glory, lifts them high above these mole-hills: for in such a debate, if debate it can be called, the spirit asserts its superiority to sense, and claims the security of its birthright. But it is otherwise when the soul is arrayed against itself. If instinct rebels against instinct, sentiment against sentiment, there is set up the most painful and perplexing warfare that the human mind can possibly undergo. We witness this spectacle in our day. And the reason is obvious. It is an age of earnest and general culture. It is an age of profound spiritual thought and anxious reflection. It is an age in which the reason of piety is more than ever considered, and the heart prefers its claims on the intellect. Signs are abounding that it is a transition age, in which devout men are passing from a religion of education to a religion of conviction—from forms to realities—from outward machinery to inward life; and consequently their faith must be subjected to new tests: for who can ascend the mountain without feeling the chill air and the encompassing cloud? Who expects not, that at intervals he will lose the fair

prospect and the ample horizon, as he toils upward to the summit of furthest vision and brightest sunlight?

The specific object of Mr. Mercein's book is to examine "*the facts of human life and consciousness*," in their relation to the Scripture doctrine of depravity. Taking the moral man, who discharges the duties of ethical propriety with a faithfulness, devotion, and beauty that must be acknowledged, and finding that he cannot enter into the meaning of those strong and vehement declarations of guilt and wickedness which abound in the Bible, he states fairly and fully the circumstances of his position—the difficulties, inseparable from character and condition, under which he labours in accepting the broad and unequivocal statements of inspiration—and the corresponding claim which he has on the intelligent forbearance of Christian sympathy. The first essay, on the "*Injustice done to Moral Men*," is an admirable presentation of the obstacles which prevent the moralist from appreciating the evil of his situation, and the influence which they ought to exert on our charity. The severe denunciation, in which so many writers and pulpits indulge, is justly condemned. The more philosophical and religious mode of treating this subject, as illustrated by Butler, Chalmers, M'Cosh, and others, is mentioned; and the necessity for careful discrimination, directing the shafts of discussion to the right point, is earnestly urged. The bearing of this essay is worthy of being thoroughly weighed: for to our mind it is perfectly clear, that the Church is not sufficiently sensible of the duties which it involves. There is a twofold reason for this appreciation of "moral men." If we ask ourselves the question, "Does Christianity sympathize with them?" there can be but one answer: It does feel for them. It takes account of their virtue, though it is earthly virtue; and while it regards them as sinners by nature and by practice, it nevertheless displays a considerate estimate of their character. Not that Christianity ever confounds this type of worldly excellence with the fruits of genuine religion, or even intimates that it is the vanishing line of a divine portraiture; but it is viewed in its own connexions and recognised on its own grounds. If such men were not the occupants of a redeemed sphere; if no Providence were over them; if the institutions of a refined and graceful civilization were not continually acting on their tastes, sentiments, and habits; in a word, if none of the indirect and secondary agencies of Christianity were operating on their minds, they would be utterly powerless on the score of social morality. Can any one suppose that Christianity would discredit any portion of its work? If it has diffused its serene and mighty influence through the economy of Providence, penetrated physical law, affected hereditary

dispositions, watched over the infant in its cradle, the youth at his sports, and the man in the commerce of the city, it is surely not the suicidal system that would dishonour its own gifts, and brand contemptuously its own favours. Admit these facts, and both interest and duty are plain. The more vital and intimate our sympathies are with Christianity, the greater degree of intellectual and spiritual strength will be produced: and especially will our social power be augmented. If we rendered justice to "moral men," it would have a good effect on them, for it would, in most instances, relieve them of an antagonistic attitude; they would cease to defend themselves: and thus freed from the supposed necessity of a constant war of resistance, they would be better prepared for the impressions of the gospel. And certain are we, that if the pulpit were more considerate of natural virtue, it would be far more effective in its rebukes of vice. The interests of Christianity are now suffering in the most serious manner, because of the inability of the Church to extend her sway over "moral men;" and we know not how the growing evil is to be remedied but by the introduction of a wiser philosophy and a truer courtesy in our conduct toward them.

The second essay, on the "*Unconsciousness of Deep Guilt*," is one of the clearest, strongest essays that we have ever read. Apart from everything else in this thoughtful and suggestive volume, it has a definiteness, a pungency, a force in its reasoning, that would give Mr. Mercein a high position as a moral writer. There are some golden paragraphs in this portion of the work, to which any one who has read them will be glad to recur in his most receptive moments. The more formal and logical parts of the argument are exceedingly well expressed, while the illustrated branches of it are really glowing with genius. The object of the essay is to show, that the general unconsciousness of deep guilt affords no presumption against the doctrine of utter depravity. Scripture seems to exhaust language in representing the natural condition of man. The boldest statements, the most ample variety of diction, the most scathing rebukes, the aptest figures run through every form that literature can assume. It is expounded in didactic instruction, and conveyed in poetic imagery. Biography, narrative, history, song, prayers, praise, sermons, exhortations, letters, visions, prophecies, are full of this mighty burden of the heart and thought of Scripture. Nor is this all. The external universe is a vast whispering gallery, where voices of wretchedness and woe, breathing forth in silence and solitude their melancholy wail, are evermore repeated; and as the tones return, there springs a deeper sense of the gigantic misery which has everywhere seized the world as its inheritance. And yet, the unregen-

erated man does not respond to the divine utterance of his guilt. The severe declarations of Scripture are not attested by ordinary experience. Guilt is treated as a fact, as a prominent fact, as a most affecting fact, in God's world; but men refuse to admit and feel it. Why? The same cause that creates guilt, creates insensibility, and, therefore, according to our present constitution, depravity is as consistent with unconsciousness as innocence itself. The simple fact is, that consciousness in all Christian relations has to be awakened and cultivated by divine grace, and hence it is a fatal folly to trust its spontaneous dictates. Like the rest of our nature, it has sunk under the spell of carnal slumber—the sleep of death is there; and only the voice of God can rouse it to life. But Mr. Mercein advances a step further. The consequences of sin are mercifully hidden from us in this world; remorse is held in abeyance; the flaming eye is veiled, lest the full perception of our transgressions and their demerits should utterly and forever overwhelm us. Probation demands this condition of mind. Mr. Mercein is correct in this view. For moral motives to be motives—*such motives as Christianity employs*—there must be a careful limitation to the circumstances and organization of man. Such an excess of action on the sensibilities of our nature as any other theory would imply, could only result in the introduction of force into the realm of intellectual and spiritual life. If every act of iniquity were to flame out its frightful features against the calm sky; if, indeed, the countenance were to picture, like the painting of the sunbeam, the moral physiognomy of the soul; if, in a word, men were to be made fully aware of the awaiting punishment—the conditions of appeal, entreaty, volition, would be radically changed. The facts of the gospel might be called "*motives*," but in no proper sense, for their power would be so intense, so subduing, so irresistible, as to establish the reign of fatalism. Heaven, therefore, follows the law of reserve. It offers sufficient reasons for repentance, faith, and holiness. It makes Christian culture attractive and ennobling. It proclaims the approaching judgment, and points the wicked to their awful destiny. But in all this, the most studied respect for the organic processes of the mind is observed. No courtly ceremonial could be more rigid and exact. Not only is our planetary home insulated from proximity to other orbs, but the message that reaches it from the throne of the Eternal is characterized by a wise deference to the circumstances and provisions of our being.

The next essay proceeds to consider another presumption, which men are disposed to indulge. It is the presumption against the idea of deep guilt, afforded by God's temporal blessings upon

natural virtue. Mr. Mercein admits, that the mind intuitively connects holiness and happiness. Nor can this be doubted; for the two are correlatives. The idea of the one is incomplete without the other. But are the temporal rewards of morality the "Inspector's brand, marking its soundness?" They are not; and Mr. Mercein proceeds to show that these consequences do not evince the moral character of the agent. Men practise these different moralities and are rewarded for them, but it is impossible to reduce them to any system. The reason is apparent: no common principle underlies them. A man may be virtuous in one of these relations and vicious in another; and thus he may be blest in the former and cursed in the latter. So much obedience—so much recompense—is the decree, that daily life executes. It is analogous to physical law. A man may obey the law of gravitation, but could he argue from this fact that the lightning would not strike him? Let him guard his stomach from intemperance and gluttony; let him attend to its health; and a certain good result will follow: but it would be sheer folly to dream that this regimen would prevent the dust from inflaming his eyes, or an undue exposure to cold from irritating his lungs. Mr. Mercein has not pressed this argument as far as it would bear, nor is its full force brought out as effectively as it might have been. The moralities of life are matters of temporary relations rather than of permanent principles, and hence they take their place among the same arrangements that reward the agriculturist or the mechanic. We work and are supported; we sow the seed and reap the harvest; we act honestly and are trusted; we love and are loved in return; we perform a magnanimous deed and the community honours it. The world is constituted on this plan. Its conservative and socializing agencies are impregnated with this sentiment, and if it were set aside, the whole organization would crumble into nothingness. Viewed in a strictly philosophic light, it is a mere economic temporality—a regency rather than the higher form of government. If these moralities could be combined into a system, then a common sentiment, a common spirit, would animate them, and, as a necessary result, the development would be uniform, regular, and consistent. A good father would make a good neighbour, a good citizen, a good philanthropist, a good merchant, a good banker, or any other good. And why? Because character would be exercised and matured *as character*. The springs of inward life would be reached and the fundamental nature would be rectified. But such is not experience and observation. The moral law of Christianity can be summed up in love to God and love to man; love is the synonyme of all the commandments; but the worldly

moralties that adorn life are incapable of any such abbreviation so long as they are contemplated as mere mortalities. Each one for itself—each one in its own distinctiveness—each one in its own place—must be set down in the formula, and by no possibility can the worth of one be transferred to the account of the other.

The aim of Mr. Mercein is to show just here, that the earthly mortalities, whatever may be their utility and beauty in the present arrangements of life, cannot involve the higher and purer morality of the gospel. Their rewards offer no pledge of its reward. "When these earthly rewards," says he, page 76, "and their virtuous acts and the relationships which called them forth have passed away, the question of *eternal morality* and *eternal rewards* will stand, as it does to-day—alone—to be determined by its own evidences." Hence, he comes to the conclusion, that "*whatever the temporal blessing and curse which attend human action may indicate, it certainly does not indicate any such regard for the moralist as shall secure him from eternal punishment in the future world.*" And this conclusion is supported by the fact, that God bestows his benediction on actions in this world simply as actions, and without any respect to motives. Imperfect as this scheme of recompense is, it nevertheless serves to express the moral relations of God as the Governor of the world, and to intimate the duties and prospects of mankind.

The progress of the argument through the fourth essay is to examine the presumption against the idea of deep guilt which is afforded by the comparative rectitude of human conduct. The secondary motives to morality, derived from prudential considerations, and their effective action in the existing economy of nature, are most admirably unfolded. There is in this section of the work not only a great deal of logical power, but an unusual degree of subtle and minute force. Nowhere is the steady hand—the exact eye—of the marksman more distinctly visible. The embroidered veil is lifted from the moral world, and its deceptive anatomy is laid bare. No heart, touched by the plastic finger of Heaven, is here,—no desires, burning for their native sphere,—no aspirations, ascending with humble prayer as the fragrant incense rises with the smoke of the sacrifice. But the reader must not suppose that these inducements, flowing from a wise regard to interest and welfare, are depreciated. Far from it. If a man will not surrender his spirit to the play of the select and sanctified motives of Christianity, he acts well in not abandoning humbler incitements. "If he is *not* a saint, it is honourable not to be a fool." Now this is certainly the correct view of the case. Men cannot live in society

without feeling the pressure of social necessities. A thousand ties bind them to a thousand objects. The strings of the human heart—what a net-work are they, spreading out and abroad over myriads of things, connexions, purposes, aims, ambitions, and projects, embracing land and sea, island and continent—intertwined with the wealth of the mine and the harvest of the field—and laced around country, neighbourhood, and home! What urgent and pathetic calls to sobriety, honesty, uprightness, in the love of the fireside and the responsibilities of wedded life! What sermons for every week-day on the nobleness of work, when nature spreads her sacrament beneath the encircling sky, and pledges her sunshine, rain, and dew to compensate the industry of muscle and nerve! Amid these gorgeous scenes, bearing still the beautiful tracery of a purer age, where the memory of Eden is casketed in gold and jewelry, where the busy light wreathes its silver drapery for unseen forms of matchless grace, where the heavens and the earth meet in sweet embrace and repeat as of old the nuptials of their birth; amid these scenes, where God yet walks and gives to our listening ears the echo of his footsteps if not the precious salutations of his voice; amid these scenes, where Christianity emblazons its symbols wide over the firmament and across every teeming landscape,—where the whitening harvests, and the bending lilies, and the soaring birds all recall the image of Christ; amid such scenes, sacred by their memorials, their prophecies, and their joys, how could *men* live and not be mellowed and moved! Not parsimonious is that hand which has multiplied its benefactions here. Heaven has its selecter and more glorious splendours; earth has its lesser charms. The cursed world is not deprived of all its resources. It is God's "*footstool*,"—worthy of being so much a portion of his throne. The benefits of intelligence, truth, and love—the institutions of refined civilization—the diffusive mercies of Christianity—are all here in rich profusion. And they must operate through every channel of human existence. Whether recognised or not, they must obey their inherent law and exert a meliorating influence over mankind. Insensibly, silently, calmly, they find their way to hearts that own them not. A reflected light, such as the moon gives from the sun, is distributed from their thoughts, sentiments, affections, and conduct.

It is easy to see, then, that there is a provision for "*comparative rectitude*" in the present economy of nature and providence—a system of life, enterprise, and sensibility, outside of Christianity, in which all prudential motives, all shapes of personal and relative emotion, may be intensely active. Such a "*rectitude*" has a

name—a *status*—a vitality that cannot be disputed or denied. Fear and pride are its most common constituents. It lacks the cardinal and central element of Christianity—love to God and man—and hence, whatever else it may be, it is not religion. However far it may remove a human being from a demon, it does not bring him to the companionship of an angel. “Social instinct” cannot be viewed as a “moral perception,” and motives that consult general expediency, and circulate only within the narrow circle of immediate, tangible, remunerative interests, are not such motives as can sustain the spirit in its heavenward flight.

Passing to the succeeding essay, (No. V,) Mr. Mercein elaborates the beauty, gracefulness, and service of the “*natural virtues*.” There is an eloquence here that is both attractive and forcible. Passages there are of gentle picturesqueness—like valley-landscapes set within mountain-enclosures—and passages too of great warmth and throbbing heartiness. A full, cordial, and cheerful acknowledgment of the numerous and gratifying offices of the “*natural virtues*” is made: the spontaneous and disinterested impulses are duly credited with all their sublime exhibitions, and their presence in benevolent institutions, literature, and other commanding forms, is honourably and gladly appreciated. Aware that these excellences have been made the theme of abuse and reproach, the author seems to be anxious to award them the fullest share of justice; and his tribute, dictated by a truthful and generous heart, is eminently successful. The charge of the distinguished Dr. Channing, that a rigid orthodoxy has often “exaggerated the sins of men, that the need of an infinite atonement may be maintained,” is felt, and the author labours to put himself beyond its application. How, then, are these “*natural virtues*” to be managed—where are they to be located—and what are their final issues? The view presented by the celebrated Dr. Chalmers, in which the claims of God are brought before “*the complacent moralist*,” and he is made to realize his spiritual bankruptcy, no matter how well he has discharged his duty to man, is introduced and examined. A brief extract from Dr. Dewey, with a sensible criticism, is given. “The very nature of true excellence,” says Dr. Dewey, “in one form is a pledge for its existence in every other form.” Mr. Mercein turns the principle back upon the doctor with decided skill. The very nature of true excellence in *one* form being a pledge for its existence in *every other* form, then, of course, “its absence, unregretted, unre-sisted in any form, argues its absence in every other form, whatever there may be of its *semblance*.” The point is well stated. Standing then on this ground, without a direct appeal to a consciousness

of neglect or enmity toward God, Mr. Mercein finds that the "*natural virtues*" are deficient in a central principle, and hence are wanting in the "symmetry, regularity, and uniformity" which attend a true love of rectitude.

The field seems now to be cleared. The sixth essay comes to the "*Relation of Morality to Religion.*" It is the most masterly section of the volume. For clear, compressed, consecutive thought—for arguments that move and march in lustre—for breadth and compass of outline—for apt, striking, felicitous illustrations—and above all, for concentration on the single point in contemplation, we shall not hesitate to express our warm admiration for this brilliant and profound essay. It indicates a thinker of extraordinary acuteness and grasp—a man of abstract and generalizing power, who is capable of ascending above the mediocre levels of religious meditation, and taking large and original views of his theme. The idea which Mr. Mercein elaborates, is, that "*some preliminary steps are requisite*" before any practicable offer of salvation can be presented. To a certain extent, the sensibilities of the mind must be restrained; the idea of sin must be *toned down* to the degree demanded by the tranquil working of thought and emotion; the "violence, the sweep, the frenzy of passion" must be checked; in brief, a repressive force is to be exerted on *passion* equally with the *sense of guilt, shame, and danger*. The mind is thus put in a *probationary position*. But what then? The soul is destitute of pure affections; how is it to be trained to appreciate excellence? How are ideas to be communicated, emotions excited, aspirations enkindled? If the soul cannot, says Mr. M., "*have virtuous affections, it must be impressed with parallel instincts.*" The conclusion is therefore reached, that "*a fair platform for further operations may be obtained by these three measures: a deadened consciousness of guilt, repressed passion, and the affectional instincts. These instincts, supported by the systems of rewards and punishments administered in this life, would preserve a true probationary condition.*"

Had we space, it would afford us pleasure to extend our examination of this theory of the "*relation of morality to religion.*" We must content ourselves with a few general observations.

First, then, it may be remarked, that the view advocated by Mr. Mercein, locates morality in the natural world. Its virtues are regarded as a sort of *outfit* for the duties of earthly life, in the immediate sphere of its appetites, tastes, desires, actions. It is the archetype—the original pattern—on which the present fallen social state is organized. It is the idea out of which friendship, home, philanthropy has grown. It is the moral capital of business,

industry, enterprise. Taken in this connexion, it is a part of the vast system of Divine Providence for the government of the human race, varied from its other forms so as to suit the wants of a rational being, and direct his agency toward the attainment of the benignant ends of Infinite Wisdom. *Secondly.* Morality points to a higher economy. Operating through the intellect, it suggests purer thoughts than it can realize; through the will, a need of strength and purpose it cannot attain; through the affectional instincts, a fuller experience of beauty, trust, and joy, than its own objects can supply. Its tendency, if not interrupted, would be to educate man to look for something beyond itself, and by means of the influence exerted on it, to stimulate him to seek it. In brief, it is a practical institute of types and adumbrations, foreshadowing every moment, and in all its manifestations, the divine remedy for its own weaknesses and guilt. *Thirdly.* Christianity avails itself of this providential instrumentality to effect its own specific work. It adopts its sentiments and offices as illustrations of its plan and regimen. Words that primarily belong to its relations are adopted into its vocabulary, and feelings that interchange between man and his fellow are purified and transferred to new claimants. The direct purposes which morality subserves are temporary and mundane; but it has a further and a nobler capability. When its immediate ends are reached, these ends may become means to a still ulterior purpose.

It strikes us that there is a great deal of discrimination and force in Mr. Mercein's views. One of the difficult points in theology is to define the exact position of the "*natural virtues*." A stern and severe orthodoxy frequently hands them over, in a mass, to Satan, and treats them as nothing more than his splendid disguises. They are supposed to be worse than valueless in the sight of God. Positive counterfeits of the true currency, they only suffice to purchase damnation by a most costly investment, giving scorpions for eggs, stones for bread, in this world, and terminating in the worst of bankruptcy in a future state. One extreme provokes another. Disgusted with this roll of infamy, in which the "*natural virtues*" are registered, a latitudinarian theology, claiming to be liberal by special distinction, seizes the tablets of heaven, and records these "*virtues*" in bewitching loveliness on their spotless marble. According to its theory, human nature is not essentially and radically depraved. It labours under an oppressive weakness; but the principle of moral health, perpetuated from our original creation and designed to be a constitutional element of the immortal mind, has been preserved. The aid of divine grace is not rejected. Watchfulness and prayer, self-denial and self-sacrifice, are held to be necessary. But, never-

theless, religion is a mere outgrowth from a native germ; all that Christianity does is to create a genial climate, to give the brightest sunshine and the most fertilizing dews for the stimulation of its fibres and juices. If, now, a cultivated Christian mind, divesting itself of all partisanship, contemplate these two systems in the ordinary forms, which they present it cannot be insensible to the fact that they both appeal to certain sentiments in its nature. Orthodoxy may be rigid; it may sometimes extend to harshness; but there is a power in its doctrines, a pungency in its appeals, a pointedness in its dealings that must be acknowledged. Sin and guilt, driven from paradise, and doomed to the trials of toil and the tears of tribulation; shrieking in the fast-ascending waters of the deluge, and shivering before the terrors of Sinai; enacting their tragedies of woe in every age, and fraternizing with hell and ruin; erecting splendid temples to Satan, defying God, crucifying Christ; such sin and guilt stand out before its eye. It feels the awful moral of the scene. Not with words of courteous compromise, nor with parlour-etiquette, can it deal with the gigantic evil. Men are perishing. The heart of Christ was pierced for them—shall they pierce themselves through with sorrows that eternity cannot assuage? The blood of the Lamb of God—the only Lamb in the fold of the universe—was shed for them; and shall they float away from the cross on a deluge of their own blood and plunge into perdition? No wonder, then, that it is so earnest, so emphatic, so intensely excited in muscle, nerve, heart, and brain! The danger warrants it—the danger inspires it; and whatever may be thought of its occasional violations of good taste, its fiery zeal, its persistent purpose, its unyielding exactions, one thing is certain, and that is, it grapples mightily with the profoundest sympathies and strongest sentiments of our nature, and comes home, with terrible vehemence, to whatever in us takes hold on the impressive realities of eternity.

But turn to another picture. "*Liberal Christianity*," as its friends term it, adopts another style of argument and appeal. It speaks to man as the child of misfortune. The accidents of education and example have misled him. A wanderer from the right way, a voluntary exile from goodness and love, he is cast abroad among temptations that often subjugate his native independence. It is a dark world, a sad world, a sinning world: but does not our *planet* belong to the same system as the *SUN*? Moral agency exists under disadvantages, and Christianity has been sent to strengthen and expand it. The element of competency is in us, but it requires a favourable combination of means and circumstances for its development. Christianity mainly supplies the want. It is the divine helper—the

gracious sympathizer—the heavenly benefactor. Regeneration, in the sense of a new creation, is not taught. It has faith; but it is simple confidence in the paternal goodness of God. It has repentance; but not such grief for sin, not such scalding tears as come from the vivid apprehension of a sacrificial death for a redemption from the bondage of iniquity. It binds man to a strict accountability, and demands of him a beautiful, thorough, earnest "*self-culture*" that shall make him worthy of his sovereignty over this lower world, and vindicate his title to the "*image of God*." Such is our imperfect outline of "*liberal Christianity*." If it has any errors, we hope to be forgiven. Just thinking is the crown of intellectual excellence, and on no account would we invade its claims.

That "*liberal Christianity*" addresses a certain order of sentiments within us cannot be doubted. If any refined and generous mind can calmly study the religious system of William Ellery Channing and Orville Dewey without feeling that it touches several sides of his nature, we envy neither his piety nor his wisdom. "*Liberal Christianity*" has made a truthful, eloquent, indignant protest against various forms of popular ignorance and religious passion. It has offered a vigorous resistance to Calvinism on the score of moral philosophy. It has defended the freedom of man. The social relations of Jesus Christ as a perfect man; the great duty of cherishing his serene spirit and imitating his illustrious example; the claims of humanity and philanthropy as religious considerations; the obligations of "*self-culture*;" the minor morals of Christianity, which are so often disregarded; the spiritual connexions of literature, science, and art, it has stated, amplified, illustrated, and enforced with remarkable clearness, beauty, and force. For this work it deserves our gratitude. Any man of thoughtful habits must see that these departments of religious intellect—these far-spreading fields of scholarship, taste, and elegance—have been shamefully neglected by orthodoxy. The mind of the Church has been engaged in unfolding Christianity as a transaction between God and man, and, particularly for the last century, the greater part of pulpit talent and lay ability has been occupied with this aspect of the system. But who can doubt that, meanwhile, Christianity, as a social law and a social life, has been strangely thrown into the background? The moon turns but one side of her orb to the earth; but is that the symbol of Christ's religion? The sense of ideality is a true element of the intellect. Not in vain have the fair and graceful forms of the material universe been created; not in vain have the stars kindled a festal splendour, and the landscape been robed in a beautiful livery. All these things are far deeper than eye and ear.

Poetry cannot satisfy the claims of this universe for expression. There are sights it cannot see, sounds it cannot hear. It cannot put a soul into the vast mysteries rising, swelling, darkening, all around us. Never! Creation—its magnificence, glory, terror—are closed to every creature. Its profoundest meanings are sure to escape us. Its most godlike emblems are the first to elude our search. But the universe exists for Christ. It was made *for* him as well as by him; and Christianity is his sole representative to interpret the wonders crowding the heavens and the earth. It only can use them so as to insure Christian instruction and pleasure, and render them an illuminated commentary on the page of Holy Scripture. The same remark applies to all the relations of Christianity to the affections of daily life. Here are these select ministers of earth's hallowed courts, anointed for pleasant and useful service, waiting the call of any token, glad to anticipate a wish or to suppress a half-uttered sigh; but Christianity has too often been suffered to withhold its influence and refuse its benediction. Men have not been taught, as they should have been, what a wealth of beauty and joy lay around them. Imagination has not been invited to the feast of munificence which the divine hand has spread on its royal boards, and sensibility has been left to seek its bliss where best it could find sympathy and cheer. And yet more. The law of labour, the toils of business, the enterprises of commerce have not been appreciated as means of moral and Christian education; nor, indeed, has the machinery of society been made to revolve with those "wheels within wheels" which sweep before us in the visions of prophecy. Orthodox Christianity has limited its field too much, and hence a *speciality* has been provoked into existence.

Let us not be misunderstood. We prefer no charges against orthodox Christianity on the score of earnest sincerity, sound doctrine, pure morals. It has witnessed a good confession. It has translated the ritual of heaven into the language of childhood, youth, and age. It has taught jurisprudence its wisdom, and government its creed. It has proclaimed the cross far and wide as the only hope, the sufficient hope, of the world. A ministration of power and purity, a co-worker with the Holy Ghost, it has borne a saving testimony to the majestic truths that are embodied in the New Testament. The precise point is this, viz.: The individual relations of Christianity to the higher forms of earthly sentiment and personal culture—its authority in literature, art, business, and intercourse—its bearings on the great out-door realities of practical existence—have been too much omitted; and in this way another system has been developed into life and activity. "*Liberal Christianity*" has

undertaken to supply this felt deficiency. It has summoned men to consider the authority of reason; emphasized the strength, loveliness, and honour of sensibility; elevated the affections of home, kindred, and race; dwelt on the capacities of mind, and carried agency through all the wide circuit of endeavour, struggle, suffering, and heroism. Had we to contemplate it in these aspects alone, it would win our warmest admiration and call forth our most cordial greeting. But the religious idea of the system—its provisions for a fallen, ruined, guilty race—will press themselves on our attention. *Here*, we feel its utter feebleness. Here, its pretensions stagger confidence in its most amiable moods. Here, we are unable to resist the oppressive thought, that it has forsaken the central seat of Zion and occupied a remote hill-top on the outskirts of the world's province. Here, in a word, our consciousness assures us, that it does not represent Christ where Christ most truly and fully revealed himself—in the garden of Gethsemane, on the cross of Calvary, on the mount of heavenly intercession.

The history of "*liberal Christianity*" throws light on these suggestions. We speak particularly of its history in New-England. Commencing as a reaction against the Puritan theology, resisting its supposed exclusiveness, harshness, and bigotry, and demanding a freer atmosphere, a broader horizon, and a more genial companionship, it went forth mildly but boldly into the realm of intellectual and speculative inquiry; it accepted the Bible as God's book, and its interpretation of Christianity as God's religion. Believing in the necessity of a divine manifestation, it received Christ as the great teacher and inspired example to the human race. It did not set aside the supernatural element in Christianity, but acknowledged the miracles wrought in attestation of its claims, and preached the operation of a heavenly influence to assist the struggles of our frail nature. The sanctity of private reason and the injunctions of Catholic charity, were brought out in special prominence. It was the champion of free-will, free-thought, free-utterance—the firm opponent of creeds and dogmas; it was jealous of associations and combinations, lest they should fetter the individual, and monopolize the influences of the age; no stranger to the woes of humanity, it cherished a tender sympathy with human sorrow, and offered its balm to bleeding hearts; the degradations of the race awakened its philanthropy, and stirred its deepest sensibilities. Poverty and nakedness, ignorance and crime, misfortune and calamity, were more than spectral shapes moving in wild dismay and savage fury before it. Dread realities were they on which the sunshine of God lay pale and lustreless. And then, beside these, but in a lower wretchedness,

the spiritual nature, so forgetful of its princely birth, so unfaithful to all its better instincts, so heedless of the myriad voices calling it to high communion, so sunk in oft-occurring bestiality, moved its emotions to interceding prayer and eager effort. It chose its modes and means of action. Endowed with intellect not surpassed; enriched with learning, scholarship, and literary arts; alive with Anglo-Saxon blood, and proud of Anglo-Saxon traditions, it entered the pulpit, employed the press, discoursed at the fireside, and brought all other honourable instrumentalities into its service. No experiment was ever tried under more propitious circumstances. Its dissent shut it out from no offices of place and power. It was under no state ban. The field was wide open; it could have the whole sweep of the horizon and multiply converts in any direction. If, now, any system, rejecting the divinity of Jesus Christ, the doctrine of a vicarious sacrifice, and the work of the Holy Ghost in renewing our fallen and helpless nature, could reach the heart and reform the world, it was New-England Unitarianism, for it was Unitarianism in its most attractive and effective form. The repulsive features of English and Continental Unitarianism were softened down to the utmost extent of which the distinctive tenets were capable, and apart from that, a class of persons became its adherents and disciples in our country, whose tastes, habits, and circumstances would correct, as far as practicable, the excesses of the system. And what have been the results? A few of its advocates have reached the border-land of infidelity. Numbers have welcomed Transcendentalism and its egregious follies; idealism, speculation, and extravagance have misled others. But, confining our view to those who still represent original Unitarianism, what tidings do they offer of its strength, progress, prospects? A careful study of its movements and effects cannot fail to demonstrate that it is a feeble religious creed. It has no centrality—no staminal trunk, out of which the various branches can grow; it has no ground of Christian sympathy. Brotherhood is one of its favourite sentiments; but this is such a general principle, diffused over so large a surface, and supported by such inadequate motives, as to be a practical nullity. Cordial Christian union—fraternal feeling, as begotten by a common interest in Jesus Christ, and the constant habit of dwelling on the same object and with the same associations—is unknown to it. In aggressiveness it is equally lacking. To push its way among the haunts of men, to storm the battlements of hoary corruption, to gain trophies from the very vicinage of hell are, apparently, beyond its scope. It has laid a decided stress on insight, and yet, strange to tell, no literature is so deficient in penetrating the soul, tracing its dark

labyrinths, exposing its endless mazes, and forcing its darling delusions out into the glare of the sunshine. Insight! What is there in all the compass of its rich and diversified literature to compare with the microscopic eye of John Bunyan; the deep, silent, earnest search of Philip Doddridge; the philosophic penetrativeness of Jonathan Edwards? If these are facts, then, what is the lesson of "*liberal Christianity*?" It seems to us that it proves the absolute impossibility of reducing Christianity to the conditions of art. It furnishes the most convincing evidence that "*Christ crucified*" is by the laws of philosophy, by the instincts of the soul, as well as by the provisions of the gospel, the only doctrine that can humble human pride, teach human reason, rouse conscience, change the heart, and regenerate society. But is this all? No; it teaches another lesson: it delivers a message to orthodox Christianity; it instructs us that the beautiful, the tender, the truthful, the noble in our nature are not to be neglected or despised.

No middle ground is wanted; the foundations of Christianity cannot be changed. "*Christ crucified*" must be preached; without it there is no hope, no pardon, no peace. The view of "*natural virtues*," presented by "*liberal Christianity*," cannot be incorporated into Christianity as we hold it, for that view entitles them to the rank of dormant religious germs, awaiting the process of mere development and superseding the necessity of a regenerating work of grace. But, nevertheless, a great advance in the conceptions of evangelical persons, and especially in the temper of their minds on this subject, would be effected, if the hand of the Divine Husbandman were traced in the growth and cultivation of these "*virtues*." Justice to these "*virtues*" does not require them to be recognised as the incipient principles of vital religion, nor, on the other hand, does it bind us to treat them as the offspring of Satan. The essential elements of heaven and hell do not appear in those sensibilities out of which the beautiful forms of social humanity spring. First of all, therefore, the distinction is to be broadly laid down between the social nature and the moral nature of man, in regard to the law of responsibility, and the awards of the final judgment. If that is clearly apprehended, the next point is to consider the "*natural virtues*" in their relation to the plan of redemption. *Are they connected with the mediatorial economy?* The fact seems to be indisputable. They exist in the human heart because Jesus Christ died; they are a portion of the benefits of his assumption of our guilt: they are under the care of Heaven, for purposes ulterior to themselves. The whole system of earthly providence is founded on them, and by means of their operations conscience is awakened to

see the need of a divine guidance, infirmity is taught to seek the aid of Christ, self-righteousness is convicted of folly and guilt, and salvation by faith in the atonement is revealed to the heart. Such views practically tend to enhance the power of Christianity in our hands. The strength of rebuke—that mighty agent in the minister of the sanctuary—is left untouched, and its loyalty to the commission from above is maintained in undiminished vigour. Sympathy is likewise encouraged. A gentle, tender, affectionate spirit, finding so much amid the ruins of human nature to gladden its eye and cheer its hopes, deepens the fervours of entreaty and inspires the eloquence that beseeches men to be reconciled to God.

On the one side, decision is guarded from the extreme of dogmatism and malignity; on the other, charity is preserved from laxity and weakness. In brief, it impresses us that the line of thought adopted and enforced by Mr. Mercein is admirably fitted to define the boundaries of morality and religion—to relieve these subjects of much of their perplexity, and make them more tangible to certain orders of thinkers. No greater service can now be rendered to truth, than to give distinctness and boldness to its features—to present its substance in a sharp and angular manner—to limit it with exact justice to its own ground by preventing its encroachment on foreign soil. Whoever brings out obscure ideas into full relief, and teaches us the precise bearings of their foundations and forms, confers a great benefit on the highest interests of science. It is not the most showy and splendid sort of originality; so, at least, the world thinks; but, in our estimation, men of this class, searching among the approved verities of familiar meditations, clearing away their false incidents, and unfolding the entire complement of their relations, are worthy of the lofty praise of intellectual benefactors.

The remaining essays in the volume are devoted to the consideration of the religious principle in man, the process of conviction, repentance, faith, and kindred topics. All of them present the strong characteristics of an earnest, logical, forcible mind.

The observations on self-culture, in connexion with religious experience, are exceedingly sensible; but we wish that they had been extended. We have long been satisfied that there is a serious defect in our preaching and literature on this subject. The time has come for Methodism to pay more attention to its duties and means; it has given special significance to the supernatural element in Christianity, and urged with uncommon ability the cardinal doctrine of the Holy Ghost's influence. Not the slightest abatement of this supreme truth do we wish to see; but rather, as time advances, and the Church expands her field, let it be exhibited

with increasing zeal. The genuine idea of self-culture accompanies this divine agency. Religion, as a constant education, as ministered to by all the offices of daily life, as the universal absorbent that is to draw upon everything with which we come in contact,—religion every moment, everywhere, in every connexion, is the urgent want of the times. Few there are who continually feel that the charms of home, the pleasures of friendship, the grace of intercourse, the meetings on the street, the commerce of business, the thousand objects acting on us, are the materials of Christian spirituality. Who think of the lessons of Heaven written all over this wide-spread world? Who realize that the beauty of childhood, the endearments of filial love, the oneness of marriage, the greetings of the marketplace, the honours of confidence, and the other experiences of earthly history are instruments to promote our growth and strength? The whole system of creation and providence ought to be classed under "*means of grace*." And the reason is obvious: personal Christianity has its earthly side as well as its heavenly side; prayer and praise, sanctuary service and sacraments, Scripture and meditation,—these are inseparably identified with all the emotions of the heart in their worship of the Invisible, in their homage to Christ, in their preparation for heaven. But where are the thoughts, born in these serene and sacred hours, to find their companionship? Where are these seeds to vegetate and bloom? The relations of social existence have a vast work to perform within us. Business, relaxation, literature, art; whatever addresses reason, taste, affection; whatever disciplines the sense to skill—the heart to virtue—the conduct to energy, patience, fortitude, belongs to God. They have been ordained for our improvement, and never can we enter into the full meaning of Christianity until we learn to make everything contribute to our moral and spiritual progress. Is it a fictitious fear or a profound reality, that the transition from an experimental Christianity to a sentimental and mystical Christianity is an easy process? The heart cannot be too frequently and pungently appealed to; but may not the appeal be too *exclusive*? If this is the fact, where but in the provisions of self-culture, as derived from the regimen of common life and the open universe, are we to seek the safe corrective, the sure and unailing balance to emotional and reflective piety? Is it all a fable that Antæus must fall back upon the earth to recruit his strength?

There is one other remark that may be worthy of notice. The habit of inward effort to enlarge the scope of reflection, to strengthen conviction, to penetrate deeply into the reasons of things, to purify feeling, to expand the intellect by large thoughts and the heart by

generous sympathies; and above all, the constant exercise of our active faculties, whether of perception, will, or sensibility, in finding the auxiliaries of religious nurture in every phase of human life, are peculiarly demanded by the fact, that in this age of popular interests and general movements, we are peculiarly liable to what may be called the formative power of religious machinery. Surrounded by a vast "apparatus" of spiritual energy, our creed faithfully and fully expounded on each returning Sabbath, our praise embodied in printed hymns, our prayers led by others, our social meetings adapted to a regular order; in brief, a continued succession of precisely the same forms and a ceaseless direction of the mind in the same channels, we are strikingly exposed to the operation of those circumstances which tend to diminish freshness of impressions, force of personal effort, independence of individual aims, and sturdy robustness of sentiment. Such dangers must remain. The best earthly economy is inseparable from them. But a safeguard has been furnished in the agency of self-culture. By its instrumentality the associations of the multitude furnish materials for solitary study, the fellowship of the sanctuary heightens the charm of self-communion, the familiar routine perfects our individual freedom, and we attain the stature of men in Christ Jesus.

The religion of the New Testament is now thoroughly *vocalized*. It is sung in choirs. It is melodized in concerts. The swell of the organ floats the sound of human voices on its aerial waves and shakes the sanctuary with its triumphant exultations. Christianity is articulated in every variety of tone and modulation; whispered, shouted, thundered; "from lively to severe," if not "from grave to gay," it runs through all the gamut of utterance and holds the ear in firm captivity. Here is the logical voice, cold, dry and hard—here is the metaphysical voice, dull and dreamy—here is the philosophical voice, contented, calm, complacent—here is the didactic voice, firm and fearless—here is the descriptive voice, following the quick glances of the organ of sight, and beating time to the palpitations of the eyelids—here is the voice of denunciation, storming the citadel of sin—here is the voice of pathos, tenderness, expostulation, and love—all fulfilling their province with wondrous variety, skill, and success. It is certainly the speaking age of the Church. And we rejoice in it. But can we disguise the painful truth, that thousands depend on vocal instruction with too much satisfaction, and rest in it as a sort of intellectual finality? Faith *comes* by hearing. So argues the apostle, and so believe all Christians. But how does it *stay*? In what way is it to be matured and perfected? The action of preaching mind on hearing mind is absolutely essen-

tial; but it has its fixed limits. No amount, no excellence of oral instruction can fully develop character. Its use is to inform, to quicken, to transmute itself into recipient natures; and whenever that is done, the individual man must convert its influence into the means of personal power and progress. After all, it is a mere tributary to self-culture. Its specific design is to put the sympathetic spirit in the best possible position to exert its own faculties and build itself up in the knowledge and service of Christ.

Alluding to the charge against the Church of a want of interest in the philanthropic schemes of the day, Mr. Mercein proceeds, after repelling the false accusation, to make some remarks on the general subject. "Perhaps the irreligious philanthropists may see more clearly the outward and material machinery to be used in regenerating society, because their attention is not distracted to the want of that spiritual life in the world's heart, without which it cannot receive and perpetuate the new forms which it is proposed to give it. Earnest and enthusiastic spirits, men of noble energy and daring, need a field of exercise and display. A secular philanthropy is the chivalry of the nineteenth century." (P. 270). We wish that this view had been extended. If secular philanthropy had been satisfied to present its merits as philanthropy, if it had prudently and wisely confined itself within its own precincts, there might have been an occasion for honest differences of opinion; but there would have been none for differences of feeling. So far from adopting such a course, it has too often taken special pleasure in choosing an antagonistic attitude in respect to the Church. It has taunted, mocked, insulted ministers and members. It has even proclaimed its narrow, local, fugitive creed, with "pictures to match," as a substitute for Christianity. Don Quixote showed a glimmering of sense in selecting a windmill for attack, but they dash against the battlements of Zion. It is shocking to any moral sensibility to contemplate the vindictive malignity, the furious fanaticism, the wanton sacrifice of the finer, nobler traits of our nature in this fierce assault on the evils of society. A philanthropy of this sort profanes its own name. It can never do God's work. Whatever schemes of usefulness may be devised and executed, the first consideration is the effect on their own immediate adherents. They are viewed as exponents—as witnesses; and hence, if they are transformed into bigots and zealots, nothing can save their cause from odium and disgrace. There is a generous martyrdom that we all admire; but the martyrdom of courtesy, refinement, truth, and virtue, for the sake of consummating a benevolent enterprise, excites our commiseration, if not contempt. The influence of these movements on the

Church has been, in some instances, exceedingly disastrous. Good men have conceded too much to them. The attention of the Church has been frequently diverted to their measures, and its patronage, tacit or active, has been extended to them. Have we to learn at this late day where our strength lies? If our guns have been mounted for ages, have we now to dismount them for the purpose of proving their metal? No moral in Church history is plainer and fuller, than that the power of Christianity is in its concentration, in its asserted and vindicated supremacy, in its complete and perfect adaptation to the regeneration of the world. The simple reason why Christianity is comparatively inert and feeble in our hands, is because we fail to trust it. Our unbelief multiplies false auxiliaries, and in turn they educate our scepticism still further. Even where the institutions are not obnoxious to serious charges, is it not to be apprehended that we are distributing our capital into more forms of business than we can manage effectively? If the Mississippi were drained of its waters as the Church is drained of her intellectual and moral resources, it would need a number of Ohios and Missouris to pour a strong, full, broad current into its tropical gulf.

Had the plan of the work permitted, Mr. Mercein would, doubtless, have been gratified to exhibit the doctrine of the atonement in its relations to the scheme of redemption. The great truth of a vicarious offering, a sacrificial death for us, runs through the work both by necessary implication and formal statement; but, nevertheless, it is not developed as fully as we could have desired. The philosophy of the atonement may embarrass minds that accept it as a divine fact. Coleridge was an instance of this perplexity; and yet we think that the habit of dwelling on it as an expression of governmental principle is highly beneficial. Apart from this, it is so intimately connected with the condition and circumstances of our fallen, ruined, condemned nature in its moral suggestions, its spiritual significance, its prodigious weight upon the conscience and sensibilities, that we like to see it brought out in marked prominence whenever depravity, restoration, and eternal life are under review. We beg not to be understood as finding fault. It simply occurs to us, that the "*natural virtues*" have a terrible account to render with this event, even on the ground which they propose to occupy. Any theory of goodness, claiming the name and sanctions of religion, must insulate the death of Jesus Christ from all ordinary phenomena. The wickedness of the Jews is not sufficient to account for it. Alone must it stand among all the tragedies of earthly history. If it were a mere seal of martyrdom, it does not confer a particle of strength or interest on the truths which the inspired

teacher taught, nor does it set off with any more distinctness and adaptability the actions which he performed as our example. These rest on totally different grounds. Confronting that amazing spectacle, the "*natural virtues*" must feel, in moments of subdued thoughtfulness, that there is something found here, differing in kind, in purport, in significance, from all else in the universe; nor can we conceive how it is possible for noble and generous instinct, for manly sentiment, for responsive sensibility to suppress the rising suggestion, that there is a divine meaning here which penetrates the profoundest depths of our spiritual being.

The patient reader, who has accompanied us through this article, needs not to be assured that the subject of human depravity, actual, total depravity, has a peculiar interest for our thoughts. Were it a mere earthly thing, it would press itself on our consideration; it would be a mystery, calling in no uncertain or feeble tone for prompt and satisfactory solution. Never could we look into the eyes of childhood, never watch the deepening shadows on the hearthstone of home, never tread a silent churchyard, never commune with midnight stars, never scan the many-coloured panorama of life, without feeling that evil demanded explanation. But when we take it in all the dread relations of immortal existence, shaping those huge images that rise up from the rolling surge of eternity, and as silently sink back into its recovering waves, there is a terrible fascination in its influence that cannot be resisted. No sooner had man been expelled from Eden than this torturing idea began to agitate his soul. It expounded the curse. Fiercer than the fiery sword guarding the gates of Paradise it gleamed before him wherever necessity and sorrow bent his footsteps. The oldest annals, the remotest traditions, the earliest usages, present it to our contemplations. The records of patriarchal and Jewish life are full of its facts. The ancient books of the Brahmins, the speculations of Eastern Pantheism, the mythology of Lesser Asia, the symbolic parable of Prometheus, the fable of Cupid and Psyche, all assert its preponderance in the minds of men. Heathens have given it their most anxious thoughts; deists have struggled with it as a mighty nightmare. Not peculiar to Christianity, it is yet essential to its scheme of redeeming grace; and hence it is unfolded in the New Testament with a frequency, a force, an exhaustive fulness proportioned to its commanding importance. In every age it has been the foremost theme; in all philosophy it has been the returning enigma; in all culture it has proved itself to be the most profound science. Poetry has struck every string in its harp to its melancholy wail. One generation bequeaths it to another, and the

sorrow rolls on in an unabated tide. What a literature it has written! See Sir Thomas Browne musing over it in his *Urn-Burial*, Blair in his *Grave*, Hervey in his *Meditations among the Tombs*, Foster in his mournful questionings, Pascal in his devout contemplations! See Goethe and Byron throwing the quick, sharp glances of their bold imaginations into its massive gloom!—see philosophers like Coleridge, orators like Robert Hall, thinkers like Chalmers, divines like Wesley and Fletcher, yielding to it their most earnest studies, and breathing over it their most believing prayers!—see patient watchers at the hidden gates of heaven—watchers like Cowper—waiting for the awful mystery to depart!

It is not pain, it is not suffering that thus torments the mind. No; it is SIN, it is guilt that oppresses our anxious hearts.

ART. VI.—THE DOGMA OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION.

1. "*Letters Apostolic of our Most Holy Lord, Pius IX., by Divine Providence Pope, concerning the Dogmatic Definition of the Immaculate Conception of the Mother of God,*" given at Rome the sixth of the Ides of December, 1854.
2. J. Perrone: *De Immaculato B. V. Mariæ conceptu, etc.* [Can the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary be defined by a Dogmatic Decree? A Theological Disquisition, by John Perrone, of the Society of Jesus, Professor of Theology in the Roman College.] 1848.
3. Joannis Launoi, Constantiensis, Parisiensis Theologi, *Opera Omnia, ad selectum ordinem revocata.* III. Tom. fol. Colon, 1731. [Tomi Primi Pars Prima, pp. 9-44: *Praescriptiones de Conceptu B. Mariæ Virginis*, 1676: with the motto, from Bernard, "*Virgo Regia falso non eget honore.*"]
4. *Versuch einer Geschichte des Marien-und-Annen-Cultus in der Katholischen Kirche*, von Cl. Frantz. 12mo. Halberstadt. 1854.
5. *Legends of the Madonna, as represented in the Fine Arts. Forming the Third Series of Sacred and Legendary Art.* By MRS. JAMESON. London. 1852.

DURING the seventeenth century, but not before, "Our Lady of the Immaculate Conception" was one of the favourite subjects of Christian art. Guido depicts the Virgin, crowned with twelve stars, standing on a crescent sustained by cherubs, with seraphim on either hand, floating between heaven and earth. Murillo, the greatest of Spanish artists, illustrated the devotion of Spain to the homage of Mary, by twenty-five pictures; the grandest of which is the "Great Conception of Seville," a city which became frantic with joy, when, in 1615-17, Paul V. sanctioned the office of the Immaculate Concep-

tion, and forbade other teaching.* The idea of these pictures is taken from the woman in the twelfth chapter of the Apocalypse, "clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars;" this great "wonder in heaven," the symbol of the Church, is made to be the mother of our Lord, instead of that "Jerusalem, which is the mother of us all."

In the Catacombs, and the mosaics before the sixth century, the mother of Christ is always represented as standing in a subordinate position, usually veiled. In the course of the seventh century, higher honours cluster around her radiant form; she is imaged forth as the bride of the Bridegroom, the type of the Church; as queen of heaven, of the angels, and of virgins. Even in the West, before 600, she is depicted as sitting on a throne, the queen of heaven. In mediæval times, her coronation by Christ becomes predominant; her sceptre is a sceptre of mercy, while our Saviour is seen in contrast, under the likeness of a stern judge; the mother is full of all compassion, the Redeemer becomes lenient for her sake. She is also the mother of sorrows, the "*mater dolorosa*," bearing the sword in her bosom, and as such she appeals to the tenderest and deepest sympathies of our nature, and feels all the woes of those who flee to her for succour. As the mother of the Redeemer, she exercises over him the rights of her divine maternity; through her intercession the grace of the Lord distils as dew upon the faithful.

All the acts of her life have been the themes for the painter, the sculptor and the poet. Apocryphal Gospels, none of which are older than the fourth century, supplying by inventions the silence of the New Testament, make Joachim and Anna to be her father and mother;† tell us that our Saviour was born in her fifteenth year, and that she lived eleven years at Ephesus with John, dying at the age of fifty-nine. Another tradition relates, that her tomb was opened three days after her burial, and that her body could not be found, but only a fragrant odour; that she was translated directly to heaven; and the festival of the assumption honours this miraculous and unwitnessed event. Though her death is assigned to A. D. 63, yet in no subsequent canonical work are these marvels recorded. But these fictitious biographies narrate all the details of her nativity, her presentation in the temple, and the scenes of her marriage, as well as the Scriptural facts of the annunciation, of the nativity of our Lord, of her purification and the flight into Egypt; legend and

* See Mrs. Jameson, pp. 45-58.

† Nicephorus's *Ecl. Hist.*, 2, 3; Cotelierius ad *Constit. Apostol.* 3, 6. Thilo, *Codex Apoc. cr. Nov. Test.*, *Evangelium de nativitate S. Mariæ*, *Historia de nativ. Mariæ*, pp. 319-400.

fable carry her through the final scenes of earth, to her triumphal coronation in heaven. There is a perhaps unconscious, yet manifest attempt to make out a complete parallel between the successive events in the history of the mother and the stadia in the life of our Lord; she is as a woman, what Christ was as a man. And all of these wonderful legends are received as genuine by the Roman Catholic Church; it vouches for their verity, and celebrates festivals as a perpetual memorial.

In the Papal Church the veneration of the Virgin is the central point of the whole system of creature-worship, with which that Church itself, as now constituted, stands or falls. The working of the "mystery of iniquity" in that corrupt communion is nowhere more apparent, and in no point more capable of historical elucidation. Its paganizing tendencies are here open to the day; its invocations to Mary are more bold, more rapturous, more tender, and more universal, than to any other of the saints; and these religious observances have grown with each century of its history. Rome has here been consistent; and she has just placed the crown upon the completed system of idolatry by the dogmatic declaration, that the "blessed Virgin Mary was conceived without the infection of original sin," exempting her from the common heritage of the human race; thus, in yet another point, making her to be like our Lord, breaking down the last barrier to her full worship.

Mrs. Jameson, in her beautiful *Legends of the Madonna*, gives only the ideal and poetic aspect of this cultus; Mary is the type of womanhood, of which each nation, and each great school of art, has its special ideal. This work contemplates the subject chiefly from the æsthetic side. But the very fact that this worship is so fair in art is but another evidence of its peril. It is the most seductive and alluring aspect of a system, which is essentially pagan in its origin, its developments, its festivities.

The first trace of the worship of the Virgin, which history records, is the enumeration by Epiphanius,* among his eighty heresies of the festive rites of the *Collyridianæ*, a company of women in Arabia, in the last part of the fourth century, who paid divine honours to Mary, partaking around a table, adorned with myrtle, of small cakes, (*collyris*,) in the same manner as Cybele, the *magna mater deum*, had been worshipped in these regions and in Phrygia. The discussion of the heresy of Nestorius in the first half of the fifth century, condemned by the third general council at Ephesus, in 431, turned upon attributing to the Virgin the title of *θεοτόκος*, *Deipara*, afterward changed into the phrase, "*Mater Dei*," the "mother of God."

* Epiphanius, *Hæreses*, lxxviii, lxxix.

It was not in honour of Mary, but to maintain the reality of the Incarnation, that this term was first used; but it gave a great impulse to her veneration. Effigies of the mother and Son become frequent, as sacred symbols, and supplant the cross. Christ begins to recede and his mother to come into the front rank of popular veneration; to Cyril of Alexandria, the chief opponent of Nestorius, is ascribed the introduction of the prayer, "Holy Mother of God, pray for us, poor sinners, now and in the hour of death." The angelic salutation "Ave Maria," becomes a popular greeting. Her perpetual virginity and divine maternity are tests of orthodoxy. The first traces of festivals in her honour soon follow; the Festival of the Annunciation (March 25, the season of the opening spring,) cannot be traced beyond the last part of the fourth, or the beginning of the fifth century;* her Purification (Feb. 2) follows in the sixth,† favoured by the Emperor Justinian, and Gelasius, Bishop of Rome; the Festival of the Assumption, on the 15th of August, already foreshadowed in the fable, follows in the course of the eighth and ninth centuries.‡ It is a singular coincidence, that at this time of the year, Astræa, goddess of justice, and Ceres, mother of fruits, and the Egyptian Isis, had been worshipped with special rites by the heathen of old, and sometimes depicted as rising from the earth to the sky. At the end of the seventh century, in the East, Mary's nativity had already been generally celebrated on the 8th of September; it follows somewhat later in the West; the testimonies for an earlier observance are insecure. John of Damascus, in the eighth century, says, that "the centuries contended for the honour of her birth." These festivals, to which others of less importance were afterward added, gave such splendour to her cultus, that Pope Sergius (c. 700) could boast of the superiority of the worship of the "bride of God," to that of Proserpine, "the bride of the god of the infernal regions;" and the Koran calls Jehovah, Christ, and Mary, "the three gods of the Christians." The first vestiges of "offices" for the public cultus are found among the Benedictines; from the eighth to the eleventh century, these are fully developed; the Cistercian order observed them daily, in

° First expressly mentioned in Council of Toledo, A. D. 659, of Guericke 2, s. 48.

† Augusti, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, Band iv, Bede, Hom. 5, in circumcis, mentions it as long extant.

‡ See Gieseler, 2, s. 158, note 12. Gregory of Tours, at the end of the sixth century, gives the legend in its fullest details. Jerome had already spoken in favour of the assumption, and Augustine declared that "he feared to say, that the blessed body in which Christ had been incarnate, could become food for the worms." See Frantz, "*Geschichte des Mariencultus*," s. 37. The Assumption has not been pronounced a dogma; it was sanctioned in the West by a council at Aix la Chapelle, 818, and by Leo IV., who made it a general festival.

seven canonical hours.* The Festival of the Visitation (July 2, 1381) completes the sacred seven. The golden period of her worship is identical with the height of the Papal power in the middle ages, from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries; the rosary of Mary was introduced in the eleventh century;† the chivalry of the crusaders was inflamed with ardour by the belief in her presence; orders of knights vowed to defend her immaculateness with the sword;‡ poets sang her glories in the most exalted strains; art gave visible embodiment to all the legends of the past; the psalter itself was rewritten, so that all of its one hundred and fifty psalms should celebrate only the praises of "Mary, mother of God," "queen of Heaven," source of mercy, prevalent in intercession, the joy, the hope, the confidence of the faithful.§ To crown the whole, the very hut in which she lived was transported by angels from Galilee to Loretto.||

Into this period, which marks the acme of her cultus, falls the beginning of the controversy as to Mary's immaculate conception, which has been continued for seven hundred years, and is now declared to be dogmatically decided by the Roman pontiff. That decision is no accident, no arbitrary matter; it was necessary to the

* See Frantz, s. 63. In some cloisters, five psalms were repeated every day, whose first letters formed the name Maria; viz., "Magnificavit," Psa. cxxv, 3; "Ad Dom." Psa. cxix, 1; "Retribue," Psa. cxviii, 17; "In," Psa. cxxv, 1; "Ad te," Psa. cxxii, 1.

† See Niedner, Kirchengeschichte, s. 418.

‡ The Spanish order of St. Iago took the oath: "We swear to believe and defend, in public and private, that the Virgin Mary, our lady, was conceived without the stain of original sin." The Spanish order of Calatrava took a similar vow, with yet greater theological precision.

§ This Psalter has been ascribed to Bonaventure, and is published in his works; but it is probably from another source, though nearly contemporary, in the thirteenth century. Its praise of Mary is idolatrous, and its parodies of the Psalms are most irreverent: "The heavens declare thy glory, O Mary;" "Hear us, O lady, in the day of trouble;" "Offer unto our lady, ye sons of God, offer unto our lady praise and reverence." See So. Presb. Rev., Jan., 1855; on the authorship, compare Gieseler.

|| The holy house of Loretto, the "casa santa," the cottage in which Mary is said to have lived, was borne by angels in 1290, after the crusaders had lost their last possessions in the Holy Land, at first to Dalmatia, then to Recanati in Italy, and the next year to Loretto. By order of Sixtus V., it was enclosed in a grand cathedral, built by the architect Bramante. It is thirty-two feet long, thirteen high, and nineteen wide; it contains the very window through which Mary received the angelic visitation. The angels must have had grievous labour in carrying it through the air; but nothing is impossible to faith, as Archbishop Kenrick of St. Louis has shown in his work on the "Holy House," which is said to be too little known.

completeness of the Papal system of saint-worship; and it shows most clearly what that system really is and demands. Contrary as is the new decree to Scripture, to tradition, and to reason, involving as it does the claim to an infallibility which must be omniscient, it is still a decree demanded by the very necessities of the Papal system, exposing its true character, and prophesying its fate. If Mary be not free from all taint of original sin, she cannot be the object of such worship as the Papal Church sanctions and enjoins; and in the dogmatic declaration that she is thus exempt Scripture, tradition, and reason are superseded by Papal infallibility.

Before proceeding to examine the decree itself, and the arguments in its favour, we will present a cursory history of this celebrated controversy. The festival of the "*immaculate*" conception was not observed until more than a thousand or eleven hundred years after the birth of Christ. Perrone thinks it may have come from the East, but adduces no evidence. In the controversy between Ratramn and Radbert, in the ninth century, upon the Lord's supper, the question raised was as to the natural or supernatural birth of our Lord, but did not reach to the specific point of Mary's immaculate conception.* The first introduction of the festival is usually assigned by Roman Catholic writers to England, and to the influence of Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, about the year 1070; but this is wanting in historic certainty of evidence.† The true point of time for the festival and subsequent controversy is the attempt of certain canons of Lyons, in France, to introduce a "Feast of the Immaculate Conception" in the year 1140. Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux, the saint of the century, the opponent of Abelard, the great orthodox name of the times, resists this festival as a "novelty," with the pertinent inquiry, "How have you come to make the discovery, that Mary was conceived without sin?" He was enthusiastic in his reverence for the Virgin, yet declares that "reason does not approve, nor ancient tradition commend" this novel rite and doctrine. He grants that she was "sanctified in the womb," as were Jeremiah and John the Baptist, while asserting that "Christ alone was conceived with-

* Radbert is claimed on the side of the immaculate conception, by Perrone, p. 83, sq. But his chief controversy is upon the matter of Christ's birth, whether Mary at that time was free from sin. In his work on the "Birth and Perpetual Virginity of Mary," he says, "that Mary was free from all original sin;" but when was she thus free? In her conception? That he does not assert. She was free when Christ was begotten. He says that "she was sanctified and purified by the Spirit." Cf. Gieseler 2, 1, s. 126.

† Anselm introduced into England the *Festum Conceptionis Domini, sive Annunciationis Mariæ*; yet even this was ridiculed and opposed. See Gieseler, *Kirchengesch.*, 2, 2, s. 474.

out sin."* No distinguished theologian of the twelfth or thirteenth century defended the dogma. The festival of the "conception" was increasingly observed in England and in France, but it was not termed the "immaculate" conception. That the "sanctification," and not the "conception" of Mary was the original object of the festival of the 8th of December, is the probable opinion, supported by the authority of Aquinas and Bellarmine, and by the contemporary acts and statutes,† from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Thomas Aquinas, Peter Lombard, Durandus, Bonaventure, all the great names of these times, opposed the new and extreme opinion, as we shall hereafter see; but it was in the necessities of the system that it should prevail; it gained in popular applause what it lacked in theological authority. Duns Scotus, "the subtle doctor," was the first of the scholastics who defended the opinion; but even he expresses himself with great reserve. He says: "Deus potuit facere, quod ipsa nunquam fuisset in peccato originali, potuit etiam fecisse, ut tantum in uno instanti esset in peccato; potuit etiam facere, ut per tempus aliquod esset in peccato, et in ultimo illius temporis purgaretur;" (In Sent., lib. iii, dist. 3, qu. i, § 9;) and he adds, "which of these three is actually true, God knows; if it is not opposite to the authority of the Church or of Scripture, it seems probable that we should attribute to Mary that which is more excellent." Yet he also admits, that if the Virgin Mary had not had original sin, she would not have needed the grace of Christ. Duns Scotus, it is also reported, defended the dogma before the University of Paris, against two hundred Dominicans, and brought the university to the decree, that "none should be admitted to the scholastic degrees," who did not maintain this "pious opinion;" but Scotus died in 1308, and the first report of this disputation is from Franciscan authorities, nearly two centuries afterward,‡ and in the acts of the university there is no account of the matter. As late as 1380, the university speaks only of the "Festival of the Conception," and in 1387 it declares the immaculate conception to be "a

* Bernardi Epistola 174 ad Canonicos Lugdunenses: "Our Lord Jesus Christ alone was conceived of the Holy Ghost." Bulaeus, in his "History of the University of Paris," says that the canons of Lyons affirmed that they had a document from heaven, prescribing the observance. Bernard tells them that Rome has not sanctioned the observance.

† Cf. Gieseler, 2, 2, s. 475, note 16, containing extracts from the Council of Oxford, as late as 1222, and from French statutes of the thirteenth century.

‡ The Franciscan, Bernardinus de Bustis, about 1480, and Pelbartus Temestarius, about 1500. See Gieseler, u. s. "The later Franciscans," says Gieseler, "are surprised that the 'subtle doctor' says so little of the matter, but console themselves with the belief that his chief works on the subject have been lost."

probable opinion," in opposition to the views advocated by the Dominican, John De Montesonus, who maintained that belief in the immaculate conception was a sin against the faith. The above decree as to the "degrees" was not made until 1497.

From the time of Duns Scotus, the controversy assumed a more definite form, and it is made more spicy and inveterate by the hostilities of the rival orders of the Dominicans and Franciscans, the former supporting the opinion of Aquinas, the "angelic doctor," and the latter of Scotus, the "subtle doctor." New miracles, revelations, and proofs, as well as popular fanaticism, urge on to a further decision. The anti-Pope Clement VII., in the exile at Avignon, in 1389, follows the lead of the University of Paris, and expresses an opinion favourable to the doctrine, by condemning the views of the Dominican Montesonus. St. Bridget has revelations for the Dominicans, and St. Catharine of Sienna has different ones for the Franciscans. The Council of Basle, in 1439, controlled by French influence, declared that Mary "was never actually subject to original sin," but did not affirm it to be an article of positive faith.* This decree was passed while the council was in conflict with the Pope; consequently it is not recognised as having authority.

A new stage in the history of the dogma is marked by the so-called "Constitutions" of Sixtus IV., himself a Franciscan. In the year 1477 he issued a bull, recommending the celebration of the "conception of the immaculate Virgin," not of the "immaculate conception" of the Virgin; and in 1483, in another bull, the "*Grave nimis*," he condemns those who assert that the defenders of the immaculate conception are heretical, and also those who maintain that the advocates of the opposite opinion are guilty of the crime of heresy, or of mortal sin; "*cum nondum sit a Romana ecclesia et Apostolica sede decisum*." Such is the substance of these famous "Constitutions," after which the Sorbonne becomes still more zealous against the Dominicans; in 1509, four of that order† were burned at Bern, giving new confirmation to the "privilege of Mary." The Council of Trent did not venture upon a final decision, though urged

* Conc. Basil. Sess. xxxvi, d. xv, Kal., Oct., 1439: "Nos vero ° ° ° doctrinam illam disserentem, gloriosam originem dei genitricem Mariam præveniente et operante divini numinis gratia singulari nunquam actualiter subiacuisse originali peccato, sed immunem semper fuisse ab omni originali et actuali culpa ° ° ° tantquam piam, etc., tenendam ° ° ° diffinimus et declaramus."

† The Dominicans at Bern set up an image of the "mother of God," which wept bloody tears; they received letters directly from heaven, and practised abominable impositions, in advocacy of their views. Cf. Hottinger, *Hist. Eccl.*, P. V., Hase, *Kirchengeschichte*, s. 339.

to do so, but merely confirmed these Constitutions, declaring that "in its decree concerning original sin, it did not intend to include the blessed and immaculate Virgin Mary, mother of God."* This left the whole question still open.

Pius V., in 1570, confirmed the Constitutions of Sixtus by condemning certain propositions of Bains, in his bull, "*Super Speculum*;" he says expressly, that the Council of Trent "gave each party permission to hold either side of the question," and forbids all popular controversy; he also first inserted into the Roman breviary and reformed missal, an office for the "conception of the Virgin Mary," to be read on the 8th of December, changing the word "nativity" into "conception;" so late was this change made even in Rome itself.† Pope Paul V., in 1616, and Gregory XV., in 1622, left the matter undecided and forbade dissension, though urged to a decision. Bellarmine, the greatest of the Papal controversialists, declares, "non haberi apud Catholicos pro re certa et explorata ac fide Catholica tenenda, beatam Virginem sine peccato fuisse conceptam;" and adds, "hanc opinionem non esse ullo modo hæreticam vel erroneam judicandam;" as also "non esse temerariam sed piam admodum ac probabilem atque adeo contraria sententia longe probabiliorem."‡ Pope Alexander VII, in 1661, in the bull, "*Sollicitudo omnium*," again forbids dispute; he also commends the piety of those who defend the privilege of Mary, and speaks of the "immaculate conception of the Virgin," in distinction from the "conception of the immaculate Virgin."§ Clement XI., in 1708, reestablished the festival, in the bull "*Commissi nobis*," but he calls it the "conception of the immaculate Virgin." The "Christian Remembrancer" contends that this bull decided the controversy, and made the present action of the Pope needless; but this bull relates to the festival, and terms the Virgin, and not her conception, "immaculate."||

◊ Launoy, *Præscriptiones* u. s., contests the authenticity of this decree of the Synod of Trent, asserting that it is not found in the original editions of the acts of the Council; but he is probably incorrect. The decree is alleged to have been passed in the session of June 17, 1546.

† See Perrone, p. 29. Our citations are from the German version.

‡ Amiss. Grat. 4, 15. See Winer, "*Comparative Darstellung*," s. 57.

§ The "Letters Apostolic" of Pius IX. say that Alexander's words are "evidently decretive;" they certainly are almost identical with the form enforced by Pius IX.: "Vetus est Christi fidelium erga ejus beatissimam Matrem V. M. pietas, sentientium ejus animam in primo instanti creationis atque infusionis in corpus fuisse speciali Dei gratia et privilegio, intuitu meritorum Jesu Christi ejus filii, humani generis redemptoris, a macula peccati originalis præservatam immunem, atque in hoc sensu ejus conceptionis festivitatem solemnî ritu colentium et celebrantium." Cf. Deuzinger, *Enchiridion*, p. 249.

|| See *Christ. Rembr.*, vol. xxiii, p. 408, sq.

Gregory XVI., in 1834, at the appeal of French bishops, in consequence of a movement begun by a remarkable coincidence again at Lyons, where the controversy in 1140 had its origin, ordered that the designation "immaculate" should be inserted in the preface to the mass of the conception; and in 1844, that Mary should be invoked in other litanies as "queen conceived without original sin."

Such has been the development of this dogma to the time of the present pontiff. For the last century and a half it had excited comparatively little discussion. The Roman Catholics seemed content to leave it as an undecided point, a matter of indifference. The French clergy showed little zeal, and many of her theologians were opposed to it; even the ardour of Spain was relaxed. But the revival of the Papal claims in new vigour, the pressure of the ultramontane influence, superseding even in France the traditional Gallican liberties, the necessary and consequent excitement of popular superstition, have pressed the matter to what is esteemed an authoritative and final decision. The apparition of the Virgin to the herdsmen of La Salette, even now vehemently contested in France itself;* the "miraculous medals" distributed by millions throughout Europe; the revived zeal of the "Sodalities," for the worship of the Virgin—have all, within the last twenty-five years, inflamed the popular ardour, and served to bring out most clearly the inherent and necessary tendencies of the Papal system. The Jesuits have lent their ubiquitous aid to this work, and it falls in with all the plans and aspirations of the ultramontane party, who seek for power through superstition, and gladly welcome a decree which fosters superstition and exalts the prerogative of infallibility in the mouth of the Pope alone.

Pope Pius IX., during his whole pontificate, has shown himself the most devoted of the worshippers of Mary. In 1847, he confirmed the decree of Gregory XVI., in respect to the introduction of the term "immaculate" in the liturgy, especially in the preface of the mass for the "Conception," with additional privileges to the order of Preachers for their zeal.† In his exile at Gaeta, in 1849, he addressed his famous "Encyclical, on the Mystery of the Immaculate Conception," of the date of February 2, to the patriarchs, primates, archbishops, and bishops of the whole Catholic Church, affirming the existence of "an ardent desire throughout the Catholic world, that the Apostolic See should at length, by some solemn judgment, define that the most holy Mother of God, the most loving mother of us all, the Immaculate Virgin Mary, had been conceived without original sin." "These desires," he adds, "have been most acceptable and delight-

* See "The Christ. Times," London, Dec. 20, 1854. † See Perrone, pp. 337, 338.

ful to us, who, from our earliest years, have had nothing dearer, nothing more at heart, than to revere the most blessed Virgin Mary with an especial piety and homage, and the most intimate affections of our heart, and to do everything which might seem likely to procure her greater glory and praise, and to amplify her worship." From such a declaration he anticipates signal blessings to the Church, tossed to and fro, and fallen upon evil times. He says he has committed the investigation of the whole matter to a special congregation of cardinals and selected ecclesiastics, illustrious for piety and wisdom, and versed in divine things; and he invokes the prayers and counsel of all the bishops to whom the Encyclical is addressed. "You know full well, venerable brethren, that the *whole ground of our confidence* is placed in the most holy Virgin," since "God has vested the plenitude of all good in Mary, so that henceforth if there be in us any hope, if there be any grace, we know that it is from her that it redounds for such hath been the will of Him who would have us possess all through Mary."* A commission was appointed for the examination of the question, under the presidency of Cardinal Fornarini; Cardinal Lambruschini produced his Tract, and Perone the work at the head of this article; Passaglia has also written a large essay, and the results of these renewed investigations are issued by the Propaganda press, in two large quarto volumes. The special commission reported, in a full conclave of the Sacred College, 27th May, 1854. Answers had come from six hundred and two bishops, all of them favourable to the dogma, though fifty-two doubted the opportuneness, and four the possibility of a decision.† The "special congregation" demanded the definition with alacrity and zeal. A Consistory of consultation was proclaimed and held at Rome, November, 4, 1854; it was not a general council, nor was any authority attributed to it. Fifty-four cardinals, forty-six archbishops, and about four hundred bishops are reported to have been present at these deliberations; five hundred and seventy-six votes are said to have been cast for the dogma, and only four against it; among the latter were the Archbishop de Sibour, of Paris, on the ground, that the pope had no power to decide such a question; and also the bishop Olivier of Evreux, lately deceased, who sent in his vote by proxy. On the 8th of December, in St. Peter's, in the midst of the celebration of the "Conception," in the presence of more than two hundred ecclesiastical dignitaries, and in answer to a petition presented by the dean of the Sacred College of the Cardi-

* Cited from Gregory, de Expos. in libros Regum.

† These letters, with others from sovereigns, orders, and associations, are printed in nine volumes.

nals, the supreme pontiff, with a "tremulous" voice, read in Latin the following decree:—"We declare, pronounce, and define, that the doctrine which holds that the blessed Virgin Mary, at the first instant of her conception, by a singular privilege and grace of the omnipotent God, in virtue of the merits of Jesus Christ, the Saviour of mankind, was preserved immaculate from all stain of original sin, has been *revealed by God*, and therefore should firmly and constantly be believed by the faithful."*

The cannon of the castle of St. Angelo, the joyful chime of all the bells of Rome, the enthusiastic plaudits of the assembled thousands, the magnificent illumination of St. Peter's church, and the splendour of the most gorgeous festive rites, gave response to the infallible decree. It was a grand pageant, befitting an idolatrous enthusiasm. The pope himself, with "trembling joy," crowned the image of the Virgin; medals of Australian gold were struck, and distributed in her honour. "Rome," say the beholders, "was intoxicated with joy." An infallible voice had spoken; a new article of faith was announced by "divine" authority; the people rejoice in hope that Mary will be yet more "propitious," that her "prevalent intercession will give peace and plenty, will stay the power of infidelity, put an end to insurrection, and crown Rome with higher honour and success." The controversy of seven hundred years is brought to a final decision; Rome is committed irrevocably to the worship of the "Virgin mother of God, conceived without original sin." "Roma locuta est," and doubt is now heresy. The work begun by the third general council at Ephesus, in 431, proclaiming Mary "the mother of God," is declared to be consummated by the Papal decree of December 8, 1854, asserting the privilege of her immaculate conception, on the authority of Peter's chair.

What, now, are the grounds, what is the proof of this dogma of the immaculate conception, to which, as we have seen, the whole history and the very necessities of the Roman Catholic system, have forced that corrupt communion to gravitate? Can it be proved by Scripture? Is it consonant even with tradition? Can theologi-

* See the "New-York Freeman's Journal and Catholic Register," Feb. 17, 1855, which contains in full the "Letters Apostolic." Immediately following the above definition are the words of "infallible" warning. "Wherefore, if *any* shall dare—which God avert!—to *think* otherwise than as it has been defined by Us, they should know and understand that they are condemned by their own judgment, that they have suffered shipwreck of the faith, and have revolted from the unity of the Church; and besides, by their own act they subject themselves to the penalties justly established, if what they think they should *dare to signify by word, writing, or any other outward means.*" The claim of Papal infallibility has here reached its acme.

cal or rational arguments of sufficient cogency be alleged in its favour? Or, is it merely the full development of an evil inherent in the whole system of that apostate Church, and supported as a dogma in the last analysis, only by the bare and irrational claim of papal infallibility?

The work of Cardinal Perrone is one of the most authoritative and complete exhibitions of the papal view, and is accompanied with the papal sanction. The author is now "general rector of the Roman College," and is styled "the prince of contemporary theologians." He was born in 1794, at Chieri, a village near Turin; at twenty-one years of age he joined the company of the Jesuits; he succeeded to the chair of Bellarmine, Suarez, and Vasquez, in the Roman College in 1823, where he has ever since taught, with the exception of a few years of absence. To great learning he adds no mean dialectical skill. He is honoured as are few of the Italian theologians; he is a member of the Congregation charged with the examination of the provincial councils, and the revision of the books of the Oriental Churches; he is also an official "consultor" of the Congregations of the Propaganda, of Rites, and of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs; and he was a member of the special commission appointed to examine the dogma of the conception. His "*Prælectiones Theologicæ*," nine vols., Rome, 1835 sq., have been through twenty-five editions; portions of it have been separately published; an abridgment of this work, in four volumes, has had some twenty editions. Perrone is also the author of a "*Synopsis of the History of Theology compared with Philosophy*," Rome, 1845, and of a work on "*Protestantism and the Rule of Faith*," published in three vols., in 1853, a complete storehouse of all the arguments and all the calumnies against the Protestants. The "*Two Præscriptions*" of the Jansenist, John Launoy, contained in the first volume of his collected works, were written to expose the groundlessness of the argument from tradition, urged in favour of the dogma. They breathe the spirit, and exhibit the learning of the old Gallican Church. Perrone honours them with especial polemics. They present an array, by one of the ablest and most learned of the French Church, of those authorities which the new decree tramples under foot. The summary of Launoy's argument is, that before 1300 the Church knew no other doctrine than that Mary was conceived in original sin; that Scotus's reasonings are futile; that the early Franciscans themselves rejected the dogma; that the same was the case with Loyola and the first Jesuits, and that seven popes have declared against the dogma. The remainder of the "*Præscriptions*," so called in imitation of Tertullian's work, is devoted to an examination

of the attitude of the University of Paris in respect to the doctrine.*

Perrone states carefully the point and aim of his whole argument in the question, which makes the title of his work: "Can the Immaculate Conception of the blessed Virgin be defined by a dogmatic decree?" That is, Is there sufficient ground or basis in Scripture, in tradition, and in theology, for declaring it to be an article of faith? Or, in yet other words, Has the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception always been of the faith of the Church?

He is also correct, and gives an accurate statement of the real question, in asserting that it is a question of *fact*; not of theory, not of possibility, not of necessity, but simply of fact. Has it been divinely revealed, as a fact, that Mary was exempt from all taint of original sin? The question is not at all of a probable opinion, nor of a speculative possibility, but about a fact, which only Omniscience could know, which only God could reveal.

What is now this alleged fact; or, in other words, What is the dogma of the Immaculate Conception? Before proof can be brought, or testimony weighed, the doctrine itself must be clearly stated. And upon this point there is no uncertainty. The decree of Pius IX., already recited, states the point with sufficient clearness. Were it not for some misapprehension, it would not be necessary to say, that it has nothing to do with the conception of our Lord, whether he was himself without sin, or Mary without sin when he was conceived in her womb. Nor is it, among the Romanists, a question as to whether Mary was actually sinless in all her life; for, whether with or without proof, this point is conceded by all Roman Catholic divines; it was as earnestly maintained by Bernard as by Scotus, by the Dominicans as by the Franciscans, as was also her perpetual virginity. Nor is it a question as to whether Mary was "sanctified" in the womb, for the disputants agree, whether with or without evidence, that she was thus sanctified, and in the womb of her mother; Catherine of Sienna, who prophesied for the Dominicans, says that this occurred "three hours after her conception." But if she was sanctified, then she needed to be sanctified, that is, she was in a sinful state, under the dominion of original sin, for a time, longer or shorter, as it is said were also Jeremiah and John the Baptist. The question is not, whether she was "sanctificata," but whether she was "sancta;" not whether she was an immaculate virgin, but whether

* Besides these works, we have made use of the collection of testimonies upon the subject contained in Petavius's great work, "*de Theologicis Dogmatibus*," vol. iv, lib. xiv, c. 2, and of the copious and authentic citations in Gieseler's "*Kirchengeschichte*."

she was immaculate in her conception—whether her conception was immaculate. The question is, Was Mary ever in the least degree, or for even a passing moment, under the taint of original sin, or wholly and ever exempt, from the first instant of her conception, through a singular privilege? The dogma asserts that she was exempt, and asserts it as a *fact*. This is her “prerogative;” this is the “*pia sententia*.”

Only one other point needs to be stated in the way of preliminary explanation; and that is, what is meant by the “first instant of conception.” Here, again, the declarations are precise. Roman Catholic theologians usually distinguish between the “active” and the “passive” conception, and make the question, as does Perrone, refer exclusively to the latter.* The former, the “active conception,” is the marital act, the formation of the body; the latter, the “passive conception,” is the infusion of the rational soul into, or its union with the seed or body; and the dogma declares, that in this “passive conception” the soul of Mary was sinless, freed by special privilege from all taint of original sin, which, but for such privilege, would have been her lot. Perrone compares it, following Bellarmine and others, to the liberation of a prisoner from prison before he has been put into it, a comparison which both illustrates his position, and, as we shall see, shows some of its difficulties.

The question which Perrone and the other advocates of the “pious sentiment” undertake to answer in the affirmative, is just this: Is there adequate evidence to establish the fact, as divinely revealed, that Mary, in the above sense, was conceived immaculate?

The three chief sources of argument to establish this alleged fact are Scripture, tradition, and the theological proofs, including the argument of congruity or fitness.

The Scriptural argument for the dogma is exceedingly slight, and is virtually abandoned by Perrone himself.† He rejects as insufficient the mystical application of the personified Wisdom, and the types and figures which many of the fathers so freely apply to the Virgin. Even the angelic salutation, (Luke i, 28, sq.,) he concedes, derives all its weight, not from itself, but from the interpretation of the fathers; “in itself considered it gives only a conjecture.” But why even a conjecture? The greeting runs, *Χαῖρε, κεχαρισμένη*; it implies grace; it says and implies nothing about her original state. But the passage claimed as having argumentative force, “the only one,” says Perrone, is Genesis iii, 15: “And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it [she]

* Some writers distinguish three acts in the conception, as Gonzalez, cited by Perrone.

† Perrone, pp. 35–38, 57–64, 112–116.

shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." The argumentation here is curious. The received Vulgate reading, not found, however, in all the copies, is "ipsa," *she*; while the Hebrew reads דָּרָא, *he, or it*; Jerome, too, reads "ipse;" Sixtus V. edition of the Septuagint reads αντός. And then Perrone contends, that it is indifferent which reading is adopted, because, at any rate, Mary could not have had the power to conquer the serpent excepting through Christ. But how does this prove the Immaculate Conception—give to the dogma "a firm foundation?" Simply for the reason, that in these words a "special privilege is conferred upon Mary," and that special privilege could "only have been the immunity from original sin." But the privilege conferred is solely, even on the author's own ground, that she should be in some way a means of subduing Satan, and she was this as the mother of our Lord. And to assert, that in order to be the mother of Christ, she must be free from original sin, is purely to beg the whole question. The "Letters Apostolic" of Pius IX. upon the dogma, sanction infallibly the application of the clause "bruise thy head" to Mary, who, the pope says, "has crushed the serpent's head with her *immaculate foot*."

The Biblical argument against the immaculate conception is simple and cogent. Mary is nowhere made an exception to the common heritage of the race. The whole human family, Christ alone excepted, is declared to be involved in original sin, through the fall of Adam; and also, without exception, the whole race is declared to be in need of redemption through the merits of Christ. The passages to prove these points we need not cite, since the Romanists concede their existence, however much they may differ in the interpretation of original sin, from the common doctrine of the Reformed Churches.* Since the Scriptures do not make an exception in the case of Mary, neither can we; to make such an exception we need unequivocal inspired authority. And if we make it in the case of Mary, why not, as Bernard himself argued, by the same reason and necessity, make it in respect to Mary's parents, grand-parents, and so on, up to Adam himself? If it is in any way necessary or needful, from the law of descent, or for the completeness of the Incarnation, that our Saviour should be born of a mother free from the hereditary fault of the race, the same necessity, under the same law, must carry us as far back as the law itself reaches.

How does the cardinal meet the difficulty raised by these two

* Perrone cites and approves the following passages: Job xiv, 14; Psa. i, 7; Romans iii, 23; v, 12; Eph. ii, 3; Romans v, 18; 1 Cor. xv, 22; 2 Cor. v, 14, 15.

doctrines? He does this in respect to the universal need of redemption, by asserting that there is a twofold mode of redemption, through the blood and merits of Christ: he concedes that Mary had need of the redemption; that, "considered in and by herself, she was subject to original sin," and that it was on the ground of Christ's merits that she was exempted; but he says, that she was redeemed before original sin touched her at all, as when a debt is paid before a man is put into prison; all the rest of mankind have their debts paid only after actually being in bondage to sin. Whether this position does not really annul the dogma,—and it is also the position of the infallible decree of Pius IX.,—we shall examine by and by. But, in addition to this, Perrone also urges, in reply to the Scriptural argument, that "papal decrees, and the decision of Trent in the case have annulled the application of the Scriptural passages to the matter in question," so that they can no longer be adduced. Popes, he says, have repeatedly called the dogma a "pious" opinion, and declared it to be not contrary to the faith; and the Council of Trent expressly declared, that "in the doctrine of original sin Mary was not excluded." This is certainly sufficiently audacious, and shows how infallibility deals with Scripture. If the pope should declare himself to be sinless, the argument would hold just as well: for it amounts to this, that papal infallibility may annul the application of a Scriptural truth to cases which are embraced in that application. But other popes—seven, Launoy says and proves—have given a counter declaration; between two contrary infallibilities who shall decide? And yet again, Perrone asserts, that these Scriptural declarations about original sin and the need of redemption do apply in some sense even to Mary; and he also asserts, that papal infallibility has decided that they are not to be thus applied. And who shall decide between these two positions; and who can hold them both?

For all who receive the Scriptures as the word of God, having ultimate authority, the evidence against the dogma is decisive. And the only conclusion to be drawn on this ground of argument is, that in the decree of the Immaculate Conception we have that asserted as a *fact* which is plainly contrary to Scripture. An infallible pope here decides not with, nor yet without, but *against* Scripture teaching. For all, too, who admit the *equal* authority of Scripture and tradition, it would seem to be a plain inference, that the equality is destroyed so soon as a doctrine is declared to be of the faith, which is not only found in tradition alone, but also in a tradition which contradicts the Scriptures. Granting that the whole of tradition is for the dogma, by a unanimous consent, if it be admit-

ted contrary to the Scriptures, the two authorities are no longer equal; the tradition is made superior. But, in fine, conceding even this, namely, that a unanimous tradition can supersede the Scriptures themselves, can the dogma of the Immaculate Conception be proved to be a part of the general tradition of the Roman Catholic Church? Does tradition, the second source of argument in its favour, support, substantiate, authorize this new decree?

Supposing tradition to be unanimous and complete in the matter, we do not see how it can prove the point which Perrone declares is to be proved; that is, the *fact* of the Immaculate Conception. Only Omniscience could be cognizant of such a recondite fact—only a special revelation could communicate that knowledge to others. Now, none of the fathers, and none of the schoolmen, and none of the popes, profess to have had a specific revelation upon the point of fact, that is, a revelation assuring them, on direct divine authority, that the Virgin Mary, at the instant of the union of the soul with the seed, was by grace kept free from all touch of original sin. Yet that is the fact which is to be proved, and proved on divine authority, on the authority of a specific revelation about this specific fact.

But, waiving this point, we come to the tradition itself. Is the dogma a part of the tradition of the Church, so that, if tradition be recognised as an ultimate source of appeal, we should be warranted in saying that the position is established? What is tradition, on the ground of the Roman Catholics themselves? Their standards declare it to be "equally with Scripture, the word of God;" and, in distinction from Scripture, to contain those truths, "*quae ab ipsius Christi ore ab apostolis acceptae, aut ab ipsis apostolis Spiritu Sancto dictante, quasi per manus traditae ad nos usque pervenerunt;*" and they further speak of such truths as "*tanquam vel ore tenus a Christo vel a Spiritu Sancto dictatae et continua successione in Ecclesia Catholica conservatae.*" These are the formal statements in the decrees of the Council of Trent, sess. iv., decree 1. The "*Professio Fidei Tridentinae*" of Pius IV., made binding upon the whole "*representative Church,*" by Papal Bulls,* enforces the declaration, "*Nec eam (Sacram Scripturam) umquam, nisi juxta unanimum consensum Patrum, accipiam et interpretabor.*" This is also in accordance with the decree on the "*use of the Scriptures,*" adopted in the fourth session of the Council of Trent: "*Ut nemo—contra unanimum consensum Patrum Scripturam Sacram interpretari audeat.*"† In sess. xiii., c. 2, tradition is designated as the "*uni-*

* Those of Pius IV., viz., "*Injunctum nobis,*" and "*In sacrosanctu.*" 1564.

† See also Concil. Trid., sess. xxiii., cap. iii., on the "*unanimous consent of the Fathers,*" as adduced in favour of ordination.

versus ecclesiæ sensus." If anything can be inferred from these authentic statements it is, that that only is to be received as a true tradition, or can be solidly proved by tradition, which can be traced to Christ, or to the apostles, in a continual succession, and which has for it the "unanimous consent" of the fathers and teachers of the Church.

In applying this authentic interpretation of the idea of tradition to the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, it will be found to hold true that the weight of tradition is adverse to it, that the oldest and best tradition is against it, that the greatest doctors of the middle ages are also opposed, and that the authorities since the Reformation are hopelessly at variance.

Before the breaking out of the controversy between the canons of Lyons and Bernard in 1140, all the great teachers are silent or adverse. The question does not exist for them; they know nothing of this specific doctrine; they speak in respect to original sin, and the need of redemption in such a way as to prove that the Immaculate Conception of Mary could not have been any part of their creed. Their praises of the Virgin are often immoderate; they defend her perpetual virginity;* many of them believe that she was "sanctified" in the womb; most of them declare that she never was guilty of actual sin; but they do not know anything about her exemption from all infection of original sin.

Augustine defends her only against the charge of actual sin.† "Excepta sancta Virgine Maria, de qua propter honorem Domini nullam prorsus, *cum de peccatis agitur*, haberi volo questionem." This passage is quoted in favour of the dogma, but it plainly refers only to actual transgression, and it is contained in a reply to the position of Pelagius, that there were saints who had not sinned. In his treatise on the Remission of Sins,‡ this greatest of the Latin fathers says explicitly that Christ alone was without sin: "Solutus ergo ille etiam, homo factus, manens Deus, peccatum nullum habuit unquam;" nor does he intimate any exception. In his work *De Genesi*, ad. lit. c. 18, n. 32, he speaks of "the body of Christ as taken from the flesh of a woman, who was conceived of a mother with sinful flesh;" and he indicates a clear distinction between Mary's nature and Christ's nature in this respect. Augustine's followers make similar statements. Eusebius Emisenus (supposed by some to be Hilary) on the "Nativity" says, "From the bond of the old sin is not even the mother of the Redeemer free." Fulgentius writes, "The flesh of

* Her perpetual virginity is defended by Epiphanius, (Hær. 78.) by Jerome *adversus Helvidianum*, etc.; and it soon becomes a common position.

† *De Natura et Gratia*, c. 36.

‡ Book ii, c. 24, § 38.

Mary, which was conceived in unrighteousness in a human way, was truly sinful flesh;" and he adds, "that this flesh is in itself truly sinful," referring to Paul's use of the term "flesh," to designate our common hereditary sinfulness. Others of the fathers make use of similar statements, irreconcilable with a belief in the Immaculate Conception.*

It is, indeed, true, that the fathers do not often speak directly upon the point in question; but this is for the simple reason, conclusive against the claim of universality, that they did not know anything about it. The doctrine is declared, A. D. 1140; by Bernard, to be a "novelty;" and he says that the festival is "the mother of presumption, the sister of superstition, and the daughter of levity."† Others of the earlier fathers speak of Mary in such a way as is absolutely irreconcilable with the idea that they believed in her Immaculate Conception. Hilary declares that she is exposed to the fire of judgment: "If that virgin which could compass God is to come into the severity of the judgment, who will dare desire to be judged of God?"‡ Irenæus, Tertullian, Origen, Basil the Great, and Chrysostom, do not hesitate to speak of faults of Mary, of her being rebuked by Christ. "If Mary," says Origen, "did not feel offence at our Lord's sufferings, Jesus did not die for her sins;" Chrysostom ascribes to her "excessive ambition at the marriage festival at Cana;" Basil thinks that she, too, "wavered at the time of the crucifixion;" all of which statements are utterly inconsistent, not only with the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, but also with a belief in her perfect innocence.§

Tertullian, *de Carne Christi*, § xvi, declares that "Christ, by putting on the flesh, made it his, and *made it sinless*;" Irenæus, "that Christ made human nature pure *by taking it*;" Athanasius, on the "Incarnation," teaches the same doctrine, that "Christ sanctified his own body," and that "he hath purified the body, which was in itself corruptible." Of course, the body he assumed was not in and of itself sinless.|| Gregory of Nazianzum, and John of Damascus, (730,) teach expressly that the Virgin was sanctified by the

* See Perrone, pp. 40, sq. The Dominican Bandellus, in his "*De Singulari Puritate et Prærogativa Conceptionis Christi*," 1470, has collected some four hundred testimonies against the dogma from the fathers; so the Cardinal Turrecamata, *De Veritate Conceptionis*. 1550.

† Ep. 174, ad Canon. Lugd., § 5, sq., cf. *Serm.* 78 in Cant.

‡ Hil. in *Psa.* cxix, lib. 3, § 12, cf. *Tracts for Times* 79, p. 36.

§ Cf. Gieseler, I, § 99, note 30; with the references to Irenæus iii, 18; Tertullian *de Carne Christi*, 7; Origen in *Lucam Hom.*, 17; Basil Ep., 260 (317); Chrys. *Hom.* 45 in *Matth.*, *Hom.* 21 in *Joh.*

|| See *Christian Remembr.*, vol. xxiii, pp. 383-385.

Holy Ghost.* If Christ, by assuming human nature in Mary, "made it sinless," it was not so before his incarnation.

The innumerable passages from the fathers, in which they declare the universality of sin, and the universal need of redemption through Christ, without making any exception in favour of the Virgin, we need not cite, because their existence is unquestioned. They have full force in the argument, however, because there are no counter testimonies to be adduced.

The citations from the fathers, which Perrone brings in favour of his dogma, are all fairly interpreted on the supposition that they believed Mary to have been sanctified in the womb, or pure as a virgin, or not subject to actual sin. For example, when Ambrose says "that Mary is an incorrupt virgin, a virgin freed by grace from all stain of sin;" when Augustine speaks of her as "without sins;" and when Ephraem declares her to be "an immaculate and spotless virgin, incorrupt, and a virgin from all stain of sin most foreign;" and when Mary is compared with Eve, on which Perrone lays much stress, as being the source of salvation as Eve was of death, all of these and similar statements are to be interpreted in some one of the above senses, and only confirm the position that the specific doctrine was not in the mind or thoughts of the early Church, and fail to render any proof, especially when taken in connexion with the counter testimony.†

The early liturgies and offices of the Church are an additional source of evidence. They exalt Mary and her conception; but they do never call it an "immaculate" conception. It is only in the latest years that the term "immaculate" has been introduced into the Western offices of the highest authority. The offices themselves, in honour of the Virgin, did not become current in the West till the eleventh century. In the office for her birth, in the ancient Churches, it is read that "she was *sanctified* from the stain of sin; in one of the German liturgies, "that she was born with a propensity to sin;" in the Roman Church itself, the office spoke of the "*sanctification* of the Virgin." This silence, and the late alteration of these offices, are conclusive as to the non-existence of the dogma.

* Greg. Naz. Or. 38; John Dam. Fid. orth. iii, 2. See Köllner, Symbolik, 2. 301.

† As further specimens of Perrone's citations in evidence, he quotes from a work on the "Sufferings of St. Andrew," of unknown authorship, the expression that "the perfect man was born of a stainless virgin;" from Dionysius of Alexandria, that Mary "is the sole daughter of life," "the house of God;" from Hippolytus, that Christ sprung "from incorruptible wood;" from Origen, "the worthy, immaculate virgin," who "did not bring forth fruit in lust;" from Ephraem, "immaculate, unperverted, and most chaste of all;" and the like. These, with the above, are his strongest passages, and they show the hopelessness of the attempt to find the doctrine in the Christian fathers.

In the year 791 (al. 796) a council was held at Friuli, (Concilium Forojuliense,) called by Paulinus, (Paulus,) patriarch of Aquileia, during the pontificate of Adrian I., to consider the Trinity and the Incarnation, in respect to the procession of the Holy Spirit, and "Adoptionism," that is, the opinion maintained by Archbishop Elipandus of Toledo, and others, that Christ in his human nature was the Son of God only by "adoption." A long and explicit Confession of Faith was published by this council, in the course of which it is said: "*Solus enim sine peccato natus est homo, quoniam solus est incarnatus de Spiritu Sancto et immaculata Virgine novus homo. Consubstantialis Deo Patri in sua, id est, divina; consubstantialis etiam matri, sine sorde peccati, in nostra, id est, humana natura.*"* If the belief in the immaculate conception of the virgin had been any part of the orthodoxy of the times, it would have been impossible for a council to have spoken in this way of Christ, as "*alone born without sin;*" and the "immaculateness" ascribed to the Virgin cannot possibly, in the connexion, be interpreted of her conception, or even of her birth; for, if it could, then Christ could not be said to be the "only" one of men *born* without sin.

The testimony of the early bishops of Rome we omit for the present. The only conclusion to be derived from the argument of tradition, so far as the first eight or nine centuries of Christian history are concerned, is that the dogma is unknown. And on the ground of tradition, this silence is conclusive. For tradition demands "universality" of belief; it demands that the doctrine be traced, "in continual succession," to Christ and the apostles. Its formula is, "*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est.*" And on this ground, silence for eight hundred years is condemnation.†

How does the case, now, stand in the mediæval Church? The

* See Harduin, *Acta Conciliorum*, 1714, tom. iv, p. 856, C.

† Launoy's Second *Præscription* declares, (p. 11 :) "If the Church should wish to explain and solve the matter of the conception of the Virgin in the way just mentioned, (that is, in accordance with the rules of Vincens of Lirens,) and to put the end of the discussion A. D. 1300, it would, without doubt, decree that the blessed Virgin, like the rest of mankind, was conceived in original sin." Melchior Canus, one of the most illustrious Roman Catholic divines of the eighteenth century, one of the most eminent members of the Council of Trent, sent by the University of Salamanca, of whom the Roman Catholic Church historian, Dr. Ritter, of Breslau, in his *Church History*, 4th edition, 1851, vol. ii, p. 276, says, that "of all the writers of his time he obtained the greatest renown," in his "*Loci Theologici*," published 1563 and often afterward, declares: "That all the holy fathers who have spoken of the point, have asserted with one voice, that the blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin."

amount of the argument, and the result of the testimony here are, that the doctrine was first invented in the twelfth century, that it was opposed by the greatest and best of the scholastics, and that it made its way, in spite of this opposition, through the force of popular superstition, and from the necessary working out of the inherent tendencies of a system of creature-worship. Some of the mediæval testimony we have already adduced; we add only the most important citations.

Anselm, (1070,) though cited for the Immaculate Conception, teaches in his "*Cur Deus Homo*," (ii. 16,) that Mary was *conceived* in sin; "*Virgo tamen ipsa, unde assumptus est, est in iniquitatibus concepta, et in peccatis concepit eam mater ejus, et cum originali peccato nata est, quoniam et ipsa in Adam peccavit, in quo omnes peccaverunt.*" See also the close of this chapter, and the next (17).*

Bernard, in the very beginning of the controversy, (1140,) in the Epistle to the Canons of Lyons, says, in addition to what we have already cited: "If, then, she could neither be sanctified before her conception, since she did not then exist, nor in it on account of the sin which was inherent in the act, it remains that she must have received sanctification while yet existing in her mother's womb, which, excluding sin, made her nativity holy, but not her conception also."

The "Four Books of Sentences" of Peter Lombard, "master of sentences," bishop of Paris, 1159 to 1164, were the theological textbook of the middle ages, upon which all the great scholastics made their comments and built their systems. He says of the flesh of Mary, which our Lord assumed, that it was "previously obnoxious to sin, like the other flesh of the Virgin, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit it was cleansed." "The Holy Spirit, coming into Mary, purified her from sin, and from all desire of sin."†

Alexander of Hales, the irrefragable doctor, also a Franciscan, taught in England and Paris, 1230-1245; his testimony is explicit:

* Also, "she was sanctified by the Holy Ghost," (*De Conceptu Virginis*, c. xviii:) his words cited by Duns Scotus, that, "nempe decens est, ut ea puritate, quam major sub Deo nequit intelligi, virgo illa niteret," refer in the connexion only to her sanctification before the conception of Christ. See Köllner, *Symbolik*, 2, s. 301.

This passage is also adduced by Perrone; it is taken from the 18th chapter of Anselm's work on the "Conception." Perrone argues, that this must refer to her purity of conception; but this is simply an addition to the text, and contrary to the above citation. Anselm further, in his "Book on the Excellence of the Virgin," says: "We certainly hold that her heart had been so cleansed from all hereditary or actual sin, which, perhaps, was still present in her, that the Holy Spirit, in all his fulness, rested in her."

† *Liber Sent.*, bk. iii, dist. iii.

"It was necessary that the blessed Virgin in her generation should contract sin from her parents;" "she was sanctified in the womb."*

Bonaventure, the seraphic doctor, the glory of the Franciscans, who died in 1274, and was canonized in 1482, is exhaustless in the praise of Mary in his "Speculum" and "Corona." To him is attributed the "Psalter" of Mary, to which we have already referred, though probably without sufficient ground. He sanctions her veneration in the most rapturous terms. Yet, on this question he is also decided, explicitly declaring "that the sanctification of the Virgin was *after* she had contracted original sin;" she was "sanctified in the womb." (Lib. iii, dist. iii, p. 1, qu. 2, 3.) Albertus Magnus, who taught in Cologne 1260 to 1280, made the same avowals.

Bonaventure was the pupil of Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus of Bonaventure, and next succeeds the greatest of all the scholastic theologians, Thomas Aquinas, "the angelic doctor," who died in 1274, was canonized in 1323, and in 1567 was declared by Pius V. to be "teacher of the Church." In his "Summa Theologiæ, p. iii, qu. 27, art. 1, it stands, "Mary was sanctified in the womb." Art. 2. "*Not before the infusion of the soul*; for if she had been she would not have incurred the stain of original sin, and would not have needed the redemption of Christ." Art. 3. The complete deliverance from original sin was only given her when she conceived Christ: "*ex prole redundaverit in matrem, totaliter fomite subtracto.*" About the festival of the Conception, he says, "that the Roman Church does not observe it herself, yet it tolerates the custom of other Churches. Unde talis celebritas non est totaliter reprobanda."

Such is the testimony of the most eminent mediæval divines, to which we need not add names of less weight. Perrone feels the difficulty arising from this source so "anxiously," that he devotes a whole chapter to its elucidation. What he advances amounts to the following positions: that if these scholastic divines had reasoned correctly from what they conceded about the birth of the Virgin, they would have made her conception immaculate; also, that what they teach can all be best explained in harmony with the doctrine; or, if not so, that they taught what they did as "private teachers;" as also, that they were ignorant of antiquity; and again, that their views on original sin were such as allowed them to speak as they did; in fine, that they did not have any guidance from an infallible decision in what they uttered; and that while they were wrangling in the schools, the dogma was making its way among the people. All of which goes to show, that the mediæval *testimony* is against

* Summa Theol., p. iii, qu. 10, memb. 2, art. 1, 4, cf. Gieseler.

it; that, as far as the middle ages are concerned, only isolated opinions are for the doctrine, and the weight of authority is against it. And yet, in tradition, the decision can only be by *authority*.

The only distinct argumentative attempt which Perrone makes to parry the force of their authority and arguments, is the assertion, that these doctors of the schools, when they speak of the conception of Mary, have reference to what he calls the first, or active conception, and not to the passive, or the infusion of the soul into the seed. But this explanation is irrelevant, for two reasons; one is, that many of these doctors do not make this distinction, and, of course, they include both parts of the conception in their statement. They make the distinction between "conception" and "sanctification," and say, that all that precedes sanctification belongs to the "conception," and is infected with original sin; this, of course, includes the "passive" conception. Another reason that invalidates this mode of explanation is, that some of these doctors do make the very distinction in question, and yet maintain that the whole conception, both active and passive, was in original sin. Thus, Alexander of Hales says, that "the Virgin after her nativity, *and after the infusion of the soul into the body*, was sanctified;" Bonaventure asserts, "that the infusion of grace may have been soon *after the infusion of the soul*;" and Aquinas declares expressly, "that the cleansing can only be from original sin, that the fault of original sin can only be in a rational creature, and, therefore, that *before the infusion of the rational soul*, the Virgin was not sanctified." In fact, this mode of meeting the difficulty can only be carried through, by supposing that the mediæval divines believed that original sin could exist in the mere fleshly material derived from parents, an opinion widely abhorrent to their well-known views.

The argument from tradition, in favour of the new dogma, we think, then, may be classed with the argument from Scripture, so far as conclusiveness goes. It will not bear a single test necessary to a real tradition, even on Roman Catholic grounds: antiquity is silent; in the middle ages the great authorities are divided; and in modern times, as our historical sketch has shown, there have been perpetual contests and divisions. Twenty years ago hardly a single name of eminence among the Roman Catholics of Germany could be found in its favour. Spain, indeed, continued her devotions, but France was indifferent, until the Ultramontane party began to gain power, and to look about for the means of arousing popular feeling in behalf of the Papacy.*

* In the light of this historical argument, what shall be said of such assertions as the following, contained in the "Letters Apostolic" of Pius IX., concern-

The third source of proof and argument in respect to the dogma is the theological. This is considered by Perrone in three chapters, in different portions of his work.* Against the doctrine four arguments are adduced: Original sin; Mary's liability to suffering and punishment, which implies sin; the universal need of redemption; and the mode of Mary's conception, namely, that she was born of sinful parents, in concupiscence; Christ alone, according to the unanimous opinion of the fathers, being conceived without lust. Perrone meets these arguments by saying, as to the first, that Mary would have had part in original sin, by descent, if God had not prevented this by the grace with which he endued her soul at the moment of its creation, when it was infused into the body; and, as this was Mary's "privilege," he claims that the argument does not lead to the conclusion that her parents must also have been sinless. Suffering, sorrow, and death, he replies, to the second, do not necessarily imply sin; and, besides, the Roman popes have already decided this point against Bains. In what concerns Mary's need of redemption, he grants that she was in a sense redeemed through Christ's merits, but before she actually came under the infection of sin; by her descent she was under the "obligation" to be sinful, and would have had a part in the common malady, had not, by divine prescience and purpose, her soul been purified through Christ's merits before hereditary sin could actually touch her soul; that is, Mary, in herself considered as one of the race, was liable to original sin, but was kept from it through a peculiar and special application of Christ's merits. This dual sort of original sin and of redemption we shall recur to again. In like way he meets the fourth objection to the dogma, by the position that she was indeed born of sinful flesh and needed redemption, unlike Christ, and had a part in such redemption in the peculiar manner aforesaid.

The theological proofs in favour of the dogma are given by Perrone in the fourteenth chapter of the first part of his work. They all rest on the idea of *congruity*, or fitness,—“that God will choose the better way in all his acts.” One of these arguments is from the dignity and office of the divine mother. God had from eternity

ing the dogma? that “this doctrine of the Immaculate Conception ○ ○ ○ always existed in the Church as received by our ancestors, and is stamped with the character of a divine revelation. For the Church of Christ, careful guardian and defender of the dogmas deposited with her, *changes nothing* in them, diminishes nothing, *adds nothing*,” but only so treats them, that they “may increase only in their own kind—that is, in the *same dogma, the same sense, and the same belief*.” The force of “dogmatic” assertion can surely no further go.

○ Perrone, p. 54 sq., 102 sq., 146 sq.

predestined her to be the mother of our Lord, and must, of course, determine to endow her with all needed grace and graces, since she was to be his own habitation; he would not, then, have allowed her to be defiled, even for an instant, with original sin: this, and this alone, is fitting, congruous. Mary's respective relations to the Three Persons of the Trinity demand the same, from the congruity of the case: of one who was to be the first and most beloved of all created beings, the bride of the Spirit, the mother of God, to be united to the Son, to be the "mother of all living," we cannot conceive it to be possible that she would have been allowed to be infected by sin and guilt. These arguments, Perrone thinks, come near to being "a strict proof;" and he urges them with great plausibility against those who maintain, on the same ground of fitness alone, and without Scripture, that Mary was sanctified in the womb, is the queen of heaven, the mother of all that live, and who pay her devout worship. And it does lie in the very necessity of the case, that all such must logically go on to the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. Mary cannot, in consistency, be worshipped and lauded as she is by all Papists, unless she be free from the defilement of our common nature. The worship of the Virgin leads to this result. In leading thereto, it tramples under foot all tradition, is hostile to Scripture, is irrational; but still it leads to this result. On Protestant grounds, we say, that this is the only consistent position for the worshipper of the Virgin. May it yet be the means of leading many to see the delusion and falsity of the whole system.

On Protestant grounds, on grounds of Scripture and reason, too, we add, that this argument from "congruity" is absolutely worthless. The point to be proved by any argument in the case is the *fact* that the Virgin Mary was conceived without sin; the argument from congruity cannot reach the fact; it can, at the utmost, prove the possibility. The fact is one which only Omniscience could know, which God alone can reveal; and to propound it as "a doctrine of faith" on any such ground of possible fitness is an insult to the word of God. It exalts the unscriptural dogma of the Immaculate Conception at the expense of the Scriptural truths of original sin, and of the universal need of Christ's merits. It is just as easy to prove a good deal more by this "fitness," namely, that Mary could not have fitly been a member of a lost race, that she could not be fitly introduced into a sinful world in the way of natural descent, and the like.

There is one other position into which the new dogma forces the Roman pontiff, which puts the matter of Papal infallibility in a disagreeable dilemma and dualism. The decree of Pius IX. is in opposition to the express declarations of preceding pontiffs; pope is

arrayed against pope; infallibility is discordant with infallibility. Not only has "a probable opinion become improbable," but Peter's chair is divided against itself; and how, then, can that kingdom stand? The Jansenist Launoy, in his *Præscriptions*, has collected the opinions adverse to, or irreconcilable with, the dogma, of seven of the successors of St. Peter, who never change. From Pope Leo, (440-461,) the greatest and most learned of the early bishops of Rome, he cites four passages in which Leo declares that Christ alone "was innocent in his birth," alone was "free from original sin," and that Christ received from his mother "her nature, but not her fault;" and he asserts that Mary obtained "*her own purification through her conception of Christ.*" This is wholly adverse to the dogma. Innocent III., who called the Lateran Council in 1213, in a sermon on the "Assumption of Christ," comparing Eve and Mary, writes: "*Illa fuit sine culpa producta, sed in culpa produxit; hæc autem fuit in culpa producta, sed sine culpa produxit.*" Gregory says, (590-604,) "John the Baptist was conceived in sin; Christ alone was conceived without sin." Innocent V., (1276,) in his "Commentary on the Master of Sentences:" "Non convenit tantæ Virgini ut diu morata sit in peccato;" and he adds "that she was sanctified quickly after the animation, (that is, of the body by the soul,) *although not in the very moment.*" This is directly against the dogma. John XXII. or Benedict XII., (c. 1340,) says that Mary "passed at first *from a state of original sin to a state of grace.*" Clement VI., (1342-1352,) "I suppose, according to the common opinion as yet, that the blessed Virgin was in original sin" *modica morula*, "because, according to all, she was sanctified as soon as she could be sanctified."

Thus the papacy, in committing itself to this new and idolatrous dogma, is in hostility to Scripture, to universal consent, and also to itself.

It explains the sense of Scripture by tradition; and it explains the sense of tradition by an infallible expositor; and that infallible expositor contradicts itself.

The new dogma makes the whole of the early Church to have been ignorant of a truth which is now declared to be necessary to the faith; it makes Leo, Innocent III., Innocent V., and Clement V., to have taught heresy; it puts the greatest scholastic divines under the ban; and while doing this it declares that what is now decreed has always been of the faith of the Church, and that it is a part of the revelation of God, given through Christ and the apostles, and handed down by constant succession and general consent.

The "Letters Apostolic," sent forth by Pius IX. to define the faith

in this matter, are composed in a style which, to a correct taste, must appear turgid and overwrought. Repetitions abound; the vocabulary of epithets and symbols is profusely spent in exalting the praise of the Virgin. There is none of the simplicity of faith, nothing of such a mode of teaching as would alone befit an authentic oracle. It is adulation, panegyric, in parts, almost rhapsody. It adopts and rehearses the most exalted strains and ejaculations of ecstatic mystics. It is not argument, but encomium and assertion. It repeats most fully and confirms the Constitutions of Alexander VII., in his "*Sollicitudo Omnium Ecclesiarum*," 3 Dec., 1661. Into the evidence from early tradition it enters only in the way of allusion and assumption. Upon some of its wonderful assertions we might comment, did our space permit; but we need only quote them to make manifest how utterly devoid of evidence they are. The ineffable God "followed her [Mary] with so great love before all creatures, that in *her alone* he pleased himself with a most benign complacency." "Which original innocence of the august Virgin," "comprehended in the deposit of divine revelation," the Catholic Church "*has never ceased to lay down, to cherish, and to illustrate.*" Following the most unnatural allegories of the fathers, this decree makes the "ark of Noah," the "ladder of Jacob," the "burning bush," the "fenced garden," the "city of God," and the "temple of God," to be types, "preannunciations" of the dignity and spotless innocence of Mary. It says that she is "the spotless dove," "the holy Jerusalem," "the exalted throne of God," "the queen who came forth entirely perfect *from the mouth of the Most High*," "the crown of all miracles." In yet loftier strains she is described as "the reparatrix of her parents, the vivifier of posterity," "always conversant with God, and united with him in an eternal covenant;" she is "more beautiful than beauty, more gracious than grace, more holy than holiness, and *alone holy*;" "God alone excepted, she is superior to all, and by nature fairer, more beautiful and more holy than the cherubim and seraphim; she whom all the tongues of heaven and earth do not suffice to extol." She is the "most faithful helper of all who are in danger, and the most powerful mediatrix and conciliatrix with the only-begotten Son of the whole world," "the most illustrious glory and guardian of the holy Church," has "destroyed all heresies," "snatched from the greatest calamities of all kinds the faithful people and nations;" and it is she also who is to "effect by her most powerful patronage" the triumphs and dominion of the Church. "Standing at the right hand of the only-begotten Son, she intercedes most powerfully and obtains what she asks, and cannot be frustrated." Are these the words of truth and soberness? Is this the gospel for

this nineteenth century of strife and infidelity? Has Rome changed? Is superstition extinct? Is the Roman Church the Church of Christ, or of Mary?

While these and similar statements are abhorrent to Scripture, destitute of proper evidence, and indicative of the idolatrous veneration of a creature, yet it is the new dogma itself, in its proper dogmatic contents, which is worthy of the most especial consideration. Destitute of sufficient evidence, without basis in Scripture, and opposed to tradition, it also contains in itself contradictory and unreconciled elements, which evince its falsity and unreasonableness. It is thus not only opposed to the past, but self-destroyed.

And, in the first place, it contains contradictory elements in what it asserts about Mary's exemption from original sin, since it declares that this exemption was "in virtue of the merits of Jesus Christ, the Saviour of mankind." According to Scripture, Christ died for the human race, lost and subject to sin through the transgression of Adam. His merits as Redeemer cannot be applied, nor be supposed to be applied, to any who have not a part in the "*vitium originis*" of the human family. He died for sin, and for that alone; his redemption is from sin, and from that alone. If Mary was preserved through his merits, it must have been that she had in some way a part in the sin of the race.

In reply to this, it is said, and Perrone argues, that she was indeed redeemed through the blood of Christ, but in a peculiar way, in a "higher method," (p. 114, sq.) "A man may be liberated, either by the payment of the debt after he is imprisoned, or before;" in the latter case he is not actually put into prison: so was Mary redeemed through Christ. Such is the mode of explanation common to the defenders of the dogma, to avoid this fatal difficulty; but it rests on a mere metaphor, and does not reach the heart of the objection. In the case supposed, the man is really and personally under the debt, the obligation to pay, though he has not yet suffered the consequences of non-payment, that is, the imprisonment. If he were not personally under this obligation, there would be no sense in saying that the debt could be paid for him. Just so must it be, by parity of reasoning, in the case of Mary. There is no propriety in asserting that she was personally delivered through Christ's merits from original sin, unless she be considered as personally under its power and obligation; and if she be so, then she has a part in the fault of the race. Nor is the difficulty avoided by saying, as Perrone sometimes does, that she was "exempted" before she was under its power, for she could not be personally exempted, unless it had a hold upon her personally; and by saying that she was exempted

through Christ's merits, it is involved and implied that *she* was exempted; and through Christ's merits she could not be exempted from something in which she had no part; and Christ's merits exempt only from sin.

Thus the dogma, in declaring that Mary had no original sin, and yet was redeemed by Christ, contains contradictory positions.

In the second place, the dogma is fatally defective in the view of original sin, on which it rests, and with which alone it is consistent. It contains the vital defect, the semi-Pelagianism of the Roman Catholic theology on this point, against which all the Protestant confessions have protested as unscriptural. The Roman Catholic doctrine puts the essence of original sin solely in defect, makes it negative; asserting that it is only the want of that righteousness, in which Adam was created; this is in scholastic usage the "formal" part, or the very essence of original sin. Concupiscence is *not* of the nature of sin. This is the doctrine of original sin, which Perone expressly lays down, in the opening of his treatise, (pp. 2, 3, sq.,) "that the essence of original sin is in the defect of grace or of original righteousness."* This is the only view of the matter with which the dogma of the Immaculate Conception can possibly be reconciled. If this view is false—if original sin, as Protestants hold,†

* The Council of Trent, as is well known, is not explicit in its definition of original sin. Sess. v, 2, declares, that Adam's sin involved the forfeiture of original righteousness on the part of his descendants, and also that sin itself, "the death of the soul," was transmitted. Cat. Rom., 3, 10, 6, avows, that concupiscence was made inordinate in all by the fall. But this concupiscence is not held by that Church to be of the nature of sin; so Bellarmine, de amiss. gratiæ, says, the difference of man after the fall compared with his state "in puris naturalibus" is only as the difference of the "spoliatus a nudo;" and that the corruption of nature is produced only by the loss of supernatural endowments. To the same effect, Mohler in his "Symbolism." This doctrine is in opposition to Augustine, with whom "concupiscence" is of the essence of original sin. (Contra Jul., lib. ii; and Nupt. et Conc., ii, 8.) Anselm brought into vogue the formula, "Nuditas justitiæ debitiæ," as giving the essence of original sin; against him is Peter Lombard. Aquinas attempts a reconciliation, by saying that the "defect of original justice is the *formal* cause," and that concupiscence is the "proper matter and substance" of original sin. (Summa. i, 2; qu. 82; art. iii, 1: "Et ita peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia, formaliter vero est defectus originalis justitiæ.") Duns Scotus puts the essence in the "privation," and declares it cannot be in the "concupiscence." See Winer, Köllner, Mohler, in their "Symbolisms."

† We need not cite many authorities to exhibit the positive Protestant view, avowedly taken and maintained against the Roman view, and which was one of the strongholds of the Reformed systems, vitally connected with their spiritual power. Augsb. Conf.: "After the fall of Adam all men, propagated according to nature, are born with sin; that is, *without* the fear of God, *without* trust in God,

according to the Scriptures, be positive and not negative, and come by descent, then the conclusion is irresistible, that Mary, by descent, must have had a part therein. The dogma of her Immaculate Conception is possible only with a false view of the nature of the "sin of birth." Augustine could not have held it, nor could Aquinas. (See the note below.) The dogma is conceived in a defective notion of original sin.

Yet again, even with this defective view of original sin, the dogma is involved in difficulties and internal conflicts, by what it asserts and implies as to the origin of the soul of Mary. The theory on which it rests is, that Mary's soul was directly created by God. It declares that the Virgin Mary, "at the first instant of her conception," was preserved immaculate. What is meant by "conception" here? It is the so-called "passive conception," or the infusion of the soul into the seed, the union of the soul of Mary with the body, prepared beforehand in the "active conception." Whence, now, this soul? It was "*created*." The "Letters," in another passage, say that Mary was the "*tabernacle created by God himself*." Pius IX. also cites the formula of Alexander VII. as having "decretive" authority, and that formula declares, "that Mary's soul, at the first instant of *creation and of infusion* into the body," was preserved free from original sin. And this hypothesis of "creatianism" is also the only hypothesis consonant with the doctrine.*

But now put these two positions together, namely, that original sin consists essentially in privation; that is, in the defect of original justice; and that Mary's soul was directly created by God, and we

and with concupiscence." So the Apology of the Conf. The Conf. Helv. ii, 8: "By sin we understand that native corruption, derived from our first parents, by which we are plunged into depraved concupiscence and averse to good." So the Gallic, Heidelberg and Dort Confessions, and the Conf. and Cat. of West. Assembly. The Articles of the Church of England, IX.: "It is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man $\circ \circ \circ$ whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil." So, too, the Article of the Meth. Ep. Church, VII., abridged from that of the Church of England, contains the same positive and negative parts of the doctrine.

* This "creatianism" is the avowed theory of Perrone. On page 1, he states the question to be about her "passive conception; that is, when her soul was created by God for the animation of her body." It is also the view of a large proportion of the Roman Catholic theologians. The vow of the knights of the Spanish order of Calatrava is worthy of being cited in this connexion for its fulness: "In the moment of her blessed conception, and of the union of her soul with her body, divine grace prevented and preserved her from original guilt by the merits of the passion and death of Christ our Redeemer, her future Son, foreseen in the divine counsel, by which she was truly redeemed, and by a more noble kind of redemption than any other of the children of Adam."

arrive at the following difficulties and dilemmas. The position is this: When Mary's soul was created and infused into her body, she was by grace preserved free from original sin. Would the original sin, from which she was kept, have come to her from her body, or from her soul,—for it must have come from one or the other? If you say that it would have come from the soul, that involves the consequence that God usually creates original sin in the soul, before it is united with the body, and, of course, before it is connected with Adam by descent. If you say, on the other hand, that original sin would have come to Mary from her "active conception," that is, from her prepared body, then it was already there, in germ and seed, before the infusion of the soul. God either creates the human soul with original sin, or the original sin is from the parents. If the former, we have original sin without any connexion with Adam; if the latter, Mary must have been really possessed of it. But you say original sin consists in defect, privation, and that the dogma means that God created Mary's soul perfectly holy. But this raises another difficulty; for it is also asserted that he created her thus holy on the ground of Christ's merits, and that had it not been for Christ's merits she would have shared the sin of the race. This creation, now, must have been either through the race (the connexion with Adam) or above the race, either mediate or immediate. If through the race or mediate, then she must have had a part in its sinfulness; if above the race, or an immediate creation, then there is no theological or rational ground for saying that, as far as her creation was concerned, she was liable to sin, or could be saved from it through Christ's merits.

Nor can any relief be found by conjoining the two points, and asserting that the exemption from original sin concerns the time or point of *union* of the soul with the seed, the conjunction of the active with the passive conception. For the still unanswered question here is, and must be, this: In the union of the soul with the body, from which of the two, soul or body, would the original sin have come, if grace had not prevented?—for it must have come from one or the other. If you say from the soul, then you would have original sin without any connexion with Adam; if you say from the body, then original sin must already have been there; if you say from both together, this simply dodges the question, or else resolves original sin into some act consequent upon the union,—that is, into actual transgression.

Nor is the matter helped by saying that original sin is essentially negative, privative; for the privation has respect to either the soul or the body, or to both conjoined, and the same dilemmas result.

The "Letters Apostolic," in other passages, speak of the dogma in this wise: that the "Blessed Virgin was free from all contagion of *body*, soul, and mind;" that she had "community with men only in their nature, but not in their fault;" and that "the flesh of the Virgin taken from Adam did not admit the stain of Adam, and on this account that the most Blessed Virgin was the tabernacle created by God himself, formed by the Holy Spirit." These expressions imply that the fault in the case could have been a fault of "nature;" that the contagion might have been of the "body;" that the "stain from Adam" would, under other circumstances, have come to her through the "flesh." But in her "active conception," before the infusion of the soul and of grace, the "nature," the "body," the "flesh," were already extant, ere the "passive conception" took place: were they with or without the fault? If with the fault, then you have original sin; if without, then it would follow that the flesh, the body, the nature, *before* the passive conception, had been already delivered from the bondage of corruption. In short, if original sin come from the race, from the "active conception," then Mary must have had it; if it come from the "passive conception," then God is its direct author in every individual case.

This dogma of the Immaculate Conception, then, contains contradictory elements; it rests on a false view of original sin. Even with that false view it cannot well be reconciled: it assumes the theory that souls are directly created, and here again it involves itself in inextricable difficulties in relation to original sin. It is opposed to Scripture, to tradition, and it is self-opposed. Yet it comes to us with the sanction and decree of an "infallible" authority, who says, "Let no man interfere with this our declaration, pronouncement, and definition, or oppose and contradict it with presumptuous rashness. If any should presume to assail it, let him know that he will incur the indignation of the Omnipotent God, and of his blessed apostles, Peter and Paul."

Our review of this celebrated controversy and its results furnishes an instructive exemplification of the mode in which Rome develops doctrines. Nothing is clearer in the way of historical testimony than that this dogma is a novelty in the Christian Church; and nothing, too, is more manifest, than that it has been developed into its present form by an inward necessity of the Roman system. Opposed to Scripture, to antiquity, and to great Scriptural truths, it has still followed a law of development. It is the slow and sure eating of the poison which Rome received from a pagan antiquity, in the veneration, the cultus, the worship of that which is not God. This superstition infects the whole system of the Papacy; it belongs

to its essence; it must work itself out to its legitimate results. In doing this it sets at naught the word of God, misinterprets ancient and authentic testimonies, is in conflict with the great truths of original sin and of the universal need of redemption; yet it must still go on in its baleful development. The might of superstition is greater in the Church of the Papacy than the power of truth, than the divine oracles, than the consent of ancient times. And this is the real secret of the growth and present position of this dogma. The voice of superstition, the paganism of Romanism, demand the enthronement of a creature.

The decreed dogma lends the authentic sanction of Rome to that cultus of the Virgin, which has been growing for many centuries, and which, in the "Glories of Mary," had reached its popular culmination. There it is asserted, "that it is morally impossible for those who neglect the devotion to the blessed Virgin to be saved;" "he who is not protected by Mary cannot be saved." Suarez teaches, that "it is the sentiment of the Church that the intercession of Mary is not only useful, but necessary," and "that Christ is never found except through Mary." Liguori also adds that "Mary is a mediatrix of grace," and that "we receive through Mary's intercession all the graces we ask;" that "God *will not* grant his graces without her intercession." "The throne of grace is Mary." "We must go to a sacrament," says M. Olier, in a Catechism approved by Roman bishops, "which is solely of mercy, and wherein Jesus Christ exercises no judgment. This sacrament is the most blessed Virgin. It is through her that we have access to Jesus Christ in full confidence."* "There is and can be no truer test of one's active, living faith in our holy religion, in the redemption and salvation of sinners through the cross, than a firm attachment to the worship of Mary."† "Mary is the channel through which our Lord dispenses his graces, and he dispenses none save through her intercession." And the pope, in his Encyclical of Feb. 2, 1849, says, that God "*would have us possess all through Mary.*"

In this arrogant decree of the supreme pontiff, we read the meaning of the Ultramontane claim of infallibility as centering in the see of Peter. It is the triumph of the Papal over the Episcopal system; it involves the position that the pope alone is the final arbiter of doctrine, that in him is the seat of infallibility. Whether

* As quoted by Dr. Pusey on the "Rule of Faith," p. 60, with other citations.

† Brownson's Review, January, 1853. Our own land, by the request of the Sixth Provincial Council of Baltimore, in 1846, has been put, by a formal decree of the General Congregation of the Propaganda, (1847,) under the protection of Mary "immaculate concepts."

this decree will be recognised as having final authority, or whether there is any vestige of the old Gallican liberties left in France, or of Episcopal independence in Germany,—whether the Dominicans will bow their heads in subjection, remains to be seen. The pretension to sole and supreme infallibility cannot be more decidedly advanced than in the words of the “Letters,” in the most formal part, when announcing the dogma itself: “We resolved that we should no longer delay to sanction and define by our supreme authority,” etc. It involves the pretension to infallibility in matters of fact as well as of doctrine, for this dogma is about a fact. In this omniscient prerogative thus claimed, is yet another instance of the necessary development of the Papal system. To this it must come. The final decision about all spiritual truth must be claimed for and by the successor of Peter. What Scripture means, what tradition is, he is to decide, and he alone in the last resort. What though Scripture be annulled! what though tradition be defied and reversed! it is still an infallible utterance. Though pope speak against pope, the Papacy is infallible. The last pope only needs to say that the others agreed with him, and it is infallibly true, and no private judgment may “think” otherwise. Never has a pope in such an authoritative way, without appeal to him, by his own motion, so distinctly interfered in respect to a religious truth, more boldly proclaimed himself the final arbiter. Divine Providence has permitted and decreed that the inherent tendencies of the Papal system, in respect to both the worship of the creature, and the claim of infallibility, should work themselves out to their utmost verge and culmination together, that it might be most apparent what the Papal system really is.

Infallibility, in this dogma and decree, sets its seal to idolatry. In the person of the pope the two are married. Infallibility stamps a Pagan lie as Christian truth, and thus disproves itself. Is not the decree idolatrous? Read its own words: “The mother of God approaches as nearly to God as created nature can do, and is more exalted than all human and angelic encomiums;” she is “the first and the peculiar work of God;” she is “*alone with her Son* partaker of perpetual benediction;” she “has brought salvation to the world;” she is the “*most illustrious* glory and ornament, and most firm guardian of the Holy Church;” to her it is ascribed that “heresies are destroyed,” “all calamities averted,” and even that “the sinner may obtain pardon;” and the consummation of this adoration is found in the exhortation: “Let all the children of the Catholic Church, with a more ardent zeal of *piety, religion, and love*, proceed to *worship, invoke, and pray* to the most blessed Virgin Mary,

mother of God, conceived without original sin." If this be not idolatry, there cannot be any idolatry. If this be idolatry, then the infallible Papal Church has ceased to be the Church of Christ, and has become the Church of Mary.

And the juncture at which this decree is uttered is also providential. Never were the claims of the Papacy more fully scrutinized, and never has its fatuity been more manifest. It is the dogmatism of an infatuated pride. The nations are in arms; they are hungering for the bread of life. They need Christ, and Rome gives them Mary. They need an almighty helper, and the Papacy gives them a deified woman. The heart of the conflict of Europe, deeper than all its politics, deeper than all its social needs, is in the question between Romanism and Protestantism; between the Church of Christ and the Church of the Papacy; between reason and faith, on the one side, and superstition against reason and Scripture on the other. At such a juncture, the very crisis of its fate, Rome speaks to the listening nations; she sends forth her thousand missives; she calls her archbishops and bishops from afar; in "Letters Apostolic," which once would have inspired, as no other word of mortal man, both faith and fear, she addresses, in the name of God, the nations of the whole earth, which she claims as her rightful heritage, and all the "consolation," all the "hope," all the "succour" which she can offer is to command them to address their prayers unto, and to put their confidence in, the Virgin Mary, conceived without the stain of original sin! "For," says Pius IX., "nothing is to be feared and nothing is to be despaired of under her guidance, under her auspices, under her favour, under her protection!"

Such a decree at such a juncture proves that the day of Rome is past and her doom at hand.

As ever of old, the true Church of Christ, his only bride, which makes not flesh its arm, is to bind closer to her heart the name of him, the only Saviour, whose is the only name given under heaven among men whereby we must be saved. Against the power of infidelity and of superstition, both arrayed in hostility to Christ, his name is the sign and pledge of final victory.

ART. VII.—THE COERCIVE POWER CLAIMED BY THE CHURCH OF ROME.

THE *Civiltà Cattolica* is perhaps the most authoritative journal now published in the interests of the Papacy. Issued at Rome, under the very eye of the pope,—edited by the Jesuits, whose distinctive function it is to maintain the Papal power,—it certainly comes as near to being the pontifical organ as any publication is ever likely to be. Accordingly, its views are generally received with great reverence throughout the Church. Even Romish editors in Protestant lands, where extreme Ultramontane doctrines have (at least until recently) been rarely preached, speak of the *Civiltà* and its utterances with the utmost respect; and when they presume to differ from it, they generally speak with bated breath. In a word, if the pretensions of Rome are likely to be stated anywhere clearly and unreservedly, it is in this journal.

Let our readers now study the following pages, which are carefully translated from the *Civiltà Cattolica*, (No. cxi, 2d series, vol. viii, Nov., 1854, pp. 272–282.) The article is not translated in full; but nothing important to the statement, or which would in any wise alter its meaning, is omitted. The italicizing is our own.

“What are the limits of the power of coercion? There are but two, which, in fact, comprehend all others, viz., *means* and *aim*, which limit all human activities: as, for instance, man has no wings, he never aims at flying—at least so long as the great problem of *aëronautics* is unsolved:—and here, for want of means, the aim is not devised. On the other hand, a sower does not need for his work a doctor's hat or a soldier's arms: as, on the contrary, the soldier does not seek to fight with a hoe, or the doctor with a plough. And in this way, the act of governing, like all other acts, is limited and determined by its means and its end. *Avveduti* goes too far, in fact, when he claims for the superior power *unlimited* authority.*

“There are, undoubtedly, many cases in which the superior power is unduly exercised, and in which, nevertheless, subjects are bound to obey, though unable to understand the aims of the higher power or the fitness of its means of reaching them. But there are a

* It will be clearly seen from what follows, that this disclaimer refers, *not* to the power of the Church, but to that of secular governments. According to the Jesuits, the Church alone has unlimited power: unlimited, that is, by any human will, law, or constitution.—Ed.

thousand cases in which the subject is *not* bound to obey, because the superior power is incompetent to command. And as the governing power is thus limited, so also is the penal function, or right to punish. The CHURCH, too, like every other judge, must inquire *how far her means extend*, and what degree of severity her end requires.*

"What then are the limits of the Church's means? There are none, except the limits of human power and of the divine assistance by which the Church is comforted. As the Church commands the spiritual part of man directly, (*direttamente agli spirito*), *she therefore commands the whole man, and all that depends on man*: for it is the property of man to live according to the spirit, according to reason.† This is the efficient cause of that wonderful power which the Church has always exercised (though under many different forms) in this world; which she exercises still; and which is so incomprehensible to mere worldly politicians. She was but a babe in the cradle in Palestine, when she attached in the Sanhedrim the chiefs of that people whose inextinguishable vitality has for two thousand years been the puzzle of the philosophers. From the darkness of the Catacombs she dictated laws to the subjects of the emperors, *abrogating decrees, whether plebeian, senatorial, or imperial, when in conflict with Catholic ordinances*. Emerging from the Catacombs to rule over the Roman world, she led the autocrats by the hand in reforming their statute-books and their administration. Did they resist? The Church, *unyielding, saw them thrown at her feet, either penitent or crushed*. When the barbarians came down, like a torrent, from the north, the Church taught them Christian civilization, and patronized both, peoples and princes. When Mohammedan license rushed in from the East, it was the Church that hurled against it the lances of Christendom. Did the Christian emperors become insolent? *The Church armed against them their very electors*. To every rampant heresy the Church *knew how to oppose the power either of the peoples or of their princes*; and when these supports seemed at last to have been snatched from her by a universal rationalism, behold! there is a sudden turning

* Notice the significant terms of this proposition. The question is not, in the mind of the Jesuit, "What is the true power intrusted to the Church?" but, "What are the *means* at the disposal of the Church?" and "what *severity* does she demand?"—Ed.

† This proposition sums up the entire claim of the Church, both as to temporal and spiritual supremacy. The *absolute* direction of the soul logically and necessarily carries with it, as the greater the less, the direction also of the body.—Ed.

back of both:—of the nations, fearing an unbridled royal power, and proclaiming the necessity of a supreme spiritual power; of the princes, beginning to understand, at the light of a bloody communism, that the principles of the Church are a firmer foundation for their thrones than bayonets, which must always be intrusted to a part of the people.

“Thus, amid all formal changes the power of the Church is always immense. If any doubt it, let them listen to her enemies, who, for so many years, have been proclaiming that ‘the Church is dead;’ ‘that she remains only as an empty and impotent shadow.’ They would not vaunt thus against a mere nonentity: the fearless do not boast. The truth is, that the only power dreaded by the demagogues and the ungodly is that very Church which they unite in attacking, calling it ‘clerical party,’ ‘Jesuitism,’ ‘theologism,’ or what not. And they are right in that fear. To-day, as in all times, the Church commands the spiritual part of man (lit. *the spirits*;) and in ruling over the spirit, she rules the body, rules our riches, our sciences, our affections, our interests, our associations—*rules, in fine, over monarchs and their ministers*. She rules over them like Divine Providence, not with an arbitrary absolutism, but by the force of truth and right, *cum magna reverentia disponens*. Petty politicians may conclude that the Church has lost her power, because she does not enlist artillery, cavalry, and infantry; but the truth is, that the *artillery, cavalry, and infantry of the Catholics are in the hands of the Church, inasmuch as in her hands are the mind, the reason, and the power of every true Catholic*.

“So far, then, as the means are concerned, the Church finds no limit to her use of penal justice, as she does not demand impossibilities from man, nor miracles from Providence. But there may be a limit found in her aim, if those actions only fall under the spiritual authority which are necessary for a spiritual aim. Here, then, we have to inquire, (1.) Whether a penal right is necessary to spiritual ends? and, (2.) Within what limits may severity be used to reach such ends? With regard to the first question, there cannot be a shadow of doubt. Is not the end of *all* punishment essentially spiritual? Take away from chastisement its moral relations to guilt and amendment, and you reduce it to mere misfortune. What is the difference between the martyr who falls by the axe, the traveller slain by an assassin, and the culprit who dies under the sentence of the law? Take away from the first case the faith and innocence of the victim, and from the third the guilt of the criminal and the justice of the court, and wherein do they differ from the second? Punishment, therefore, has, *essentially*, spiritual aims; so that those

Febronians* who advocate the separation of Church and State, and question the competency of the Church in the matter of penal justice, should rather question whether punishment can properly belong at all to the temporal power. We, who repudiate that Utopian separation, concede to governments the use of moral acts and force, and consequently, also, a true right to punish. But *how much more* must we claim it for the Church, as it properly belongs *entirely* to the spiritual order? All the arguments of our opponents may be summed up in one, viz.: that spiritual acts cannot be compelled by external force. But *this sophism* includes two errors, of which the first is, that the Church ought to confine herself to acts which are spiritual in their *entity*. But when we speak of the Church as a spiritual power, imposing spiritual acts, we do not speak of their *entity*, but of their *aim*; and the power of the Church, and the acts commanded by her, are called spiritual, because they have spiritual ends, (as above explained,) although done in material things and by material (*materiati*) men. The second error lies in assuming that punishment aims directly to produce a spiritual act, which, on the contrary, it can only effect indirectly. Its direct aim is to afflict the sensitive part of man, and thus make him abandon the occasion of the affliction. This aim being a moral one, there is nothing to exclude it from the competency of the Church.†

"Our second question was, (To what extent) *may the Church make use of severity?* Here also we answer, that the aim, of itself, does not impose any limits. For, as the spiritual good is the greatest of all goods, therefore everything, allowed for other smaller goods, must be allowed for the greatest. And as it is a universal law of punishment that the infliction be not greater than necessary, nor less than sufficient, the spiritual authority must be entitled, *a fortiori*, to everything conceded to the temporal power.

"The conclusion is, therefore, that there are no limits to the exercise of the coercive power of the Church, either in view of her means, or of her aim.

"If we find no limits in the means of the Church to forbid her

* The Jansenists and liberal Catholics of Germany were called *Febronians*, from Justin Febronius, (Hontheim,) who wrote a work, *De Statu Ecclesiæ et legitima potestate Rom. pontificis*, (Frankfort, 1763-74, 4 parts, 4to.,) which has been several times reprinted, abridged, and translated.—Ed.

† Mr. Chandler, in his recent speech in Congress, denies, indignantly, that the "power of the pope extends one grain beyond his spiritual relations with the members of his Church." How easily and irresistibly does the Jesuit's text bring all possible relations within the category of spiritual those who admit the infallibility of the Church!—Ed.

the use of a just severity in punishing, let us now see whether we can derive such a limit from the spirit with which the Saviour has comforted her in proportion with the aim for which she was established by him. Here, indeed, is the great battle-field whereon our adversaries plant in array all their forces, drawing forth from their arsenals everything they know of and do not know of, to show that the Church, as a pious mother, must not get angry or provoke the indignation of her sons.* This custom of playing the schoolmaster, with reference to the Church, has become very common now-a-days, and even Catholics sometimes do not shrink from taking part in it, not considering how much such an arrogance is unbecoming every subject, and that it is irreligious and impious, if declared against a superior, appointed and guided by the Divine Paraclete.†

"But if the Church is a pious mother, she is not on that account a stupid one; she will not, in order to obtain from her children a kiss, a caress, or a flattery, let them uncautiously break their necks. The Church, if full of compassion, is also the bride of that Divine Spirit which admonishes the parent that really loves his child not to spare the rod. These writers cannot, without turning Protestants, arrogate to themselves the right to teach the Church the true sense of the gospel, and the duties of Christian meekness. If our adversaries would bring forward only philosophic reasons to show that the Church has no penal right, they might be wrong; but they would not thereby make themselves ridiculous. But when we see a physician or a lawyer, dressed up and perfumed, coming from a coffee-saloon, after losing a few games at billiards, and enjoying himself with punch and ice, and commencing a sermon on Christian meekness against the priest-party, then, indeed, in order to keep from laughing, we have to recollect that the man curses like a Turk, and disguises himself like a hypocrite. Away, gentlemen; if you are Catholics, revere the Church, and learn from her what are the just limits of Christian meekness, between the stupidity which punishes nothing, and anger which seeks, not the amendment of the culprit and the preservation of social order, but satisfaction of passion. If you are heretics, confess it freely, and we shall know how to judge

* Nuytz, p. 72. [Nuytz is the well-known Professor of Canonical Law at the University of Turin, whose work on *Jus Canonicum* was put into the Index, because it confines the right of the Church to merely spiritual affairs. The bishops of Sardinia demanded his removal from his chair, which was, however, refused by the state government.—Ed.]

† It is with such gentle rebukes that the Gallicans must constantly put up in these days of Ultramontanism and Jesuitism. Yet Mr. Chandler appears to believe that Gallicanism is Romanism!—Ed.

of your interpretations of the gospel, and will answer you : *Ne sutor ultra crepidam*, (shoemaker, stick to your last.)

"We leave it, then, to the Church to determine to what extent she can or must be severe. She has spoken long since, she has declared that she never will be reduced to shed the blood of her enemies any more than that of her children. But if a Catholic government, desirous of preserving among its subjects those sentiments of religion and that honesty of conscience which secure obedience to the laws, *reliance upon one's word, honesty to contracts, inviolability of marriages, peace to families, honour to the citizens, assistance to the wretched, and, in general, all those duties on which depend happiness and social order, should declare that the duties of a Catholic are regarded as a law of the state, and that an infringement upon them is to be punished as an infringement upon this law ; then, certainly, it belongs to the Church to declare to what extent Catholicism has been offended, of which she alone can be a competent judge ; but she will leave it to the lay judge to determine the punishment in the civil order.*

"This, however—may the enemies of the Church remember it—*this is voluntary moderation on the part of the Church, not a right conceded to anybody to check her.* The Church is meek, because this is her spirit, *not as if she, being a spiritual society, has no RIGHT TO PUNISH, EVEN WITH BLOOD OR WITH DEATH.* The synagogue was a spiritual society, and established by the same God who afterward substituted for it the Church—a God of infinite goodness in establishing the first as well as in substituting the second. Now the synagogue did not shrink from dealing with the sword, and from those first Levites who sanctified for the Lord their right hand, cutting down the fornicators, down to those last Maccabean priests who, by killing the idolater at the altar, 'in accordance with the precept of the law,' vindicated for the holy people the liberty of their temple and sacrifices, there extends a series of formidable punishments ordered by the Spirit of God, and apt to convey quite another idea of divine goodness and the right of spiritual society, than that which the slanderers of the Church and apostles of philanthropy would like to canonize. According to them, every material punishment, every material coercion, is interdicted to the Church ; and because she is a spiritual society, the material means of coercion are not allowed. Then only will it be allowed to her when she has got the means from the civil government. Ah ! then, to be sure, the scruples of Christian meekness lose their stings, and their gospel finds no difficulty in fashioning itself after the state law.

EPILOGUE.

"You see, reader, how inconsistent those are who, presupposing the right of man to confer a coercive power to an authority, deny it to the Church, who is the most voluntary of all associations; inconsistent, if worshipping a primitive Church fashioned by their own imagination, they wish to force the Church to have recourse to the princes who were the oppressors of the primitive Church; inconsistent, if professing to be Catholics, they refuse the dogmatic *Bulls* which, for centuries, the whole Church has accepted; inconsistent, if recognising the imperishableness of the pure Church, they wish to deprive her of the means to be imperishable; inconsistent, if recognising the proneness of human wickedness to trample under foot reason and faith, *they pretend that the Church ought to reduce human passion to order by those spiritual means which have a worth only for reason and faith*; inconsistent, if confessing finally, from despair, that the Church may excommunicate the obstinate, *they pretend that the excommunication does not produce its natural effects, and thus that they need not accept the smaller afflicting punishments*; inconsistent, if recognising in the Church the right to hurl her excommunication against the obstinate, to permit, at the same time, the obstinate to annul the excommunication; inconsistent, if professing to be obedient sons and disciples of the Church, they arrogate to themselves to teach the Church the true spirit of the gospel, which they have to learn from her:—in short, everything in them is inconsistency. And must not man be inconsistent, if he revolt against God? They are inconsistent, whether as philosophers or theologians, as lawyers or canonists, as libertines or royalists, as philanthropists or stoics, as Catholics or heretics. They are in a labyrinth, from which there is no outlet.

"If they wish to find their way out of it, let them show that the Church may sustain herself as an external and visible society, without attempts on the part of human passions to disturb the external order; or let them suggest efficient and sufficient means to change the nature of human passions, always prone to extravagance, without requiring a reaction on the part of society. Until we find this out, *we shall have to allow the Church to use those means, without which she cannot subsist, and to make each one who does not listen to authority and reason, listen to the impression of a sensible punishment.*"

ART. VIII.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) THE General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, at its session in 1848, requested the Rev. Dr. Elliott to write a history of the Church from 1844 to 1848, authorizing him to have "access to all the journals and documents of the Church" that might be necessary. In going at his work Dr. Elliott found himself everywhere confronted with slavery, and therefore took up the discussion of that subject in two preliminary volumes on "The Sinfulness of American Slavery," which appeared in 1850, and were noticed in this journal, (vol. xxxiv, p. 311,) as containing a "complete repertory of facts and arguments on the subject of slavery in its relations to the moral law." Pursuing the discussion with the same exhaustless faculty of labour, the author now presents us with the "*History of the Great Secession from the Methodist Episcopal Church in the Year 1845, eventuating in the Organization of the New Church, entitled the Methodist Episcopal Church, South.*" (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Poe, 1855; large 8vo., pp. 1144.) In preparing this volume the writer has lost sight of no work, pamphlet, or even newspaper article of any value, bearing on the question. The account given in the preface of the method on which the work has been done, and of the labour spent upon it, would delight the heart of a thorough-bred German professor of the old school. The "standpoint" of the book is given in the following words:—

"The Methodist Episcopal Church, South, in these pages is called 'a secession from the Methodist Episcopal Church,' and the word secession is used in its plain, simple meaning, of a separation from the Methodist Episcopal Church, by the sole act of the seceders themselves, without authority, sanction, or approval by the Methodist Episcopal Church. It cannot be considered, we believe, other than a violent secession, originating without necessity or adequate cause, carried on by wrong measures, pleaded for by raising fallacious issues, and when completed comprising several dangerous elements. The Methodist Episcopal Church, South, stands, therefore, in the same relation to the Methodist Episcopal Church, and to the British Wesleyans, that the Methodist Protestant Church, and the followers of Mr. Scott in America, and other Methodist bodies in Europe do. The parent bodies do not stand in antagonism to these new bodies; though they do not become identified with them any more than with other Protestant Churches. Nevertheless, it is readily conceded, that a secession from a Church may be justifiable, when based on Scriptural principles, when conducted in a Christian manner, and when it is calculated to promote the salvation of souls. Our southern brethren attempt to make these pleas, and they maintain that their cause is just. Thus the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, are now at issue. In the following pages we have endeavoured to present the truth of history. Yet we do not forget that we are identified with the Methodist Episcopal Church so intimately that our version of the whole will admit of scrutiny. We expect this scrutiny, and intend to meet it, by admitting errors whenever clearly pointed out; and leaving all the means of detection in the materials which we have deposited in a safe place to be used for this, as well as for other purposes."

As to the propositions that have been made for changing the present general rule on slavery, Dr. Elliott expresses himself as follows:—

"Some suppose the Methodist Episcopal Church itself is in rather a perilous condition in regard to slavery. A few persons in her pale are disposed to rem-

edy the supposed evil by changing the General Rule on slavery, and make other changes to correspond to this. We are persuaded the principles of the Discipline on slavery cannot be changed, and that the present Rule, which is the same in substance as that adopted in 1784, is preserved to this day by no material variation from the original type. For the temporary and inconsiderate essay at one time to exclude all slaveholders never was established; just because it attempted an impossibility, and fixed on an unjust standard under the circumstances. The only thing that could now be done would be to place in the section on slavery a literal explanation of the General Rule. It is clear that the word *enslave*, in the Rule, does not mean to reduce free persons to slavery, just because neither buying nor selling, which the Rule includes, can take place till a person is first deprived of his liberty. Then in applying the Rule in any case of trial, there are two facts to be ascertained. The first, Has the person bought or sold? This being ascertained, the next fact is, Has liberty been accomplished by this act, either immediately or prospectively? If it has not, the person is guilty according to the Rule. The only exception to this is, in Methodist principles, where emancipation cannot be secured, that humanity and mercy have been exercised, and cruelty and injustice avoided. Freedom, when possible, is the rule; and in all cases mercy, justice, and right. But no trading in slaves is allowed, except to free or emancipate. The various proposed amendments to the Rule, some of them vague or unmeaning, others of them impracticable or unjust, show clearly that the present Rule is the only one that can stand the test among all the candidates for its place. Whatever additional regulations could be added to the section on slavery, for the more efficient instruction of slaves religiously and intellectually, would also be in place. But those amendments that have been proposed, from the suggestions of the recent abolition school, have little in them calculated to benefit the slaves; while most of them would prove ruinous. Such amendments have, by way of contrast, a sort of offset in the course of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, which has explained away the General Rule, and excluded the entire section."

We trust that Dr. Elliott's great and valuable labours will be duly appreciated, and that our preachers, and all others interested, will buy this volume, and inform themselves thoroughly from it as to the merits of the question.

(2.) "*The World in the Middle Ages*, by A. D. KOEPPEN, Professor of History in Franklin-Marshall College." (New-York: D. Appleton & Co., 1854; folio, pp. 232.) This belongs to a class of books for which, heretofore, American students have always had to look to Germany. Lest "nativism" should boast too loudly, however, it must be stated that Professor Koeppen is a Dane by birth, and that his education was obtained in lands where the means of culture are far more abundant than they can be in a new country like ours. Whatever else "Know-Nothingism" may accomplish, we hope it will not prevent foreigners like the author of this book, who "know something," from coming "over to help us." The work is a concise but systematic historical geography of the middle ages, giving an account of the origin and development, the institutions and literature, the manners and customs of the nations of Europe, Western Asia and Northern Africa, from the close of the fourth to the middle of the fifteenth century. What is even more important to American students than the text, the work contains six coloured maps, illustrating the political divisions of the world at the six most important epochs of the history. The maps are taken from the historical atlas of Spruner, well known for their painstaking accuracy. If there were no text at all, the maps alone would be worth more than the price of the whole work to students of history. We commend

the work to the attention of all our readers who wish to understand the history of the middle ages; or even that of modern Europe, which rests entirely upon it.

(3.) AMONG all the modern saints of the Church of Rome, there is not one held in higher estimation than Liguori, though his canonization only took place in 1839. His life has been published in various forms; one of the best is, "*The Life of St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori*," (Baltimore: Murphy & Co., 1855; 12mo., pp. 594,) which is compiled from the one given in the series of "*Lives of the Saints*," edited by the Fathers of the Oratory in England. It gives copious details of the personal and public history of Alphonsus; setting forth his piety, zeal, asceticism, and success in the most ample, not to say prolix way. The book tells of far more miracles than the Bible does: Christ and his apostles were far more chary of interfering with the order of nature than Liguori, both before and after his death. It is our purpose to present to our readers hereafter a fuller view of the subject, in an article or two on Liguori and his Moral Theology.

(4.) "*The Footsteps of St. Paul*" (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1855; 12mo., pp. 416) is an "attempt at a consecutive history of the great apostle to the Gentiles, adapted for younger students and for general readers." The compiler has made excellent use of the many valuable works that have recently appeared on the subject—especially of Conybeare and Howson's great work—selecting such parts as are adapted for the purpose with much judgment, and weaving them skilfully into a continuous and graphic narration.

(5.) *A Review of Unitarian Views*, by the Rev. H. M. DENISON, A. M." (Louisville: Morton & Griswold, 1854; 12mo., pp. 155.) The "Unitarian Views" alluded to in the title of this excellent little volume were originally set forth in a published report of a committee of the "Conference of Western Unitarian Churches," held at Louisville, May 1, 1854. The conference, believing itself to have no right to issue any statement of belief as authoritative, or "as a declaration of Unitarian faith, other than the New Testament itself," did not adopt the report, but yet so far sanctioned it as to order it to be printed. It rejects the deity of Christ, the humanity of Christ, the deity and personality of the Holy Ghost, the atonement and original sin, and attempts arguments, historical, metaphysical, and exegetical, against all of them. Mr. Denison, in very brief space, shows that the three gentlemen who made the report have, to some extent at least, corrupted history, invented metaphysics, and perverted exegesis, to suit their purpose. The book will furnish an admirable manual to put into the hands of young persons likely to be exposed to Socinian or Arian sophistries.

(6.) It was a remark of Dr. Dwight, that "the man who should show to common minds the connexion between colleges and the interests of the Church, would be a benefactor to his species." This benefactor has been found, and

has done his work in "*Prayer for Colleges; a Premium Essay*, by W. S. TYLER, Professor of Greek in Amherst College." (New-York: M. W. Dodd, 1855; 12mo., pp. 214.) A benevolent individual, some years ago, placed at the disposal of the Society for the Promotion of Collegiate and Theological Education at the West, the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars, to be given to the author of the best essay on "PRAYER FOR COLLEGES." A competent committee, after examining thirty-two manuscripts, awarded the prize to Professor Tyler's essay. The "prize" system has seldom brought forth so good a book. It divides the subject into two parts: (1.) Prayer in General; and (2.) Prayer for Colleges. To the first of these the author devotes three chapters of his work, justly remarking that it would be of little avail to present colleges as a special object of prayer, unless Christians in general can be brought to a higher appreciation of the efficacy of prayer than seems now to exist in the Church. The remaining eleven chapters treat of the origin and history of colleges, and their close and inevitable connexion with popular education on the one hand and with the ministry on the other. These topics are set forth with great fulness of knowledge and amplitude of illustration. It is shown, too, that colleges, instead of being hotbeds of vice, as many suppose, are in fact, as their history in this country abundantly shows, nurseries of piety; and that the number of young men "ruined" at college bears no proportion to those "ruined" at home or in the walks of trade. We hope the book will obtain a wide circulation, not only among college men, but among readers of all classes.

(7.) ALEXANDER CARSON was in some respects the Ewald of British theologians: his hand was against every man. Like Ewald, too, he brought heavy metal to bear against his adversaries; nor was mercy ever among his attributes. The latest volume of his works, as republished here, contains three treatises, namely, "*Examination of the Principles of Biblical Interpretation of Ernesti, Stuart, Ammon, &c.*," a "*Treatise on Figures of Speech*," and a "*Treatise on the Right and Duty of all Men to read the Scriptures*." (New-York: E. H. Fletcher, 1855; 12mo., pp. 468.) The collocation of this last with the others is singular: and in this, as in other respects, the book sadly evinces a want of careful editing. The Greek quotations are inaccurately printed; there is no table of contents—no index of subjects or of texts—in short, no aid whatever to the use of the book for any purpose but bare reading through. It is really too bad that valuable books should be got up in this style; and we shall never cease to protest against it. The first treatise is in the highest degree characteristic of the author. He attacks Ernesti; he crushes Ammon; he abuses Stuart; and, in truth, he generally has right on his side, with all the cruelty of his blows. But in this, as in all his controversial writings, Dr. Carson's dogmatism and arrogance detract greatly from the effect of his arguments. He is often right—often wrong; but whether right or wrong, he is equally self-confident.

(8.) "*Art, Scenery, and Philosophy in Europe, being Fragments from the Portfolio of the late H. B. WALLACE*." (Philadelphia: H. Hooker, 1855; 12mo., pp. 345.) Our opinion of the intellectual rank of Mr. Wallace was

given in a former number of this journal, (January, 1854, p. 132.) The volume before us, though made up chiefly of fragments of manuscripts left unfinished by the deceased, amply sustains that opinion. Few American writers have shown so much clearness of intellectual vision, with so wide and so varied culture, as this book displays. It consists substantially of art-criticisms of the highest order—resting on principles which are admirably set forth in several preliminary essays on “Art as an Emanation of Religious Affection,” “Art Symbolical, not Imitative,” on the “Law of the Development of Gothic Architecture,” and on the “Principle of Beauty in Works of Art.” Then follows a series of graphic and delicate descriptions of all the great cathedrals of continental Europe. A journal of visits to Netley Abbey, to the Roman Forum, and to Vesuvius, with brief notes of a town in Switzerland, is conceived in the same spirit. The remainder of the volume is chiefly made up of remarks upon the great painters: Michael Angelo, Leonardo da Vinci, Bartolommeo, Perugino, and Raffaele. No one can read these fragments without echoing the language of G. F. H. in this journal, (July, 1854, p. 453:) “I would rather feed upon the broken bread from such a table than upon the stalled oxen of such pompous and imbecile philosophers as Whewell, Morell, and the juvenile eclectics, French, English, or American.” There are a few passages in the book, in which Mr. Wallace speaks of the Roman Catholic Church, with the spirit of which we cannot sympathize.

(9.) AN ambitious title injures even a good book. Such is the case with “*The Problem solved, or Sin not of God*, by M. P. SQUIER, D. D.” (New-York: M. W. Dodd, 1855; 12mo., pp. 255.) Had the book appeared as a contribution to our investigations into the greatest mystery of humanity, it would have met with a reception better commensurate with its merits than it is now likely to get. The gist of the book lies in the proposition that sin arises from finite agency, “possessing, inherently, the attributes of real cause, originating its own plans.” Of course, in order to maintain this proposition, the author has to repudiate the Edwardian metaphysics and the theology grounded upon it. Dr. Squier has an acute and penetrating analysis, and puts forth his views with a good method and in most perspicuous language.

(10.) “*Discourses on Truth, delivered in the Chapel of South Carolina College*, by JAMES H. THORNWELL, D. D.” (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1855; 12mo., pp. 328.) This is a series of discourses preached in the ordinary routine of Dr. Thornwell’s ministrations as chaplain of the South Carolina College. Blessed is the college in which such services are “ordinary.” The ethics of Christianity, resting upon a sure religious ground, are here drawn out with admirable clearness of method and exhibited in a style at once pure, perspicuous and forcible, to an extent rare in these days of extravagant writing.

(11.) WE must give the praise of good intention, at least, to “*The Dream of Pythagoras, and Other Poems*, by EMMA TATHAM.” (London: Binns & Goodwin: 18mo., pp. 165.) The rhymed portions of the volume are better than the blank verse.

(12.) "*Discoveries in Chinese*, by STEPHEN PEARL ANDREWS." (New-York: C. B. Norton, 1854; 12mo., pp. 136.) This is a very curious and suggestive book. The Chinese language has heretofore been considered (at least by all outside barbarians) as a vast jungle of symbols, bristling with unmeaning knots, thorns and projections of all kinds, apparently of no use except to hinder the progress of any one attempting to penetrate the thicket from the outside. Mr. Andrews thinks he has found a clue to this labyrinth in an analysis of the characters, which strikes us, to say the least, as exceedingly ingenious. The task to be accomplished, as he states it, is to "rediscover the original emblems of which the whole written language was composed, and tracing each through all its combinations with the rest." A proper adjustment of the phonetic and symbolic elements of the language will, it is clear, reduce it to system; if system it has. We confess our inability to judge of the practical value of the book; but, *a priori*, we cannot but put a high estimate upon a theory so striking, and on general philosophical grounds so obviously just. We hope all our missionaries and students of Chinese will have their attention called to this remarkable book.

(13.) "*The Meaning of Words*, by A. B. JOHNSON." (New-York: D. Appleton & Co., 1854; 12mo., pp. 256.) Some years ago Mr. Johnson published a "*Treatise on Language*," (1836, 8vo., Harpers,) which excited some attention from its acuteness of thought and boldness of assertion. In the present work he takes back or modifies his former theories. His object is to show that all words, in all languages, are either "verbal or un verbal;" that is, they either denote *other* words, or else denote *things*; and that various important consequences flow from this distinction. The work is worthy the attention of all students of philosophy.

(14.) "*A Cyclopædia of Missions*, by the Rev. HARVEY NEWCOMB." (New-York: C. Scribner, 1854; 8vo., pp. 784.) This copious volume contains a large amount of valuable matter. It gives, in alphabetical order, accounts of all the principal missions and mission stations throughout the world, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant. The work aims at catholicity; "giving to every mission the degree of prominence to which it is properly entitled by its age, importance, and success, without respect to the denomination of Christians which supports it." Writers belonging to the various Churches have been employed to prepare the accounts of their several missions. The volume brings down the history and results of missionary operations to the present time. The value of such a work is abundantly obvious: no library can be at all complete without it. We are bound, in duty, however, to say that the vast stores of information contained in the book, are, for purposes of reference, to a great extent, locked up by the *want of an index*. The book has therefore not half its real value and usefulness. There is not even a list of the maps, with references to the pages where they may be found; so that if one wishes to consult a particular map, he must search the volume for it. We are glad to learn that these defects are to be remedied in a new edition.

(15.) THE late Rev. Edward Bickersteth was the type of quite a large class of preachers in the Church of England—devout, industrious, zealous, worthy of all praise as a labourer, but of very small capacity as a writer. Yet he made books with great rapidity; hardly a year was without its volume or volumes; all pious, all praiseworthy in their aim; but all feeble. The last book bearing his name that we have seen (and the last we hope to see) is "*Condensed Notes on Scripture*;" (London: Seeley, 1854, pp. 658;) a huge volume made up of the manuscript sermons and skeletons left behind by Mr. Bickersteth. There are many sound practical sermons in the volume; but better are preached by unnamed men every Sunday, and (wisely) left unprinted.

(16.) "*The Chart of Life, indicating the Dangers and Securities of the Voyage to Immortality*, by the Rev. JAMES PORTER, A. M." (Boston: J. P. Jewett & Co., 1855; 18mo., pp. 259,) is an excellent practical manual for young men. It treats of the dangers of scepticism, of social life, of trade, &c., with clearness and earnestness. The several lines of Christian activity are pointed out, and all excuse for indolence and inactivity taken away. The book is eminently calculated to be useful, and we hope it will have a wide circulation.

(17.) "*The World a Workshop: or, The Physical Relationship of Man to the Earth*, by THOMAS EWBANK." (New-York: D. Appleton & Co.; 12mo., pp. 197.) The object of this book is to show that the earth was "designed and literally fitted up for the cultivation and application of chemical and mechanical science as the basis of human development." In the view of some men the world is a victualling-house; for others it is a show-room or a lounging-place; for others a hospital; and for others, again, a hunting-field: but Mr. Ewbank makes it a *general factory*. It is easy to see into how many channels a proposition like this may run, and how many valuable lines of thought may be made to centre in it. He shows that the earth was made for man, as a worker in given matter, by a consideration, first, of the general features, faces, &c., of the earth; and, secondly, of man, his structure, instincts, and achievements. A third section is devoted to certain erroneous views of man and of matter. Mr. Ewbank is a clear, straightforward writer, who knows what he has to say, and says it. If he makes too much of matter and its uses, it is very certain that others have made too little; and the lesson which he gives is one suited to the times. He has sought to make this book acceptable to Christian and even orthodox minds: but an occasional subdud sneer intimates his *animus* to be, after all, not in harmony with evangelical religion.

(18.) "*The Doctrines and Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South*." (Nashville: Stevenson & Owen, 1854; pp. 267.) This volume differs from the Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church, both by certain significant omissions and by certain additions. The section on slavery is thrown out entirely; the band rules are expunged, and wisely; the special directions under the head of "Dress," about high "heads, enormous bonnets,

ruffles, and rings," &c., are expunged, and only a general rule against "superfluous ornaments" takes their place. Certain words of the ritual, supposed to imply the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, are also omitted.

(19.) "*Campbellism examined*, by JEREMIAH B. JETER." (New-York: Sheldon, Lamport & Blakeman, 1855; 12mo., pp. 369.) Mr. Jeter has enjoyed peculiar opportunities of observing Campbellism in its rise and progress, and has made good use of them. He shows its narrowness, exclusiveness, and inconsistency in the most thorough way and from the most authentic documents. A little more skill in the arrangement of his matter, and a more concise style, would help the book very much. Mr. Jeter writes from the Baptist stand-point, and uses the peculiar dialect of the Baptists in a way that is sometimes offensive to other Christians.

(20.) SOME years since, in a gentle criticism of GEORGE GILFILLAN, we pronounced him "a literary quack." In the preface to his "*Third Gallery of Portraits*," (New-York: Sheldon, Lamport & Blakeman, 1855; 12mo., pp. 468,) he tells us that "his mind no more than his pen have stood still during the last eight letters." In fact, we think he *has* mended somewhat; he is now only in part a charlatan. Now and then he shows some sign of a critical faculty; but in the main, his sketches, whether of books or men, are mere accumulations of *words* about the subject, rather than dissections or elucidations.

(21.) "*Christianity and Statesmanship, with Kindred Topics*, by WILLIAM HAGUE, D. D." (New-York: E. H. Fletcher; 12mo., pp. 429.) We seldom have the privilege of commending a book of essays on topics of present interest so heartily as we can this volume of Dr. Hague's. In matter it rests upon a profound view of Christian truth and of the human mind to which that truth is addressed: in spirit, it is full of the hopeful element which a belief in the progress of the race inspires, while it indulges no vain fancies of the capacity of humanity for improving itself without divine aid: in style, it is manly, clear, vigorous, and scholarly. In our judgment the ablest of the essays is the last, on "Christianity and Slavery," in which Dr. Hague treats the supposed silence of Christ and the apostles on the subject of slavery better than we have ever seen it treated elsewhere.

(22.) "*A South-side View of Slavery*, by NEHEMIAH ADAMS, D. D." (Boston: T. R. Marvin, 1854; 12mo., pp. 214.) This book is a more marvellous phenomenon than the life of Barnum. A northern Christian minister writes a volume substantially in defence of African slavery: and his line of argument is, in a nutshell, that he spent three months "*at the south*," (to use his own provincial phrase;) and that the slaves, so far as he could see, were generally well-treated, comfortable, sleek and contented. It is true that Dr. Adams disclaims defending slavery, and makes admissions now and then that sap his whole structure at the base. He accomplishes nothing except making a display of his own amiable weakness.

(23.) "*Mornings with Jesus*, by the Rev. WILLIAM JAY," (London: J. F. Shaw; 18mo., pp. 500,) contains a series of brief devotional readings for every day in the year, prepared from notes (left in manuscript) of sermons preached by Mr. Jay during the last twenty-five years. They abound in the warmth of Christian feeling and felicity of Scripture illustration that characterized the similar works put forth during the life-time of their venerable author. It is proper to say, however, that the members of Mr. Jay's family who reside in America have issued a statement declaring that they "knew nothing of the origin of said work, and have remonstrated in vain against its publication. All that the Rev. William Jay prepared for the press has already appeared; consequently they do not recognise in any way the authenticity of the new volume which has been so clandestinely presented to the public."



(24.) "*Shakspeare's Scholar*, by RICHARD GRANT WHITE." (New-York: D. Appleton & Co., 1854; 8vo., pp. 504.) Mr. White is an enthusiastic Shakspearean. He gives in his preface, singularly enough, as one of his credentials as a critic of Shakspeare, the fact that his earliest studies of Shakspeare were made in *editions without notes*. This is something like Sydney Smith's plea for not reading books before reviewing them—"it prejudices one so." But Mr. White has made acquaintance with the critics since arriving at manhood, if not before, and he gives us in this book the results of his reading, and of his own historical and critical studies of the text. Many of his notes are ingenious and acute.



(25.) MESSRS. C. S. FRANCIS & Co. have published a new edition of "*The Poets and Poetry of Europe*, by H. W. LONGFELLOW," (1855, 8vo., pp. 779.) To those who are acquainted with this admirable book, it will be enough for us to say, that it is the only volume entitled to the name of a collection of the poets of all lands. It contains translations from ten different languages—the Anglo-Saxon, Icelandic, Danish, Swedish, German, Dutch, French, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese. The materials are arranged, first nationally, and then chronologically; the most convenient form, by far, for the use of ordinary readers. The purchaser of this compact book will find it the *best* English version of specimens of the best poets in the above languages; material that would otherwise have to be sought through hundreds of volumes, and which, indeed, may be said, for common readers, to be altogether inaccessible.



(26.) "*The Calvinistic Doctrine of Predestination examined and refuted*, by FRANCIS HODGSON, D. D." (Philadelphia: Higgins & Perkinpine, 1855; 18mo., pp. 131.) This small volume gives the substance of three discourses delivered by Dr. Hodgson in St. George's Church, Philadelphia. In the first, he cites various Calvinistic writers as complaining that their system is misrepresented by Arminians, and gives the outlines of the system itself in the words of Calvinistic authorities; in the second, he examines the theory in the light of Scripture and reason; and in the third, he sets forth the true and Scriptural doctrine of predestination. No man is more competent for this kind of discussion than Dr. Hodgson: his analysis is acute and thorough; his logic well-

jointed throughout; his style clear, nervous, and vigorous. We must confess our surprise, on learning from his first discourse, that the "Presbyterian Board of Publication" sanctions such statements as are therein cited from their issues. It can hardly be possible, we should think, that the intelligent men who conduct that institution have read all the books offered to them by recent writers before putting them to press.

(27.) "*Irish Stories*." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1855; pp. 285.) This little book is one of the most attractive ever issued from the Sunday-school press. It has all the beauty of a fairy tale, and a better moral than fairy tales can have.

(28.) "*Israel in the World*, by WILLIAM H. JOHNSTONE, M. A." (London: J. F. Shaw, 1854; 18mo., pp. 195.) The object of this book is to exhibit the influence of the Hebrews upon the progress of the human race, and especially upon the four great military monarchies of antiquity. Mr. Johnstone makes the Jews, in fact, a sort of touchstone for all nations: if they treat the Jews well, they prosper; if not, they decay. He applies this test closely, even to the modern European nations: he believes in the future restoration of the Jews to Palestine, and in the personal and corporeal reign of Christ upon the earth. Like every other Adventist (so called) he writes at once earnestly and dogmatically.

(29.) "*The Great Journey*," (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1855; 18mo.) is another "echo of Pilgrim's Progress," but not so faint a one as most of its predecessors. A much neater edition is published by Carlton & Phillips, (square 12mo.,) in which certain Calvinistic views of the author are "either thrown out" or modified.

(30.) "*Parish and other Pencillings*, by KIRWAN," (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1854; 12mo., pp. 272,) contains a number of brief articles on miscellaneous topics, some of which have been published before in the newspapers. There are some exquisite sketches of pastoral experience in the volume; but the sharpest and best papers are those which touch on Romanism. One of these, on "Bedini, the Papal Nuncio," is in the best vein of the author of the "Letters to Bishop Hughes."

(31.) A NEW edition of "*The Trials of True Godliness*, by BENJAMIN KEACH," (18mo., pp. 215,) has been published by the American Baptist Publication Society. It is not a very successful allegory, but abounds in practical and pungent reproofs and exhortations to careless sinners.

(32.) "*Detached Thoughts and Apophthegms from the Writings of ARCHBISHOP WHATELY*," (London: Blackader, 1854; 18mo., pp. 187,) is a little book, but full of wisdom. No writer is more rich in comprehensive and suggestive maxims, and in lucid though brief statements of great principles, than Archbishop Whately. It was an excellent thought of the compiler of this little volume to gather some of these pregnant passages together, and offer them in a neat and commodious shape.